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ABSTRACT 
Significant changes in attitudes toward farm policy and trade have occurred within the 
European Union and the United States in the past decade. Trade negotiations under the General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) specifically the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and 
later under the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have bought about 
considerable changes in the market structure in the cereals trade. Bilateral trade has further been 
impacted by the cessation of concession treaties like the Blair House Accord that expired at the 
end of the 2004 marketing year (WTO).  
Domestic budget pressures in the United States have lead to decreased support to 
farmers, making them more oriented to world market needs based on prevailing world prices 
(Daryll E. Ray). The European Union has introduced reforms in the Common Agricultural Policy 
as a consequence of high budgetary expenditure and the accession of the ten new central 
European nations into the European Union in the form of the Mac Sharry Reforms and the 
Agenda 2000 Reforms. These reforms are now aimed at decreasing the distortions caused due to 
the high amount of protection for farm income thus moving towards more targeted farm 
programs. 
These economy wise changes internal to each of these major players in agricultural 
trade in the world, coupled with transformed bilateral trade relations under the auspices of the 
WTO have had vital effects on bilateral transactions and world markets. These reforms may have 
had compelling economy wise effects on consumption, production, trade and world prices and 
could subsequently provoke trade liberalization in other sectors based on the quantification and 
prediction of welfare effects of such measures by the two trading partners.  
 
 viii
This study is aimed at reviewing policy changes in the European Union’s Common 
Agricultural Policy and their effects on the cereal trade with the United States. The study 
contributes to estimating whether changes in the cereal policies of the EU have had a significant 
impact on the trade between the EU and the US. Further a forecast for the domestic prices for 
wheat in a free trade scenario is documented with an estimated trend for the exogenous variables. 
Results obtained from the suggest that the re-instrumentation of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) by the Mac Sharry Reforms of 1992 and the Agenda 2000 Reforms 
have had significant effects on trade between the U.S. and the fifteen member countries. The 
forecast for domestic prices in wheat for the EU suggest a period of decreased prices followed by 
an increased amount of imports of wheat. 
 ix
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
“In matters of trade and investment conflicts, cooperation and convergence have 
all characterized relations between the United States and the European Union. 
Liberalization under the auspices of the GATT/WTO and the OECD promoted 
convergence over the past half century but the forces of markets, culture and language 
were far more important than policies emanating from Washington, Brussels or other 
European countries. If policy had been the driver of convergence, long ago Europe and 
the United States would have created the first NAFTA – the North Atlantic Free Trade 
Area” (Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Reginald Jones, Federic Neumann 2002). 
There are major limitations to free trade between the United States and the 
European Union. Policies influenced by national and regional political forces, imperfect 
information, and ideological conflicts have restricted trade between these two major 
countries. Agricultural trade has thus been influenced by domestic policy mechanisms 
that are aimed at protecting farmer interests while distorting the world market and trade. 
Cereal trade between the United States and the European Union is one of the 
most complex matrices in world trade, characterized by policies aimed at supporting 
domestic producers while distorting the world prices as well as trade between these two 
dominant trading partners (characterizing the European Union as a single entity though it 
is more accurately an economic federation). 
Graph 1.1 depicts the U.S. share of cereal imports to the European Union1 
imports of cereals. Total cereal exports by the United States have declined over the past 
                                                 
1 The European Union  considered here is the EU – 15 unless specified otherwise. 
 1
couple of decade. Though the United States cereal exports still account for 25.6 percent2 
of the net cereal exports to the European Union with respect to the rest of the world, there 
has been a decrease in the amount traded compared to the pre – 1992 era (64 percent in 
1991). Wheat, Barley, Corn and Rice form the major cereals exported by the United 
States while Rye, Oats and Sorghum are minor cereals which collectively form a sizable 
amount of cereal trade. 
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Figure 1.1: Cereal Imports by U.S. compared to the Rest of the world3
This decrease in trade between the United States and the European Union is 
mainly attributed to the policy changes in both these major cereal trading entities. The 
1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR 1996), the 2002 Farm Bill  
of the United States and the Common Agricultural Policy reforms of the European Union 
vis-à-vis the Mac Sharry Reforms (1992), the Agenda 2000 Reforms (1999) and the Mid 
Term Review (MTR) of Agenda 2000 aimed at being GATT/WTO compliance have had 
major welfare and trade effects on agricultural trade in general and cereals specifically. 
The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) under the auspices of the GATT may have helped 
                                                 
2 Source: National Agricultural Statistical Service, USDA. 
3 Source: Eurostat – Internal and External Trade of the European Union 
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increase trade flows between the European Union and the United States. Bilateral cereal 
policies under the Blair House Accord of the AoA which amended the Dunkel draft and 
broke the impasse between both these trading partners helped decrease price distorting 
policies (Sharma). The Accord signed in November 1993 included a shelter from 
challenges for major cereal policies of both the United States and the European Union. 
The protection was conditional to there being no increase in subsidy payment increase 
from the 1989 baseline levels (Josling, Tangerman. and Warley, T.K). This clause may 
have also provided an impetus for a larger and freer bilateral trade between these trading 
partners.  
In light of domestic policy changes, modified economic forces such as exchange 
rates, and the evolution of bilateral trade agreements, cereal trade between the major 
importer (European Union) and the major exporter (United States) in the world could 
have many welfare effects apart from changes in the demand and supply elasticities and 
their effects on the world market of cereals. This thesis will construct a partial 
equilibrium model to determine such trade impacts and simulate alternate scenarios to 
predict trade flows between these two major agricultural trading entities.  
1.1. Problem Statement 
Significant changes in attitudes toward farm policy and trade have occurred in 
The United States and the European Union during the past decade. Trade negotiations 
under the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), specifically the Agreement 
on Agriculture (AoA) and later under the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), have brought about considerable changes in the market structure in agricultural 
trade in general and cereals in specific. Bilateral trade has further been impacted by the 
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cessation of concession treaties like the Blair House Accord that expired at the end of the 
2004 marketing year (WTO).  
Domestic budget pressures in the United States have lead to decreased support 
to farmers, making them more oriented to world market needs based on prevailing world 
prices (Ray). The European Union has introduced reforms in the Common Agricultural 
Policy as a consequence of budgetary pressures and the accession of ten central European 
nations into the European Union. These reforms are aimed at decreasing distortions 
resulting from the high levels of protection for farms income thus moving more towards 
targeted farm programs. 
These economy wise changes internal to each of these major players in the 
world agricultural trade, coupled with transformed bilateral trade relations under the 
auspices of the WTO have had vital effects on bilateral transactions and world markets. 
Cereals are one of the major sectors that have undergone domestic and trade reforms in 
both these partner entities. These reforms may have had compelling economy wise 
effects on consumption, production, trade and world prices and could provoke trade 
liberalization in other sectors based on the quantification and prediction of welfare effects 
of such measures by the two trading partners.  
Current issues of further liberalization in the agricultural sectors have created a 
demand from policy makers to quantify estimates of demand elasticities and forecasts for 
the future based on policy initiatives. The analysis of changes in elasticities of demand 
and forecasts based on policy changes and their significance could help make policy 
makers make better informed decisions on liberalizing other sectors of agriculture thus 
affecting better trade relations between the two trading entities. The analysis will also 
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help in determining if decoupled payments in cereals did have significant impacts on 
freer trade while providing price stabilities to both farmers and consumers. 
1.2. Problem Justification 
Previous quantitative assessments of the likely impacts of the recent reforms of 
the Common Agricultural Policy differ across empirical studies4. Differences in 
analytical results are mainly due to the way these policy instruments are taken into 
account vis-à-vis explicit modeling, implicit and ad valorem, the data used for analysis 
and the model used in explaining trade impacts due to these policy changes. 
Many earlier studies either accentuate on the welfare impact of these policy 
changes on the member countries of the European Union, thus abstracting the world trade 
scenario or take the European Union as a bloc to illustrate trade distortions between the 
European Union and other non-member countries. 
Since the United States is one of the largest exporters of cereals to the European 
Union, policy changes by the EU have significant effects on United States production, 
consumption and trade and vice versa. The termination of the Blair House Accord at the 
end of 2004 will have a huge impact on cereal trade between these two nations. In this 
background study of the effects of the changing agricultural policy of the European 
Union will find issues that are of vital significance for United States agriculture.  
                                                 
4 .  (a). Medium term Forecast and Simulation Model (SPEL/EU-MFSS) is a partial equilibrium 
characterization of the EU agricultural sector. 
 (b). The Food and Agricultural Policy research Institute (FAPRI) model is a recursive dynamic PE   
econometric model. 
     (c). The CAP Modeling and Accounting (CAPMAT) is a EU focused dynamic computable General 
Equilibrium model with emphasis on Agriculture and food processing. 
     (d)  Quest II is a macro econometric business cycle and growth model of the EU economy used to 
produce economy wide impact. 
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The thesis is aimed at predicting possible outcomes of these changes taking 
individual countries of the European Union into consideration rather than the European 
Union as a bloc. The study will analyze six commodities (Barley, Corn, Oats, Rye, and 
Wheat) and categorize trade among 16 regions (EU – 15 and the US), using a computable 
partial equilibrium model. Apart from these policy changes exchange rate effects have 
also been computed to determine their effects on the bilateral trade. Quantification and 
estimation of these policy changes and their impacts on trade will make policy makers 
make wiser decisions and understand domestic policy implications to both the consumers 
and producers in both the European Union and the United States. 
1.3. Review of Literature 
Benjamin; et al, (May 2003), evaluated the effect on the world cereal market 
under the new Common Agricultural reforms. They used the world econometric 
modeling of arable crop model (WEMAC) – an econometric, dynamic, multi product, 
non spatial5, partial equilibrium commodity model. They studied the effect of the 
European reforms in three scenarios – with no CAP reforms. With the mid term review 
and finally a totally decoupled scenario and simulated their effects until 2008. The study 
identifies the United States as the highest exporter of wheat to the European Union with a 
share of 28.9% of the total cereal exports to the European Union. They estimated that 
exports by the U.S. actually increased by 5.3% while imports decreased to 1.1%. The 
study considered behavioral equations of production, consumption, price linkages 
(especially the price transmission equations) stocks and trade flows for each of these 
regions apart from the European Union’s domestic policy instruments. The study also 
                                                 
5 Does not identify trade flows between one specific country or region 
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assumed a specific severability structure in the CAP. Thus allocation decisions were 
made in three stages: 
i.   Producers split total available area between fodder and arable crops. 
ii. Area under arable crops was allocated between industrial crops and cereals and 
oil seeds. 
iii.  Area under cereal and oil seed cultivation were demarcated among the crops 
The study was restricted to the third stage and assumed that the total area under 
the oil seeds and cereals is fixed but allocatable across various grains and oil seeds. 
Cereal area in the European Union under the baseline projections were found to increase 
due to higher direct payments. World prices compared to the European Union prices for 
wheat showed a higher increase. Under the Mid term scenario the study concluded that 
the area harvested and production in the European Union decreased slightly, it also 
predicted that the prices would decrease and the amount of cereal imports increased. 
Finally, the total decoupled scenario showed that the harvested area decreased further and 
world prices for wheat increased. Imports to the European Union were estimated to 
increase by 12% through 2009. The study concluded that the United States would under 
the mid-term scenario and the decoupled scenario increase the amount of cereal 
production and exports to the European Union. 
Thompson et al (November 2001) used a non-linear perfect substitutes, constant 
elasticities, one commodity, two region partial equilibrium market model for the 
European Union, rest of the world wheat market. The study was aimed at assessing the 
impact of reform of the CAP on wheat prices and the economic welfare in the European 
Union. The study took into consideration policy changes that included the 1992 Mac 
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Sharry reforms, the Uruguay Round of Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) and the first 
effects of the Agenda 2000. Aggregate welfare effects and the distribution of gains and 
losses among producers, consumers and the European Union’s budget were evaluated. 
Offsetting effects of the reduced price supports and direct producer payments on producer 
welfare were also assessed. The study does not explicitly model individual agricultural 
policy instruments like the set-aside policy, intervention price, hectare and set- aside 
premia of direct payments, co-responsibility levies, variable import levies, import tariffs 
and export subsidies. Intra European Union trade was also excluded from this study. The 
EU-1518 was only taken into consideration. The study used the USDA – Economic 
Research Service (ERS) data for world wheat market prices, production and supply. 
German producers served as a proxy for EU prices. A comparative study was done using 
pre and post 1992 data. The study estimated that consumers gain, producers lose without 
hectare premia payments while they gain when these payments are considered. Budgetary 
costs increase and the net welfare change are positive. Government expenditure was 
found to be less than welfare gains of producers and consumers and the study also 
observed that producers were over compensated with the direct payments for policy 
induced price reductions. The study finally concluded that the maximum impact of the 
post 1992 CAP reforms was on price levels and not on price stability.  
Philippidis et al., studied the welfare effects of the Agenda 2000 reforms of the 
CAP on member countries. The study aggregated the database into two components – 
regions of developed countries and less developed countries along with the European 
Union’s 15 member countries. They developed a 16 sector 17 region Global trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) model to study the welfare effects and additional budgetary 
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allocation. They analyzed the welfare effects by employing the standard, multi-region 
GTAP comparative states framework with modifications to represent CAP interventions, 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) and macro economic projections. 
The study compared the full implementation of the URAA, comparing 
projections up to 2008 with simulations incorporating the Agenda 2000 reforms. Using 
these, they estimated the change in output, land use, retail prices, economic welfare and 
agricultural incomes in the EU apart from budgetary expenses due to implementation of 
the Agenda 2000 reforms. 
The results of this study showed that welfare effects on individual member 
states differ considerably. The output of cereals, oil seeds and cattle falls, while output of 
pigs, poultry and milk increase. Oil seed production is replaced by cereal production due 
to the higher amount of compensatory payments done in cereals as compared to that of 
oil seeds. A switch in the use of pastures from cattle to milk was also observed. It was 
also found that cattle sector gains at the expense of cereal and milk. 
As a result of these changes agricultural household income show gains and 
losses in various member countries with Finland, Ireland and Sweden gaining most while 
France, United Kingdom and Spain being the main losers. The Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) was also found to decrease in all member countries. The budgetary cost of the 
Agenda 2000 was estimated to be an additional € 3,203 million. 
Betina Dimaranan et al, assessed the likely impact of ‘decoupling’ payments by 
OECD economies6 on developing country welfare with a special attention on the impact 
of reforms on real farm income in the reforming OECD countries especially the European 
                                                 
6  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development of which the EU forms a major partner apart 
from the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, Korea and Mexico. 
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Union, United States and Australia. The main focus of their study was to analyze the 
effects through terms of trade. They used the standard GTAP model and then provided 
central parameter values for the key elasticities of substitution and factor supply 
elasticities. The study found that these elasticities are less than one in contrast to the usual 
assumption of perfect factor mobility assumed in most studies. 
 The study observed that the EU and the U.S. show sizable cuts in the Producer 
Support Estimates (PSE) in periods from 1987 – 1997 though the 1996 FAIR Act of the 
U.S. reversed the trend. In contrast the EU showed a decisive shift in its composition of 
support with the share provided for market price support falling in favor of increased land 
and headage based payments. The U.S. recorded a moderate level of reduced PSE mostly 
due to the elimination of Market Price Supports (MPS) with historical entitlements 
becoming a more important technique of PSE in the U.S. for grains. The study observed 
that Argentina maintained its export specialization in program crops while the Middle 
East and North African (MENA) countries has been consistently a net importer of 
program crops7. 
The study also observed that while the USA and Canada’s net export position 
strengthened over the period, the EU – 15 and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) 
have substantially reduced their net imports as a share of total imports. They further 
conclude that increased domestic support for program crops has led to the improvements 
in the net trading position of the OECD countries at the expense of developing countries. 
The study considered wheat as the chief agricultural commodity since it 
accounted for significant amount of trade as well as having high domestic support in the 
                                                 
7 Program crops include cereals, oilseeds, raw sugar, processed rice and refined sugar. 
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OECD countries. It found that developing countries as a whole export 14% and import 
54% of the total wheat traded. Further the U.S. and the EU each account for a quarter of 
total world wheat exports. 
The study does not take a set world price for a commodity but computes it by 
analyzing bilateral trade thus domestic-world price gap is measured as a trade weighted 
combination of bilateral import and export prices. Also in order to compute the Market 
price support, the study took this price gap and applied it to output to compute the change 
in PSE associated with a policy change. The study assumes the trade elasticities using 
earlier studies which estimated this using the GTAP model. Import demand is estimated 
using the trade, tariff, and transport cost data for different countries. 
The study observed that an output subsidy has a larger effect on the output, 
producer prices and farm income than does market price supports and hence substantiated 
to be more trade distorting. The study also found that EU production of wheat decreases 
while its consumption increases due to the decrease in export subsidies. It is estimated 
that total welfare gain due to this re-instrumentation of the policy will be $188 million. 
Most developing countries lose from higher wheat prices (total welfare estimated to be 
$65 million). Thus the study concludes that developing countries largely dependent on 
EU imports (MENA) lose with the decrease in domestic support in OECD countries 
while developing countries which compete with the OECD countries for the same 
products increase their share of exports since border support prices decrease giving 
greater access to these country markets. 
Birgitte Gersfelt et al, provided a quantitative assessment of the impact of EU 
reforms namely the Agenda 2000 and the Mid Term Review of 2004 on non-EU 
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countries, focusing particularly on implications for trade, production and welfare. The 
analysis was conducted using the CAP specific version of the GTAP model. The analysis 
took into consideration 3 scenarios – the first simulation served as a benchmark against 
which the reforms were compared, it incorporated the effect of changes in CAP and the 
EU preferential market access from accession countries. Two scenarios are then 
compared and simulated till year 2013. The first illustrates the effect of enlarging the EU 
under the current CAP regime (Agenda 2000 scenario) and the second incorporates the 
effects of enlarging the EU and reforming the CAP in accordance of the Mid Term 
Review reforms (MTR scenario). 
The implication of the Agenda 2000 scenario for the acceding 10 new countries 
is that the domestic support payments will be coupled to land use and livestock 
production. While the MTR – reform scenario illustrates that wheat intervention prices 
are reduced to € 285 per hectare in traditional areas and no payments in well established 
areas. For rice the intervention prices were decreased, coupled with an increase in direct 
payments. However since the MTR reforms stipulate that countries will have certain 
discretion in implementing the decoupled domestic price support the study assumed the 
MTR-reform implementation in each member country was based on options for 
decoupled direct payments in each member country.  
The results of simulations conducted till 2013 showed that the joint effect of 
enlargement and the implementation of the MTR on all member countries would result in 
a 5.7% reduction in cereal production while under the Agenda 2000 scenario an increase 
in 1.5% of cereal production is seen for the same period.  
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The study also observed that under their assumption that there will be no 
restrictions on the use of agricultural land receiving single farm payments there will be a 
shift in production from cereals to other crops like vegetables, fruits and nuts. The study 
also concluded that there is a decline in the value of exports of cereals from the EU 25 in 
the MTR-Enlargement scenario while the net export value of cereals would have 
increased in the Agenda 2000-Enlargement scenario. Further, it estimates that the joint 
effect of the two reforms thus result in the net improvement in the agricultural trade 
balance by approximately $1 billion. Another notable observation that the study made 
was that the MTR-reform actually increases the value of EU exports and imports to the 
U.S. which is attributable to the increase in trade of fruits, vegetables and other non-
program crops. Agricultural exports by the African countries to the EU 25 decrease by 
$660 million. Welfare effects illustrated that the total global welfare of almost $10 billion 
could be achieved with the implementation of the MTR-Enlargement scenario with the 
highest gain to the EU 25 and the highest losses to the African and Latin American 
countries.   
Hans van Meijl et al examines the compatibility of the Agenda 2000 reforms of 
the CAP with GATT commitments of the EU. They also analyze the effects of alternative 
world market price changes on the fulfillments of these commitments.  
The study used a eight region, 18 sector computable general equilibrium model 
– the GTAP version 5 to analyze the effects. Policy instruments taken into consideration 
were price transmission mechanism between market and the intervention price, lowering 
of intervention price for cereals, increased area payments for mandatory set-asides and 
intervention stock policy changes. The study deviates from the standard GTAP model by 
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including a multiple support price system of cereals. The variable import tariff which 
insulates the domestic cereal market is modeled along with variable export subsidy to 
dispose excess supply and the endogenous price transmission mechanism between the 
intervention price and market price. 
The results show that there is a negative impact on output for feed grains while 
the opposite was observed for the food grain sector. The study also illustrates that within 
the cereal, oilseed and protein complex production shifts from oilseeds to cereals due to 
the fact that the drops in premiums for oilseeds outweigh the downward revenue effects 
in the cereal sector. Lower cereal price intervention price is partially compensated by 
higher area premiums. Exports were reported to effect negatively for feed grains and oil 
seeds. In contrast food grains export increases because of increased production. 
The study concluded that the Agenda 2000 reforms had limited effects for 
producers outside the EU 15 with some positive output effects in oil seed trade of the 
U.S. and Australia. The study also observed that since intervention prices are kept equal 
for both food and feed grains which imply a higher export subsidy to feed grains as there 
is a positive differential between the two international markets. The paper also shows that 
even with the full implementation of the Agenda 2000 reforms successful reduction in 
export subsidies depend on the world market and exchange rate developments. 
1.4. Project Objectives 
The main objective of this thesis is to determine if policy re-instrumentation in 
the U.S. and the EU had any significant effects on bilateral trade and welfare of domestic 
producers in each of the countries. Future forecasts based on scenarios presented 
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considering policy reforms are analyzed to quantify whether these reforms were 
significantly affecting bilateral trade. 
1.5.  Specific Objectives 
The specific objectives of the thesis are enumerated below. The thesis will 
address these objectives in a hierarchal manner.    
1.5.1 Objective 1 
Review major domestic policy changes and other treaties and agreements 
between in the United States and the European Union. 
1.5.2 Objective 2 
To analyze the country-wise effects of Agenda 2000 reforms on the U.S. and 
EU bilateral cereal trade taking into consideration policy re-instrumentation, the change 
in exchange rates affected by the dismantling of the Monetary Compensatory Amount 
(MCA) system of the European Union and affect of intervention stocks on trade.. 
1.5.3 Objective 3 
To predict the consequences of the Agenda 2000 reforms in specific and other 
major EU – U.S. reforms on world prices, cereal imports from the EU and cereal exports 
to the EU with specific emphasis on the U.S. trade position. 
1.5.4 Objective 4 
To forecast the effect of free trade in wheat on U.S. exports of wheat to the EU, 
effect on world prices, change in welfare gains/losses to various agents in a general 
equilibrium setting. 
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1.6. Research Methods and Procedures 
Demand and supply elasticities based on bilateral trade will be estimated using a 
system of equations in Statistical Analytical Software (SAS). Equations are derived and 
modified based on those applied in the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) - a 
Computable General Equilibrium model (CGE) will be used to help us build our partial 
equilibrium model framework. Forecasts will be based on variables defined in the model 
some of the variables like GDP, population and world prices are exogenous and given in 
the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
while all others will be estimated based on elasticities derived from our equations. The 
model will use only cereals under the HS – 4 classifications8 and will exclude processed 
cereals from the model. Impact of policy changes will be analyzed based on price 
movements and their significance to world price levels. 
1.6.1. Objective 1 
A thorough review of literature of the domestic policies in the European Union 
and the United States relating to cereals has been carried out. Treaties and sanctions have 
also been documented for a meticulous understanding of the variables that may affect 
trade between the trading entities. Legislations under the Official Journal (OJ) of the 
European Union sourced through the ‘EUR-Lex’ database have been studied for a better 
understanding of regulations concerning cereals in the European Union. Earlier research 
concerning the FAIR Act 1996 and other farm bills of the United States have given us 
insights as to how to model U.S. agricultural policies more efficiently. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System developed by the World Custom Organization. 
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1.6.2. Objective 2 
To analyze country-wise effects of the Agenda 2000 reforms in specific and 
other reforms vis-à-vis FAIR Act 1996 of the United States and Mac Sharry Reforms of 
1992 of the European Union we derive demand and supply elasticities based on the 
MODEL procedure in SAS. Data construction and modifications to the basic data for 
derived prices and policy instruments are documented. Country wise trade patterns are 
constructed using a system of equations and closing each model with the price variable. 
The entire model is then computed for world price to evaluate the impact of each country 
of the European Union on world price thus yielding a finer understanding the major 
players in bilateral trade between the United States and the European Union. Effect of 
change in exchange rates and the redesigning of the ‘Green Money’ concept to 
commercial Euro price on trade is also evaluated to observe whether they have significant 
consequences on trade.    
1.6.3. Objective 3 
A system of simultaneous equations model, modified for a partial equilibrium 
analysis are shocked for each of the scenarios created. Price variations are evaluated for 
significant changes from world price levels to quantify policy effects on bilateral trade. 
Welfare effects on producers, consumers and the government for each of the six cereals is 
analyzed based on results of the Non Linear three-stage Least Squares (N3SLS) 
estimation which are corrected for assumptions of the N3SLS procedure in SAS.  
1.6.4. Objective 4 
Based on the results from the econometric model constructed under objective 3 
simulations will be carried out for wheat in a free trade scenario. Opening stocks will be 
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based on a trend variable while future demographic and macroeconomic variable data 
like population, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and consumption will be taken from 
predicted values published by the IFS, the EUROSTAT and the National Agricultural 
Statistical Service (NASS) of the United States. Significance of change in price and 
production is evaluated for the most significant policy affecting trade. These scenarios 
could provide valuable information on trade trends that could take place based on policies 
followed by each of these countries. An important change in the database while 
constructing these simulations will be to aggregate the European Union as a single entity 
rather than a disaggregated group considering trade policies followed by each of the 
member countries are governed by the Common Agricultural Policy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CAP AND OF THE U.S. 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
 
2.1. Evolution of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European 
Union 
 
Article 38 of the Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic 
Commission in 1958 stated, “The Common Market shall extend to agriculture and trade 
in agricultural products.” Though the objectives of the agricultural policy were detailed in 
the Treaty, the specific mechanisms by which they were to be achieved were not. Thus 
cooperation in agriculture was obscure at that time and formed a very insignificant part of 
the momentous Treaty. It was not until the Stresa Conference that a definitive policy 
framework for a common agricultural market and a Common Agricultural Policy was 
established which considered the central problem to be the disparity existing between the 
level of income in agriculture and other sectors of the economy. The development of 
trade within the community without threatening ties with third world countries, policies 
designed to manage markets and increase productivity, equilibrium between production 
and market outlets to stimulate efficiency and a high priority to increasing the efficiency 
of the family farm unit were some of the major factors that played an important role in 
the establishment of Common Agricultural Policy which came into existence on July 1st 
1962 and thus “…. Agriculture ceased to be a subject of purely national administration9 
and control” (Linberg 1963). The five main objectives of the Common Agricultural 
Policy at that time were 
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a. To increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by      
ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum      
utilization of the factors of production, labor in particular. 
b. Thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in 
particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture. 
c. To stabilize markets. 
d. To assure the availability of supplies thus providing food safety. 
e. To ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 
An alternative way of characterizing the CAP is by its three principles which became the 
de rigueur, that any reform that the CAP may undergo, must not call into question these 
three principles (Christopher Ritson) 
a. Free intra-Community trade: No barriers to trade in farm products between EC 
member states. 
b. Community preference: Supplies from within the Community to be given 
preference in the market over those from outside the EC. 
c. Common financing: Funding for the CAP would be through a European budget 
responsible for all revenues and expenditure generated by the Policy. 
The CAP had two arms – a market arm and a structural arm. The market arm 
was responsible for all market stabilization mechanisms that were instituted by the 
structural arm which acted as the policy and guidance section. The policy is financed by 
a special section of the common budget known as the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (FEOGA). 
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2.1.1. Policy Mechanisms 
Policy mechanisms play an important role in controlling the market for 
agricultural products. These vary significantly from product to product and have been 
subject to repeated modifications. The major features of these mechanisms can be 
broadly classified into three categories: 
a. Import regulation: these were mainly designed to increase prices of imported 
goods thus making it less attractive for purchasers. Mechanisms included were 
variable import levies, import quotas, tariffs, countervailing duties, special trade 
arrangements, voluntary restraint agreements and supplementary levies.  
b. Internal support: These were basically aimed at providing stability in income to 
farmers in the European Union as well as stabilizing prices for the consumers 
while keeping it in the CAP budget. Policies included were intervention purchases 
which formed a significant part of the Policy, production subsidies, production 
refunds, production quotas, input subsidies, co-responsibility levies3, milling 
subsidies, market withdrawal compensations, private storage aids, headage 
premiums10, subsidies for disposal and special sales schemes.  
c. Export regulation: These were fundamentally aimed at helping the disposal of 
large stocks that accrued due to Governmental purchases over years. The major 
export regulation was export subsidies which were variable in nature for most of 
the products and cereals. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Co-responsibility levies and hedge payments were not a part of the original CAP but   was introduced 
during the Mac Sharry Reforms 
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2.1.2. Design of the CAP 
The system of price support for cereals in specific and most of the other 
Agricultural products in general is depicted in figure 2.1. 
      TARGET PRICE                                                                                            TARGET PRICE 
                                        
 
 
       MINIMUM  
       IMPORT                                                                                                         INTERVENTION PRICE 
       PRICE                        IMPORT  LEVY          EXPORT        SUBSIDY 
   
       WORLD PRICE                                                                                             WORLD PRICE 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  IMPORTS                        EXPORTS 
 
Figure 2.1: Model of a typical CAP system11
This elaborate system of price supports builds on three prices: the target price, 
the threshold price and the intervention price. The target price defines the indicative 
market price for the European Union producers and represents the upper limit in which 
the producer prices fluctuate. Imports enter the European Union at the minimum import 
price commonly called the threshold price. The intervention prices form the floor below 
which the market prices for agricultural commodities should not fall; intervention 
agencies buy agricultural commodities at the intervention price thus guaranteeing farmers 
a stable price for their produce much higher than the world price for the commodity. To 
limit the budgetary expenditure, co-responsibility and producer levies were introduced 
                                                 
11 Reproduced from ‘The Common Agricultural Policy’ 2nd Edition Ritson. C. 
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for cereals and other agricultural goods most notably for that of milk. The European 
Union also offers voluntary and compulsory set-aside acreage scheme for this purpose. 
Trade barriers were put in place to protect the European Union agricultural 
markets from the world markets. Variable import levies and quotas that bridge the gap 
between the threshold price and the world market were introduced. To dispose the excess 
production on the world markets, the European Union gave its farmers export subsidies 
which was the difference between the intervention prices and the world prices. Monetary 
compensatory amounts (MCA’s)12 were also applied to intra and extra European Union 
trade. 
The most important non-price support mechanisms used were storage subsidies, 
deficiency payments and production premiums13. These measures were also applied to 
irrigation schemes, Research and Development, and reforestation projects. 
2.1.3. Agricultural Conversion Rate – the Green Money Concept 
The Common Agricultural Policy’s agri-monetary system simply referred to as 
– its ‘Green Money’ is usually ignored or referred to only obliquely in most econometric 
analysis of the Common Agricultural Policy partly due to its complexity and partly due to 
the many changes that it had undergone during its existence. Yet this system had been of 
a major significance in the development of the Common Agricultural Policy until the 
common currency – the ‘Euro’ was introduced. The adjustments of the ‘Green Money’ to 
the valuations of the national currencies across the European Union gave rise to largely 
invisible upward creep in price supports and generated some interesting twists with 
respect to the European Union’s implementation of the GATT Agreement.  
                                                 
12 Differences in the national price levels could only be sustained if taxes and subsidies were applied on 
intra-community trade. These border taxes and subsidies were known as MCA’s 
13 For beef and sheep only. 
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Since 1979 all support prices in the Common Agricultural Policy vis-à-vis 
intervention prices, production aids, export refunds, import levies, etc. were fixed in the 
European Currency Unit (ECU). However while applying these to farmers and traders the 
national intervention agencies paid them in national currencies. Consequently a 
conversion rate was required to convert the ECU into national currencies. This 
conversion rate fixed under the Common Agricultural Policy rules was called the 
Agricultural Conversion Rate more popularly known as the ‘Green Money’. It was the 
rules that governed the Agricultural Conversion Rate that gave rise to the complexity in 
the ‘Green Money’ system (Swinbank, A.).  
The European Currency Unit was basically a collection of European currencies 
as listed in column one of table 2.1. Thus the value can be determined by adding up the 
value of its constituent currency. These conversions were not necessary with the 
introduction of the ‘Euro’ which unlike the ECU which was only used as a reference 
currency for conversion to national currencies, had commercial and trade value. The 
European Union for the purpose of these conversions invented a notional currency called 
the Unit of Account (UA) and tied this to the United States dollar (USD). To calculate the 
exchange rate conversion the USD was preferred over the French Franc or the German 
Mark since all international commodity prices were usually quoted in this unit. One Unit 
of Account was then fixed to one USD since international currency markets were 
characterized by fixed exchange rates denominated in gold and since the European 
Union’s Unit of Account had the same gold content as the United States both were kept at 
the same value 
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Table 2.114: Currency basket and the specific weights they carried for the calculation of 
the ECU 
 
Currency 
Quantity in 
collection 
Value15
% Weight in value 
of ECU 
Belgian/Luxemburg Franc 3.431 39.3960 8.71
Danish Kroner 0.1976 7.2858 2.71
German Mark 0.6242 1.91007 32.68
Greek Drachma 1.44 292.867 0.49
Spanish Peseta 6.885 162.493 4.24
French Franc 1.332 6.40608 20.79
Irish Punt 0.008552 0.792214 1.08
Italian Lire 151.8 2106.15 7.21
Dutch Florin 0.2198 2.15214 10.21
Portuguese Escudo 1.393 195.792 0.71
British Pound 0.08784 0.786652 11.17
 
The ECU was also used to conduct transactions with farmers and traders and 
hence they incurred the currency conversion risk since national currencies fluctuated over 
a range. Thus a common price support and the law of one price could not be upheld with 
the concept of the agricultural conversion rate alone. This gave rise to the introduction of 
the Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCA). Thus when there was an appreciation of a 
currency and its value decreased with respect to the Unit of Account the positive 
difference between these two currencies was adjusted by the Monetary Compensatory 
Amount essentially meaning that an additional payment was made for intra-European 
Union trade thus keeping the one price law in place. Consequently when there was a 
                                                 
14. The ECU and its value at the last adjustments of the central rates within the exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM) as given by the European Commission. 
15 As on March 1995 initial rate 1 ECU = $1. 
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depreciation of one of the member nation’s currency an MCA tax was levied on exports 
of produce in that country to other member countries while a similar MCA subsidy was 
given to imports into that country. When trading with countries outside the Union, import 
levies and export subsidies also had to be adjusted to account for lower price support in 
the country where the currency fluctuates.             
In August 1969 the French Franc was devalued while the German Mark was 
revalued and hence the MCA was created to maintain price stability. In 1973 the Unit of 
Account was tied to a ‘joint float’ (Christopher Ritson and Alan Swinbank) which 
consisted of the Benelux states16, Germany and Denmark. These countries had agreed to 
restrict their exchange rates to a very narrow band of movement between their currencies 
but would allow their currencies to float freely collectively against their currencies. This 
resulted in the development of two types of MCA’s the ‘joint float’ MCA and the 
‘variable float’ MCA for those countries in the Union that did not participate in the ‘joint 
float’ system. The fixed green conversion rates kept the prices constant in the national 
currencies while the MCA’s contracted or expanded to compensate for fluctuations in 
currency exchange rates. The fixed MCA was also subject to periodic revisions which 
were usually devaluations thus increasing the support prices. Another type of 
compensatory payments entered into account was called the Accession Compensatory 
Payment in 1973 due to the entry of the United Kingdom into the Union in order to 
accommodate its very low price supports to the grain producers.  
In 1979 the MCA system was dismantled and the concept of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) was established. The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
replaced the earlier ‘joint float’. The key feature of the ERM was that certain countries in 
                                                 
16 Benelux states consisted of the first three nations in the Union – Belgium, Luxemburg and Italy 
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the EU maintained fixed exchange rates between their currencies with narrow margins on 
either side of the fixed central rates for fluctuations. The commercial ECU replaced the 
Unit of Account and was worth commercially less than its predecessor. With the 
introduction of the ‘Euro’ this elaborate system for price stability and one price law was 
dismantled since the Euro had the same commercial value across the European Union.     
2.2. Reforms in the Common Agricultural Policy 
Since its inception CAP was mainly concerned with price stability for family 
farm units. It was argued that this would attract more labor and increase productivity thus 
making the European Union self sufficient in agriculture. Incidentally the European 
Union did not consider export subsidies as a major element at that time and expected that 
the revenues accrued from the import levies would exceed the cost of subsidies. It was 
not until later when the community that they began to expand their export of cereals that 
the cost of export refunds became a major policy issue (Tracy, 1994). By the mid eighties 
the European Union moved from being the main importing country to the second largest 
exporting country (Silvia Weyerbrock, 1996). 
The common financing of the CAP was introduced in 1966, called the 
Guarantee and Guidance Fund (FEOGA). Allocation of national contribution was 
established on the basis of a fixed ceiling for each of the member countries. One issue 
that was of vital concern was the level of common prices. Too high a level would have 
upset the balance of payments in some member countries while extremely low prices 
would have adversely affected the farm income. Prices were finally set close to the higher 
price margin among the member states which subsequently increased the financial cost of 
the CAP but guaranteed price support to the farmers. This conflict resolution led to a 
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production surplus and thus influenced higher budgetary allocation to the FEOGA all 
throughout the 1970’s and the 1980’s. 
The first reforms to check these surpluses were taken up in the mid 70’s 
popularly known as the ‘Agriculture 80’17. The main directives agreed upon were: 
a. Modernization of farms 
b. Encouraging cessation of farming and re-allocation of farms for the purposes 
of structural improvements. 
c. Provision of socio-economic guidance for the acquisition of occupational 
skills by persons engaged in agriculture. 
These directives fell short of their desired effects partly due to the reluctance of 
the member countries to follow them and partly because these directives were not 
specific and left a large amount of ambiguity that were exploited by the member 
countries. 
The principle of producer co-responsibility came into effect in the mid 80’s and 
was extended to cereals at the end of the decade after overcoming a great resistance by 
the farm lobbies of member countries bringing CAP’s budgetary allocation back from the 
verge of bankruptcy. 
With the starting of early GATT negotiations at the turn of the decade, the CAP 
underwent major policy changes shifting from its previous policy of supporting farm 
incomes at all costs to decreasing distortions while maintaining nearly the same amount 
of price support to its farmers. These radical changes were partly triggered by the need to 
decrease budgetary expenditures on Agriculture and partly to streamline Agriculture with 
early GATT objectives. 
                                                 
17 Council Regulation  (EEC) No 1418/76 ‘On the Common Organization of the Market for Cereals’. 
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This led to the application of stabilizers and hence to the adoption of Maximum 
Guarantee Quantities (MGQ)18 for majority of the agricultural commodities with 
automatic price adjustment mechanisms should the MGQ be exceeded. In addition to the 
MGQ member countries agreed to include voluntary set-aside19, extensification and 
diversification schemes aimed at adjusting supply and demand whilst compensating 
farmers for the loss of income. On the revenue side the Council agreed to increase the 
budget of the CAP by enlarging the resource base to include a proportion of the Gross 
National Product of each member state20. These reforms did have some short term effects 
with oil seed production drastically decreasing while the cereal production continued to 
increase. The stabilizer policy in the long run proved ineffective since they did not attack 
the underlying problem of supporting payments being linked to the quantity produced. 
The Commissions 1991 paper ‘Reflections’ quoted “the reforms of the years 
85/88 have not been implemented and render themselves incomplete. It is not surprising 
that under these conditions the CAP finds itself once again confronted with a serious 
crisis. It appears under these conditions that the Community’s agricultural policy cannot 
avoid a succession of increasingly serious crisis unless its mechanisms are fundamentally 
reviewed so as to adapt them to a situation different from that of the sixties. The 
Commission considers therefore that the time has come to stimulate a reflection on the 
objectives of the Community’s Agricultural Policy and on the principles that should guide 
the future development of the CAP” (Commission, 1991). The outcome was the so called 
radical reforms of 1992 referred popularly as the ‘Mac Sharry Reforms’. 
                                                 
18 Council Regulation (EEC) No: 1766/92 ‘On the Common Organization of Markets for Cereals’ 
19 .  Though they were proposed fifteen years before they were implemented. 
20 This was calculated as the difference between the standard 1.4% of the assessment basis of VAT and 
1.3% of the GNP 
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2.2.1 The Mac Sharry Reforms  
The Mac Sharry reforms were initiated in response to the weakening world 
prices for cereals and dairy products which substantially increased expenditure of export 
subsidies under the CAP. The mounting international pressure within the Uruguay round 
of the GATT Round also forced the Council to take drastic measures for a long run 
budgetary discipline to be incorporated into the CAP. For the first time these reforms 
combined substantial price reductions for major agricultural commodities with annual 
compensation payments modulated in favor of smaller farmers21, this for the first time 
gave rise to the concept of decoupling payments which were at least partially imposed 
during these reforms. 
Incidentally, the Mac Sharry reforms were focused only on cereals, oil seeds 
and protein crops apart from beef and sheep production together with an ‘Agri-
Environmental Action Program’. 
The following were some of the major reform proposals submitted and 
approved by the Council 
1. Reduction of cereal support prices by 35%. 
2. Introduction of area payments to cereal producers to compensate the fall in farm 
revenues. 
3. Compulsory set-asides were proposed which would then qualify for area payments. 
4. A tradable bond scheme was introduced for the milk quota system. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Though these modulations were later dropped with no consensus achieved by member countries. 
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2.2.1.1 Significance of the Mac Sharry Reforms on Cereal Production: 
Three annual reductions were put in place for support prices for cereals 
instituted from 1993 to 1995. Figure 2.2 shows changes in cereal trade and support more 
accurately 
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Figure 2.222: Price Support for cereals from July 1995 
• Target prices were significantly below and near the intervention prices. Graph 
2.1 thus shows a downward trend for target price and intervention price with a 
relatively higher decrease in the target price.     
• New intervention prices and target prices were kept nearly same for all cereals 
which can also be noticed in the graph.         
• All cereals received same arable area aid – though additional area payments 
were paid on durum wheat in recognized production areas. 
                                                 
22 Alan Swinbank, 1995 
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• On the import side as the figure shows the old system of threshold prices and 
variable import levies were abolished and were replaced by fixed tariffs. Since 
the U.S. under the GATT insisted that the community should limit itself to 
applying an import duty “at a level and in a manner so that the duty paid 
import price for such cereals will not be greater than the effective intervention 
price ….increased by 55%”. In figure 2.2 this is shown as the maximum duty 
paid import price. 
• In addition export refunds were still being paid though the GATT restricted on 
the volume of subsidized exports.  
• The Integrated Administration and Control System was put in place to control 
supply and monitor the set-aside land. 
• The system of MCA to calculate national currency system was abolished and 
a new EMS system was adopted. 
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Figure 2.3: Wheat Intervention and target price trend from 1976 to 1995 (Data 
collected from various issues of the EURO-Lex) 
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Figure 2.4: Import Levy and Export Refund trend Pre and Post Mac Sharry Reforms 
 
2.2.1.2 Impact of the Mac Sharry Reforms on EU Cereal Market 
            The effects of the Mac Sharry reforms on cereal markets did achieve some 
financial responsibility of the CAP. A most comprehensive effect of these reforms are 
given below 
• The immediate effect of these policy changes was an increase in the budgetary 
cost for implementation of these reforms though in the long run it was helpful 
in cutting CAP costs. 
• Since Mac Sharry’s proposal of modulated payments to the farmers was 
rejected by the member countries tax payer’s cost escalated. 
• Set-aside payments and land acreage payments paved the way for decoupling 
production and decreased distortions in trade. 
• The Commission envisaged that these reforms would stabilize yields - “The 
reform of CAP is based on per hectare payments with fixed yields……there is 
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no longer an incentive for higher yields as there will be no payments beyond 
the fixed yields” (Commission, 1992, p 7) 
2.2.2 The Agenda 2000 Reforms 
The 1992 Mac Sharry Reforms though were the first radical steps to bring a 
certain amount of budget discipline; it did not bring the amount of reforms expected. This 
was due to various reasons 
1. The tariffication conversion rates were fixed at the 1986/88 prices when 
the production was low and the world prices were close to the European 
Union prices. 
2. Strong growth in the world agricultural markets with price offering a good 
rate of return. 
3. Agricultural support was perceived to be unequally distributed between 
regions and producers. 
4. The Mac Sharry reforms assumed that cereal production would increase at 
a rate of 1% and then stabilize, by 1999 cereal production rose steeply 
adding pressure on the already stressed budget of the CAP, 
5. Set-aside payments introduced in the earlier reforms were minimum and 
farmers usually removed the most unproductive land from production. 
These were some of the key factors that played an important part in the 
inception and implementation of the Agenda reforms. 
The main objectives of the Agenda 2000 as stated in the Council Regulation 
were 
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1. To consolidate the support system for producers of certain arable crops 
established by the 1992 reform of the CAP with a view to boosting the 
competitiveness of the European agriculture by bringing European prices in 
line with world prices. 
2. To continue the regionalization of the CAP so that the return leads to the 
development of sustainable, competitive and multifunctional agriculture in 
all regions, including those with specific problems. 
3. To base payments to farmers on production as well as on their additional 
contribution to society, particularly from the point of view of the 
environment and countryside. 
2.2.2.1 Support System under Agenda 2000 
The Council established a supports system for producers; the main elements 
were as follows23
1. Granting area payments. 
2. A 15% reduction in the present intervention price of cereals in two equal 
stages of 7.5% (in 2000/2001 and 2001/2002 marketing years respectively). 
Consequently area payments were increased in two equal stages which was 
multiplied by the historical regional reference yields for cereals. 
3. Progressive alignment of area-based aid for oilseed and non textile linseed 
to the level applied to cereals and set-asides. 
4. A 10% set-aside requirement from the 2000/01 marketing year apart from 
the already 15% in place. 
 
                                                 
23 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1251/1999. 
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2.2.2.2 Area Support Payments 
1. The support system for producers of cereals and other arable crops 
introduced regionally differentiated area payments. 
2. Payments granted for the area of arable crops or subjected to set-aside 
should not exceed the regional base area. 
3. Producers receiving area payments are subject to a compulsory set-aside 
part of their holding from production (10%) for which they received 
compensation amounting to the aid granted for cereals. 
4. Small producers were exempted from any se-aside requirements. 
2.2.2.3 Regionalization Plan 
           To set average prices for calculating area payments a regionalization plan was 
established. Taking into account differentiated yield for both irrigated and non-irrigated 
land. 
Apart from these measures producers were required to apply environmental 
measures appropriate to the specific situation of the land set-aside. An aid was also given 
up to 50% of costs for start up costs for growing multi annual crops intended for bio mass 
production. 
2.3. Reforms of the United States Cereal Policy 
The major changes in the U.S. agricultural support system were the 
implementation of two legislations the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and trade Act 
(FACT, 1990) and the Federal Agricultural Improvement Program (FAIR) Act in 1996. 
While the FACT was primarily perceived as a short term response to market conditions 
(Food and Agriculture Organization) prevailing at the time with depressed export prices 
 36
and higher production, the FAIR Act was targeted as a long term trend towards greater 
market orientation of the farmers by practically decoupling income support measures 
from farm prices. The U.S. cereal policy was based on a price support program, acreage 
controls and marketing quotas. The U.S. farm support program was a combination of 
target prices, acreage programs and the loan rate program. The government paid farmers 
of program crops24 a deficiency payment multiplied by the eligible production. 
Deficiency payment was calculated as the difference between target price (set annually 
and revised periodically) and the market price or the loan rate whichever was the smaller 
(Micha Gisser). Acreage reduction program was introduced and combined with the 
deficiency payment by making farmers eligible to the payments only when they idled 
land as required by the acreage reduction program. To prevent external world price 
effects on the domestic markets, the government further developed programs for 
purchasing commodities for stocks at the loan rate when crops were exceptionally good 
and to sell the commodities when they failed. This, in the long run, led to a net 
accumulation of stocks which further increased government spending on storage costs.  
2.3.1 The Food, Agriculture, Conservation and trade (FACT) Act 1990 
The FACT Act of April 1990 represented a major shift in the U.S. farm policy 
and had significant impacts on cereals production, prices and trade in the U.S. It was 
perceived as a short term response to market conditions which were characterized by 
• Depressed international agricultural prices. 
• Strong consumption in export markets among the main exporters (including 
the U.S.) 
                                                 
24 These included but not restricted to cereals, feed grains, cotton and rice.  
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• Expectations that the Uraguay Round of Multilateral Trade negotiations 
would lead to substantial reduction in the extent of protection. 
• Budgetary costs that were increasing at a considerable rate. 
The implications of the FACT Act25 can be categorized under three major segments. 
2.3.1.1 Implications on Production 
The system of target prices and deficiency payments were retained with certain 
modifications which included 
• Freezing target prices for cereals at the 1990 price levels for the next five 
years which in real terms would represent an annual decrease in support. 
• The Acreage Reserve Program (ARP) which is closely related to the 
deficiency payments under the Act, would be based on the stock to use ratio 
for cereals. 
• The Act also introduced the “Triple Base Program” aimed at achieving 
considerable savings on budgetary costs. The program stipulated that cereal 
crop farmers may not be eligible to receive deficiency payments on a 
proportion of their base area which was mandated at 15 percent for the first 
year. The area would still be eligible for non recourse and marketing loans. 
• The act also introduced the “Targeted option payment” where farmers were 
allowed a decrease or increase in their ARP in exchange for a percent 
increase or decrease in the target price for calculations of their deficiency 
payments.  
 
                                                 
25 “Agricultural Food Policy Review: U.S. Policies in a changing world”, ERS, USDA, 1989. 
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2.3.1.2 Market and Government Stock Changes 
Domestic market prices in the United States were fundamentally governed by 
the loan rate mechanism which also built up (or depleted) government held stocks. From 
1985 to 1990 a lower loan rate had contributed to a depletion of the stocks in government 
held agencies and lead to modifications to the loan rate mechanism in the cereal sector. 
Under the Act, the loan rate was disaggregated into a basic and an actual loan rate system 
with the former being determined based a on five year moving average of prices received 
by the farmers with a minimum being set between 75 to 85 percent of the average. This 
average has been reduced by up to 20 percent over the five year period. The FACT Act 
provided provisions that included: 
• A loan rate for cereals calculated at 85 percent of the average price with a 
maximum decline of 5 percent annually. Considering that actual loan rates 
were calculated as a percentage of the basic loan rate the FACT Act 
eventually lead to higher basic and actual loan rates while removing 
discretionary powers to reduce the basic loan rate below 5 percent per 
annum. 
• The Farmer Owned Reserve (FOR) which provided price stability by 
encouraging grain storage by farmers until prices tended towards the target 
price was structurally modified. The price band was determined by the 
adjusted loan rate and the FOR release price (Allen, K.). Farmers received 
storage payments and loans for which interest was waived for the first year. 
The Act made the entry into the program more stringent by allowing only 
those farmers who had nine month Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) 
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loans26. Prices that determined the initiation of the program (also called the 
“trigger prices”) were drastically reduced. Table 2.2 below shows the 
significant changes that were adopted under the FACT Act. 
Table 2.2: Trigger Price and quantity required for FOR to be initiated27: 
Cereal Activated Quantity (Million Tons) 
Market Price 
(Percent loan Rate) 
Wheat 8.2 < 140 
Barley 11.4 < 120 
Oats 11.4 < 120 
Sorghum 11.4 < 120 
Rye 11.4 < 120 
Maize 12.5 < 120 + 22.5% of stock/use ratio 
 
2.3.1.3 Trade Implications 
Trade policy for cereals in specific and other agricultural products in general 
were unaffected with the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) being the main vehicle for 
providing export subsidies. The EEP was sub-divided under the Short Term Export 
Credit Program (GS-101) and the Intermediate Export Credit Program (GS – 103)  
2.3.2 The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act 1996 
The 1996 FAIR Act was aimed at reducing farm payments and decoupling 
support payments from farm prices28. The main features that affected the domestic and 
international price and production policies for cereals have been enumerated under three 
broad categories.   
2.3.2.1 Modifications to the Production Payments  
• The FAIR Act suspended the two major farm income support payment 
programs vis-à-vis target prices and deficiency payments. 
                                                 
26 “Agricultural Food Policy Review: U.S. Policies in a changing world”, ERS, USDA, 1989. 
27 Cereal Policy Review, FAO, 1990. 
28 Provisions of the FAIR Act of 1996, ERS, USDA. 
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• In contrast to the FACT Act of 1990 which stipulated only 15 percent of the 
base area could be planted in non-program crops for being eligible for 
deficiency payments, the FAIR Act provided flexibility of planting 
decisions to the farmers, thus making them more market oriented29.  
• The loan rate system though retained was frozen to the 1995 levels for the 
next seven years. Farmers were required to follow conservation compliance 
obligations while keeping land in agriculture 
• Production Flexibility Contract payments were introduced which were equal 
to 85 percent of the base area multiplied by the ‘contract payment rate’. 
Program yields (which included all cereals) were frozen to the 1995 levels. 
• The Area reduction Program (ARP) was eliminated but farmers eligible for 
support payments were required to set aside as fallow at least 15 percent of 
the base area.  
2.3.2.2 Marketing and Stock changes 
The Market and stock situation was largely unchanged with the Market Loan 
Assistance (MLA) program and the non-recursive payments retained. The major shift 
under the market program included the suspension of the Farmer Ordered reserve (FOR). 
2.3.2.3 Trade Effects 
Major changes in the export sector for cereals were introduced with the budget 
for the EEP was capped30. Considering that over 80 percent of the budget was utilized for 
export of cereals which mainly included wheat and corn, it had huge impacts on cereal 
trade and world prices. 
                                                 
29 Agricultural outlook Supplement, ERs, USDA, April 1996.  
30 Cereal Policy Review, FAO, 1995-97. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA, METHODOLOGY AND ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
This chapter provides the basic framework of the economic model that governs 
the econometric model developed to analyze the various relationships between the 
variables and their effects on bilateral trade. Data collection procedures, data 
modifications and derivation of relations are documented for better understanding of 
quantifying policy initiatives in each of the member countries. The econometric model is 
used to calculate elasticities and evaluate variable significance. 
3.1 Assembling the Raw Data 
This section documents the main features of the empirical database that has 
been constructed for analyzing the policy-wise effects of the reforms in the Common 
Agriculture Policy (CAP) of the European Union and the Policy Reforms of the United 
States in an applied, partial equilibrium (PE) model. 
The database considers five cereals: Wheat, Maize, Barley, Oats, and Rye and 
the fifteen European Union nations: Austria, Belgium Denmark, France, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, and United 
Kingdom. The database also includes the United States as a trading region while the rest 
of the world is considered as price takers in the world market for cereals. Data on 
Luxemburg has been merged with that of Belgium since data on some economic 
variables were not readily available for Luxemburg in disaggregated terms.  
In assembling annual raw data from 1976 onwards for the variables in our 
analysis, we employed two major sources - The European Statistical Service 
(EUROSTAT) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).  
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3.1.1       Assembling the European Union Data 
The basic data for the European Union has been assembled by the five sectors, 
each representing a cereal crop, and fifteen country level. Annual data for production, 
consumption and crop yield for each of the fifteen countries of the European Union were 
collected from the ‘AGRIS’ Database of EUROSTAT while external trade data on the 
quantity exported from each of the member countries to the United States of America was 
collected from the ‘COMEXT’ database also known as the ‘Internal and External Trade 
of the European Union.’ It provides annual information on the quantities of total imports 
and exports for every pair of countries that we consider in our analysis. Demographic 
data such as Population, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Nominal Exchange Rates 
were collected from the International Financial Statistics database published by the 
International Monetary Foundation. Domestic Price data for the European Union (EU – 
15) was made available to us by the office of the Director General (DG) of Agriculture 
for the European Union, Brussels, Belgium. Price support data for the five cereals was 
based on two acts if legislations: The Common Organization of the Market in Cereals31 
and Particular and Special Intervention Measures for Cereals32. Prior to 1995, three 
prices were defined by the European Commission namely – Target Price, Threshold Price 
and Intervention Price. Price supports which included import levies, export refunds and 
production refunds were derived from these three reference prices. Legislations from 
1994 repealed such derived price measurements and replaced it with direct aid payments 
under each category33. 
 
                                                 
31 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2727/75 enacted on 29th October 1975 
32 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1146/76 enacted on 17th May 1976 
33 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1866/94 enacted on 27th July 1994 
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3.1.1.1 Modifications to the Raw Data 
Several modifications to the raw data were made for the construction of the 
database and are described briefly below 
3.1.1.2 Calculating the Import Levies 
Two components of the import levies were defined by the European 
Commission (EC); the fixed component derived from the prices defined by the EC and 
calculated as the difference between Threshold Price and World Price and a variable 
component defined as a factor of the fixed component and revised bi-monthly. Thus, 
annual data for import levies was calculated as a sum of the difference of Threshold Price 
and World Price and average of the monthly weighted import levy based on import 
quantity in that month to total imports in that year (Equation 3.1). World Price was 
calculated as an average of the weighted export price based on the quantity of the 
commodity exported by that country to the total exports for that commodity in a specific 
year (Equation 3.1). The world price was based on the major exporting country prices 
that made up to 80 percent of total export quantities in the world market.  
Equation 3.1 
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3.1.1.3 Calculating the Export Refunds 
Export refunds were calculated as the difference between the intervention price 
and the world price for the specific commodity in that year34. Equation 2.3 below is the 
derived relation between the export refunds and the prices published by the European 
Commission. 
Equation .3.2 
( )
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 = Export Refund for commodity  in year 
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34 Regulation (EEC) No 2746/75 of the Council of 29 October 1975 laying down general rules for granting 
export refunds on cereals and criteria for fixing the amount of such refunds 
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3.1.1.4 Calculating Production Refunds 
Production refunds for cereal commodities were calculated once every 
marketing year and were available from the ‘EUROLEX’ database which included all the 
legislations passed by the European Commission for cereals. This was calibrated to total 
domestic production for each of the fifteen European countries. While the Commission 
reviewed the amount of production refund each year it also passed legislations that 
governed the calculation of production refunds35 (Equation 3.3). In estimating production 
refunds for years in which data was not available we used these calculations The Mac 
Sharry reforms36 introduced the concepts of co-responsibility levies and voluntary set-
asides. These instruments, which were mainly aimed at making producers more sensitive 
to the market, were incorporated in our database as a part of production refunds. Thus, 
production refunds were a derived value and a function of co-responsibility levy and set-
aside payments (Equation 3.4).  
 
 
 
                                                 
35 Council regulation (EEC) No: 1863/88  
36 Council regulation (EEC) No: 1766/92 ‘On the Common Organization of the market for Cereals’  
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Equation 3.3 
:
 = Production Refund for commodity  and year 
 = Average c.i.f price used for calculation of import levy
 = Intervention Price for commodity  and year 
ij ij
ij
ij
PR K IP
Where
PR i j
K
IP i j
= −
 
Equation 3.4 
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3.1.1.5 Conversion Factor and Exchange Rates 
For the purpose of constructing the database and to incorporate the effects of the 
Monetary Compensatory Amount (MCA) system that was followed until 1992, we used 
the Agri-Monetary System conversion rate (Swinbank, A., 1988). MCA’s for the fixed 
and variable baskets were collected from the Economic Accounts for Agriculture (EAA) 
and various editions of the Handbook for EU price statistics. The conversion factor to 
U.S. dollars after 1992 was based on Nominal exchange rates given by the International 
Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Foundation (IMF).   
3.1.1.6 Apparent Production and Consumption 
Production for each of the country was derived as a function of area under a 
specific crop and yield per hectare (Equation 3.5). 
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Equation 3.5 
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Consumption for each of the country was a function of domestic production, 
imports, opening stocks and total exports. Equation 3.6 below shows the relation for 
estimation of consumption of cereals in the two trading partners. 
Equation 3.6 
( )
Where:
 = Consumption
 = Domestic Production
 = Import Quantity Defined for comodity  year  and countr
 = Opening Stocks
 = Export Quantity
ijk ijkijk
CONP DPROD IMPQ OPSTK EXPQ
CONP
DPROD
IMPQ i j
OSTK
EXPQ
= + + −
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
y k
 
3.2 Econometric Model Specification 
To understand the effects of policy re-instrumentation in member countries of 
the European Union and the trade effects between each of these countries with the United 
States we developed a static, partial equilibrium, simultaneous equation model which 
solves for the demand side equations and the supply side equations simultaneously. The 
model thus incorporates the interdependence of both the supply and demand side 
equations on each other. An iterative, non-linear, three stage least square (N3SLS) system 
is developed. Two dummy variables are introduced in the system that account for the two 
major policy changes in the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union.  
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Demand side equations are disaggregated into four equations Inventory demand, 
Domestic demand, Export demand and Import demand while the supply side equation is a 
single equation. The following sections describe the demand and supply side equation 
system.  
3.2.1.5 Demand Side System 
As mentioned earlier the demand side system includes four aspects, each of 
which helps us understand the specific effects of policy changes in the European Union 
and the United States. Each of these demand equations is further discussed in detail in the 
sub sections below 
3.2.1.1 Inventory Demand 
Iinventory demand denotes the demand of opening stocks and is a function of 
domestic price and the ratio of apparent production and apparent consumption. The 
econometric model is specified in Equation 3.7. 
Equation 3.7 
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3.2.1.2 Domestic Demand 
The domestic demand function estimates the demand of the commodity in the 
specific country. An inverse demand function is used to estimate the effect on domestic 
prices as a function of other independent variables. Inverse demand functions have been 
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widely used in farm commodity market analysis (Westcott and Hull; Salathe, Price and 
Gadson; Subotnik and Houck; Meike and Young; Cromarty). The importance of a 
normalized simultaneous system of equation needs a causative specification for each 
variable including the price and thus justifies the use of an inverse demand function 
which otherwise would give erroneous results if none of the equations normalized on 
price. The domestic price is considered as a function of domestic consumption, opening 
stocks, income which is measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and two 
dummy variables each for the two major reforms of the CAP (Equation 3.8).  
Equation 3.8 
1 2 3 4 5ln ln ln lnijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijtdmpr conp opstk gdp mref aref eα β β β β β= + + + + + +  
:
 domestic price
 Consumption
Defined for commodity  year  and country 
 Opening Stock
 Gross Domestic Product
 Dummy for Mac Sharry Reforms
 Dummy for Agenda 2
Where
dmpr
conp
i t
opstk
gdp
mref
aref
= ⎫⎪= ⎪⎬= ⎪⎪= ⎭
=
= 000 Reforms
j
 
3.2.1.3 Export Demand 
The export demand equation suggests the effect of policy changes on demand of 
exports for the specific country commodities. Policy effects causing huge changes in 
trade hence would yield insights about the impact on trade and world price effects. The 
demand for exports in the European Union thus depending on the two reform measures of 
the CAP, export refunds, domestic price, world price and exchange rates (Equation 3.9) 
which have undergone some drastic changes after the dismantling of the MCA in intra-
EU trade. 
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Equation 3.9 
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3.2.1.4  Import Demand 
Import demand is modeled in the system of equations to understand the effect 
on quantities of cereals imported bought about by the two policy changes. We introduce a 
ratio of quantities imported from the United States to total imports of the commodity as a 
measure of significance. Significance of this ratio would suggest that imports from the 
U.S had considerable effect on demand of imports due to policy changes modeled as the 
two dummy variables. We introduce the equation with the log of the import quantities as 
a function of domestic price, exchange rate, import quantity, world price, import levies 
and the ratio of imports from the U.S. to total imports (Equation 3.10). Data for the 
import levies were collected from various issues of the Official Journal of the European 
Union which is maintained by the EURO-LEX (European Legislation). 
Equation 3.10 
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 World Price
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3.2.1.5 Supply Equation 
The supply equation tries to quantify the effect of these policies on the total 
domestic supply of commodities. Thus production is a function of total imports, 
production refunds, the two policy changes in the CAP and GDP of the country that 
accounts for income for that country. (Equation 3.11). 
Equation 3.11 
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3.3 Estimation Results 
A non-linear, three stage least square method was used to solve for the system 
of equations for each of the countries. The simultaneous equation system helps us to 
understand the cross correlation effects of the independent variables across different 
equations. The coefficients of the independent variables give us the elasticities since we 
use a double log model for our estimation. We test for normality for the entire time series 
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data using the Shapiro-Wilk method where the null hypothesis considers that the 
distribution of the residuals is not normal. Heteroscedasticity for the residuals is tested to 
see if the residuals show any pattern using two tests – the Breusch-Pagan test and the 
White’s test, where the null hypothesis that the error variance of the independent 
variables is not constant is rejected in the case where the p-value is greater than 0.05 for a 
95 percent confidence interval. Furthermore, we use the Durbin Watson test to test for co-
linearity in the independent variables. Results from these tests are cataloged in the 
appendix (Appendix 1). Elasticity results for the independent variables in the system are 
illustrated in table 3.1 to 3.6 for each of the cereal commodities. The standard error, t-
value and the p-value for each of these elasticities are enumerated in the appendix 
(Appendix 1) for the reader. We do not find any correlation between the independent 
variables for each of the countries. The system was evaluated based on four main criteria 
which included the magnitude of the coefficient which suggested how elastic or inelastic 
it is to the dependent variable, the sign of the coefficient which illustrates if the 
dependent variable is positively related to the independent variable, the statistical 
significance of the coefficient at 90 percent significance level, the goodness of fit for 
each of the equation in the system. 
3.3.1.5 Elasticity Results for Wheat 
The coefficients of the parameters for wheat are presented in table 3.1. Since the 
model is a log-log model where the independent and the dependent variables are in their 
natural log form the coefficients represent the associated elasticities. Significance of these 
elasticities is represented by an asterisk associated with the parameters that show 
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significance. We discuss the elasticity results and try to understand the coefficient effects 
and their signs in the following sections. 
3.3.1.1 Inventory Demand 
The inventory demand which is a function of domestic price and the ratio of 
apparent production to apparent consumption showed acceptable statistical results across 
countries in the European Union. Economic theory would suggest that with an increase in 
domestic price there would be a decrease in the opening stocks of the commodity. Thus 
opening stocks and domestic price are inversely related ceteris paribus. Seven of the 
fourteen countries among the fourteen which includes France, Austria, Denmark, Spain, 
Greece, Portugal and Finland are consistent with economic theory while the rest show a 
positive sign suggesting that opening stocks increase with an increase in domestic price. 
This could be due to the fact that in most of these European countries the market price 
was governed by an intervention price below which the domestic price was not allowed 
to drop thus providing price stability to farmers. Figure 3.1 below further substantiates 
this perception. The average domestic price for these seven countries governed by the 
market demand is below the average intervention price for most of the period and hence 
the government in these countries had to buy all quantities offered by farmers in any 
given year which increased opening stocks into the next year. Eight of the fourteen 
countries in the European Union show that the relationship for inventory demand is 
significant at 90 percent significance level. The magnitudes of the parameters show the 
elasticities which suggest that, except for Belgium-Luxemburg, all other countries show 
that domestic prices are relatively inelastic to opening stocks. 
Table 3.1: Empirical Estimation of Elasticities for wheat in the European Union using Non-Linear Three Stage SLS: 
WHEAT  lndmpr (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp  lndmpr 
 a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
FRANCE 1.12326 -0.7451* 5.426605* 3.31563 -0.909* -0.1194 -0.3590* -0.1705* 0.45361* 2.98747 0.05424
AUSTRIA 1.69949 -0.9321* 10.24812* 1.652265 -0.368* -0.2722* -0.5507* -0.05736 0.47936* 4.61654* 0.47738
BELGIUM 2.60806 1.11385* 0.030716 1.247883 -0.789* -0.0962 -0.1001 0.10783* 0.43134* 11.2907 -2.30252
GERMANY 1.30101 0.85113* 3.796* -0.49773 -0.520* -0.3214* -0.4755* 0.06917 0.52732* 18.0132 -0.81615
DENMARK 3.77997 -1.6596* 4.272407* -0.812 -0.316* -0.1659* -0.3679* -0.02086 0.56350* 7.88735 -0.29476
IRELAND -0.77523 1.02261* -0.40622 4.102613 -0.604* -0.2923* -0.7744* 0.14553* 0.40663* -0.07253 3.35325*
ITALY 9.92008 0.92996* 9.690053* 2.161606 -0.7394 -0.5169* -0.6746* 0.29343* 0.06168 5.20351 -1.7849*
N.LANDS 0.02701 0.17144 0.434926 -0.73357 -0.392* -0.1678* -0.3991* 0.2031* 0.56778* 0.00537 0.41981
SPAIN 0.19699 -0.06223 5.920328* 9.010716* -1.197* -0.2759* -0.121* 0.04055 0.11581 1.16292 -1.00973
UK 10.0786 0.12576 -5.67089* 10.07368 -1.063* -0.4502* -0.6023* 0.04395 0.46745* 3.02029 4.19456*
GREECE 10.5130 -0.25844 -3.90531* 11.39609* 0.0421 -0.34546 -0.51395 0.04795 -1.0333* 10.0998 1.82932
P.GAL 3.59861* -0.19024 0.741402 10.428349 -1.665* 0.26789 0.41204 0.08125 -0.4954* 11.5174 -4.4853*
SWEDEN 5.99929* 0.174887 -0.64284 -0.10764 -0.475* -0.6760* -0.9898* 0.0908 0.54538* 1.67627 -0.9332
 
FINLAND 7.86957* -1.0383* 0.819484* 2.083789 -0.115* -0.3820* -0.6012* -0.0996* 0.21764* 1.909344 -1.4054
WHEAT lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt mref aref  lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
FRANCE 0.418281* 0.00946* 0.73804* 0.239418 0.226732 -0.1539 -0.23414 0.515967 1.70204* -12.390* -0.25752
AUSTRIA 0.032159 -0.1161* 0.59962* -0.3079* -0.17176 16.40767 -3.2595* 0.123778 -1.98264 -0.13585 -1.4410*
BELGIUM -0.00871 0.190096 -0.66647 0.23363 -0.5928 -9.30979 0.255669 0.98220* 0.673451 -0.08974 0.223388
GERMANY -0.26493 1.83117* -1.9996* 0.262911 0.72479* -1.30603 0.341101 -0.03407 1.104717 0.000986 -0.20254
DENMARK -0.14698 -0.01057 0.54142 0.63755* 0.573726 -8.69949 1.438219 -0.74985 3.76372* -0.10315 1.28012*
IRELAND 0.309252 1.60619* 2.71715* 1.20172* 1.77050* 1.563265 0.096516 -0.07751 0.262729 0.072969 -0.12439
ITALY 0.418281* 0.093364 -1.1564* 0.271463 -0.31699 5.49337* -0.03155 -0.4570* 0.82378* -0.1793* -0.07624
N.LAND 0.032159 8.66129* -0.02184 0.29823* 0.105821 3.95614 -1.1176* 0.38790* -0.42838 -3.7420* 0.100146
SPAIN -0.00871 2.73017* -2.443* 0.539013 0.566459 13.79969 0.546431 -1.8527* -0.38911 0.093347 1.83110*
UK -0.26493 7.6602* 2.79932* 1.56153* 1.48621* 13.7417* -1.1496* 0.15715 -1.6542* -1.6990* 0.07871
GREECE -0.14698 2.9453* -0.28923 2.07638* 2.21500* 8.986458 -0.89616 -1.6649* 0.568849 -0.1162 -0.33917
P.GAL 0.309252 -0.15687 -3.8273* -0.7843 -0.02537 7.416288 0.908698 -0.45924 1.16954* -0.09712 0.97861*
SWEDEN 0.747867 0.009852 -0.8375 -0.7504* 0.196016 -14.941 -3.9644* -0.69011 -0.18167 -0.0390 -1.4301
FINLAND 0.874964 -0.10526 -0.2882 -2.1031* -3.0414* 30.38712 -2.4078 -3.5736* 5.431779 -0.6460 -2.4125
 (Table Continued) 
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(Table Continued) 
WHEAT aref lngdp lnimpqu/lnimpq lndmpr lnprodr mref aref lngdp 
 d7 d8 d9 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
FRANCE -0.552 0.89094* 3.08131* 3.15469* 0.6943* 6.62572* -0.1546* -0.423* 0.45014*
AUSTRIA -1.65514 0.411929 -0.29443 0.07481 0.2292 5.24173* -0.17163 -0.058 0.187085
BELGIUM -0.00299 0.259485 1.61453* 0.03715 0.6928* 1.59809* -0.1794* -0.356* 0.589442*
GERMANY -0.09448 0.404549 0.37384* 1.013766 0.5546* 2.10077* 0.017256 0.09901 0.609937*
DENMARK 1.45145* 0.97542* -0.16501 -3.1629* 2.3463* 0.048707 -0.3990* -0.956* 1.553344*
IRELAND -0.04627 0.39093* 4.79703* 1.03262 0.5828* 2.97349* -0.2702* -0.470* 0.58861*
ITALY -0.3507* 0.37141* 1.1901* 1.013459 0.211506* 1.57305* 0.004054 -0.1236 -0.2149*
N.LANDS 0.214689 0.32367 -0.24269 4.60475* 0.06739 -0.04739 -0.01202 -0.0734 0.245791*
SPAIN 2.14486* 1.10939* 0.53859* 8.01806* 0.41495* -0.02041 -0.4159* -0.421* 0.067798
UK 0.288189 -0.5677* 1.25176* 2.004813 0.026057 5.14037* -0.2434* -0.455* 0.678672*
GREECE -0.34528 0.12551 0.56698* 4.075386 0.589024* 3.88089* 0.214422 -0.1537 -0.17327
P.GAL 1.25330* -0.0970* 1.94095* 3.964956 0.02684* 0.190501 -0.27138 -1.523* 0.000881
SWEDEN -1.9345 3.27466* -0.0960 3.027776 0.6568* 4.84347* -0.4313* -0.3496 0.380414*
FINLAND -5.1470* 2.13570* 2.48023* 8.37967* 2.0822* 0.31797* -1.2797* -1.725* 0.775589*
 
Table 3.2: Variable Definition and Units: 
Variable Name Definition Units 
lndmpr Log of Domestic Price U.S. Dollars per Ton 
(lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp Log of Ratio of Apparent production to Apparent consumption  1000 Tons 
lnconp Log of Consumption 1000 Tons 
mref Dummy Variable capturing the effect of Mac Sharry Reforms  
aref Dummy Variable capturing the effect of Agenda 2000 Reforms  
lnopstk Log of Opening Stocks 1000 Tons 
lngdp Log of Gross Domestic Product Million U.S. Dollars 
lnworldp Log of World Price U.S. Dollars per Ton 
lnexpr Log of Export Refund U.S. Dollars per Ton 
lnexrt Log of Exchange Rates Domestic Currency per U.S. Dollar 
lnimpl Log of Import Levies U.S. Dollars per Ton 
lnimpqu/lnimpq Log of Ratio of Imports from United States to Total Imports 1000 Tons 
lnprodr Log of Production Refunds U.S. Dollars per Ton 
lnexpq Log of Export Quantity 1000 Tons 
lnimpq Log of Import Quantity 1000 Tons 
lnprod Log of Domestic Production 1000 Tons 
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Figure 3.1: Average Domestic price and Average Intervention Price in seven countries which   
                  illustrates a positive relation to opening stock. 
An increase in the ratio of apparent production to apparent consumption, should in ideal 
conditions, increase the opening stocks ceteris paribus. Except for four countries – Ireland, 
United Kingdom, Greece and Sweden, the rest of European Union members conformed to the 
economic theory. This exception could be due to the distortions caused by export refunds. Thus 
an increased production could have increased relative exports in these countries and 
subsequently could have had inverse effects on opening stocks of the country. Our intuition is 
further confirmed by observing the mean annual ratio of consumption to production in Figure 3.2 
which suggests that Greece and Ireland are net exporters of wheat over the 29 year average. The 
magnitude of the elasticities suggests that the ratio of apparent production to apparent 
consumption is relatively elastic except for Belgium-Luxemburg, Ireland, Portugal, Finland and 
Sweden which exhibit fairly inelastic relationships to opening stocks of the country. 
 57
05
10
15
20
25
30
AT BE DK FI FR DE GR IR IT NL PT ES SE UK
M
ill
io
n 
to
ns
Consumption
Production
Figure 3.2: Average Ratio of Consumption and Production of wheat for the fifteen EU countries.   
                   
 Nine countries which include France, Austria, Denmark Germany, Italy, Spain, United 
Kingdom, Greece and Finland show that this relationship is significant at 90% significance level.   
3.3.1.2 Domestic Demand 
The inverse demand function for domestic price was modeled as a function of domestic 
consumption, opening stocks, the Gross Domestic Product of the country and the two policy 
dummy variables one representing the Mac Sharry reforms and the other for Agenda 2000 
reforms. The coefficients in the log-log model for the equation thus represented the elasticities. 
The results show statistical significance across all the countries of the European Union. 
Table 3.1 shows the estimated results for all variables (b1 – b6). Consumption shows a negative 
relation to domestic price which complies with economic theory that as prices increases the 
demand of the commodity decreases. Also all countries exhibit coefficients which are significant 
at the 90% significance level except for Italy which shows an inverse relationship with price. 
GDP shows a positive relation to dependent variable for all the countries which implies that as 
expendable income increases in an economy the prices increase and this could be due to the fact 
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that people tend to buy more with higher expendable income. Greece and Portugal show 
unexpected signs and show that as GDP increases prices tend to decrease. The results also 
suggest that the coefficients are significant at the 90% significance level except for Spain. Four 
countries France, Austria, Denmark and Finland show a negative relation of opening stocks to 
prices which suggests that as opening stocks increase prices tend to decrease on the consumer 
market. The other ten countries in the European Union showed that prices tended to increase 
with an increase in opening stocks. This could be due to the fact that stocks are also eligible for 
export refunds once exported. A higher opening stock would thus displace them on the world 
market due to the subsidy offered for these exports in the countries. Six of the countries showed 
significant effects on price at the 90 percent significance level. The elasticity estimates suggest 
they are inelastic in nature since all the elasticities are less than 1. The dummy variables ‘mref’ 
and ‘aref’ representing the effect of the Mac Sharry Reforms and Agenda 2000 reforms 
respectively showed a negative effect on domestic price across all the European countries, we 
can thus deduce that both these policies depressed domestic prices. Considering that these 
dummy variables were considered as intercept dummy variables the effect could be measured as 
a difference in the intercept and the coefficient of the equation (b1-b3 for mref and b1-b4 for 
aref). Ten out of the fourteen countries which included Austria, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Finland showed that the 
coefficients were significant at 90 percent significance level and that they were relatively 
inelastic for the Mac Sharry Reforms. The Agenda 2000 Reforms further increased this negative 
impact on domestic price with the reforms showing significant negative effect on France at the 
90 percent significance level while Belgium, Greece and Portugal were not affected by either of 
them. 
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3.3.1.3 Export Demand 
Export demand refers to the amount of wheat exported and the various parameters that 
influenced these exported quantities. Economic theory would suggest that the domestic price and 
world price, apart from exchange rate, would affect the amount of exports for any commodity. 
Higher domestic prices would relatively decrease exports while higher world prices would make 
exports more appealing. A relatively lower exchange rate would provide an incentive to 
exporting country providing it more domestic currency for every unit of export. The sub-model 
for exports in our system differed in many aspects to the economic theory mentioned above. 
Coefficients for France, Austria, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom showed a positive 
relation to that of export quantity suggesting that as domestic prices increased exports also 
showed an increase, though none of these showed statistical significance. Ireland, Italy, Sweden 
and Finland were the only countries whose coefficients were negative and significant at 90 
percent significance level indicating that as the domestic prices increased exports to the world 
decreased. Eight countries – Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Finland 
showed that their elasticities are higher than 1 which is suggestive of a highly elastic export 
demand. Six countries which include Belgium Germany, Denmark, Spain United Kingdom and 
Greece show a negative effect of world price on exports. France and Italy are the only countries 
whose coefficients show statistical significance at alpha equal to 90 percent. These two variables 
which in normal situations drive exports thus show less or no effect on most of the member 
countries. This could be due to the fact that exports are primarily driven by domestic policies and 
the export refund regime. Also exports in terms of food aid to third world countries distort trade 
and world price effects. Our intuition is further justified by observing the behavior of export 
refund which shows a positive relation to the amount of exports in eleven of the fourteen 
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countries while Belgium, Portugal and Finland show a negative effect though not statistically 
significant and thus can be ignored. Eight of the countries show that the coefficients have a 
statistical significance and are mostly inelastic except for the Netherlands, Spain and Germany 
which show a very high elastic demand for exports.  
Export countries tend to have a higher exchange rate which reinforces exports, thus 
theory would suggest that higher exchange rates would assist export growth. Our results show 
the contrary in nine countries – Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Greece 
Portugal, Sweden and Finland where the signs suggest that the two variables are inversely related 
to each other. We assume that this could be due to the elaborate structure of the Unit of Account 
system which was later replaced by the adjusted Monetary Compensatory Amount (MCA) 
system further modified by the European Monetary System (EMS). These regulations which 
were instituted to stabilize prices across nations in the European Union to uphold the law of 
single price across the member countries tended to increase domestic supports thus helping 
countries with surplus production with higher domestic support in terms of exports to non-
member countries. Seven countries showed that the elasticities were significant at the 90 percent 
significance level and six countries – Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom and 
Portugal show that the export demand is highly elastic to changes in exchange rates while the 
rest suggest that exchange rate variations were inelastic to export demand.  
The Mac Sharry Reforms dummy variable suggests that exports actually increased in 
ten of the fourteen European countries from 1992 onwards. This is illustrated by the positive sign 
for the coefficients. This could be due to strong world prices (Figure 3.3), and the fact that export 
refunds were frozen at the 1989 levels37 which further assisted domestic farmers and trade. 
                                                 
37 Council regulation (EEC) No: 1766/92 ‘On the Common Organization of the market for Cereals’  
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Austria, Portugal, Sweden and Finland showed a negative sign for the coefficient suggesting that 
these reforms were detrimental to wheat exports from the respective countries. Austria, 
Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK, Greece, Sweden and Finland showed that the 
elasticity estimates are significant at 90 percent significance level. Coefficients for Greece, UK, 
Ireland and Finland indicate that export demand is highly elastic with the Mac Sharry reforms.  
The dummy variable for Agenda 2000 reforms indicates that demand for export had a 
significant effect on exports due the reforms, in Germany, Ireland, UK and Finland while they 
were insignificant in the rest of the member countries. Germany, Ireland and Finland show a 
positive relation to the reforms while UK shows that the reforms had a negative effect on wheat 
export demand in the country. These results could be due to the fact that The EU was a net 
importer of wheat and thus exports would affect only few countries which were the major 
producers in the Union. The UK, Greece and Finland show that the demand for exports were 
elastic in relation to the reforms while the rest of the countries exhibited an inelastic demand. 
3.3.1.4 Import Demand 
The import demand assesses the total domestic demand. Higher prices in the European 
market compared to that of world market would make exports by other countries attractive. 
Policies that restricted this entry thus would have an adverse effect on exporting countries since 
they tend to decrease incentive to import to the EU at a huge cost to domestic consumers and the 
government. The import demand is thus dependent on domestic price, exchange rates, world 
price, import levies, GDP, the two policy variables and the ratio of imports from the U.S to the 
total imports which helps us understand the effect of change in policies on U.S. exports. 
Ten of the fourteen European countries show significant impact of GDP on imports. 
This suggests that higher expendable income led consumers to demand more of import quantities 
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Figure 3.3: World Price for Wheat from 1987 to 1996 
 
 
 
Portugal and the UK show unexpected signs and suggest that as consumer income 
increases the import demand is decreased and are inelastic. This may be due to the artificial 
effects of import levies in these major cereal producers in the European Union. Spain Sweden 
and Finland show that the import demand is highly elastic to GDP increase. Ten countries – 
France, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, the UK, Greece, Portugal and Finland show 
significant elasticity coefficients for the ratio of imports from the US compared to total imports 
from the world to the European Union. We also observe that all these results show a positive 
relation to import demand suggesting that U.S. imports have increased with an increase in import 
demand. Import levies comply with economic theory that it decreases the import demand. All the 
coefficients for the fourteen countries show a negative relationship with import demand. Four of 
the fourteen countries show significance at the 90 percent level and all these countries – France, 
Italy, Netherland and UK show that import demand is highly elastic to changes in to import 
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levies. Only five countries among the fourteen European countries show significant effects on 
imports due to world prices, which suggests that domestic policies have a major role in 
influencing amount of imports in the European Union. Nine of fourteen countries show a 
negative impact on import demand due to world prices which conform to economic theory that 
as prices increase the demand for the good decreases. Six countries – Belgium, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Spain, Greece and Finland show significant elasticity coefficients at 90 percent 
significance level levels. Exchange rates show mixed results for wheat in the import equation. As 
a major importer we expect that imports would increase with decrease in exchange rates. Five of 
the fourteen countries conform to this economic theory while the rest show a positive relation to 
amount of imports. This may be due to the internal market demand and the internal exchange 
rate system that governed trade between the member countries and the rest of the world. 
Belgium, Italy and Germany formed the joint float and restricted their exchange rate compared to 
the U.S. Dollar while the rest of the member countries adjusted their exchange rates and internal 
subsidies to these three country rates rather than the U.S dollar. Import demand is highly elastic 
to exchange rate in seven of the fourteen countries. Five countries which include France, 
Denmark, Italy, UK and Portugal show a significant impact of exchange rates on quantity 
imported at 90 percent significance level. An increase in domestic prices will increase the 
quantity imported. The estimates for domestic price effect for the member countries show that 
eight of the countries – France, Austria, Italy, The Netherlands, UK, Greece, Sweden and 
Finland have a inverse effect on import quantity. The import levies in place to restrict the amount 
of import could actually make imports unattractive and thus hamper trade in these countries. 
Domestic Prices in only three countries – Austria, Italy and UK show significant effect on the 
import quantity at 90 percent significant level. Four of the fourteen countries show significant 
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impact due to the Mac Sharry Reforms which include Denmark, Spain, Portugal and Austria. 
The Agenda 2000 Reforms apart from the four countries affect Finland. The Mac Sharry 
Reforms show a positive significant effect on import quantity in Portugal, Spain and Denmark 
while Austria shows a negative impact, implying that imports decreased as a result of the policy 
change. The Agenda 2000 reforms illustrate that Austria and Finland have a negative impact on 
quantities imported while the rest of the countries significantly affected by the reforms had 
positive impact on import quantities.  
3.3.1.5 Supply Equation 
Supply of wheat was modeled as being a function of domestic price, the production 
refund, GDP which represented the expendable income and the policy re-instrumentations of the 
CAP. All member countries show a positive relation of production refunds to the quantity 
supplied except for The Netherlands and Spain whose coefficients are not significant at 90 
percent significance level. Nine countries – France, Austria, Belgium, Demark, Ireland, Italy, the 
UK, Greece and Sweden show that supply is highly elastic and significant to production refunds. 
Finland shows that supply of wheat is inelastic to production refund and is significant at the 90 
percent significance level. GDP shows a positive relation to the amount of supply in all countries 
except Italy and Greece which implies that as income increases the amount of supply increases. 
Ten of the fourteen countries show that this relation is significant at the 90 percent level. 
Estimates suggest that the Mac Sharry Reforms have had an overall negative impact on 
production of wheat in these countries. Eight of the EU nations show that production had been 
negatively affected significantly by the policy. The Agenda 2000 reforms also had similar 
negative impact on the production of wheat in all the fourteen countries and eight countries show 
significance at the 90 percent significance level. Domestic Price shows a positive relation to the 
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quantity supplied in the member countries implying that as prices increase in the domestic 
markets the supply of wheat increases. Four of the fourteen countries show that this relation is 
significant and elastic at the 90 percent significance level.    
3.3.1.5 Elasticity Results for Rye 
Elasticity results for rye are presented in table 3.3, while the definition of the variables 
remains the same as in table 3.2. Due to lack of disaggregated data for all the cereals except 
wheat for imports by country and commodity, estimation of the ratio of imports by U.S 
compared to total imports was not possible. We assume that total imports thus form a good ratio 
measure of imports by U.S to the European Union. Data for six variables in our analysis which 
included domestic price, opening stocks, import quantity, export quantity and production refunds 
were unavailable for Ireland for analysis of results for rye and hence only fourteen countries 
were included in our analysis. 
3.3.2.1 Inventory Demand 
The inventory demand equation depended on the ratio of apparent production to apparent 
consumption and domestic price. Domestic price across the thirteen countries show a negative 
relation to the quantity demanded which conforms to economic theory of an inverse relation 
between quantity demanded and price. Eight of the thirteen countries showed that these results 
were significant at the 90 percent significance level. The Netherlands and Spain showed a 
positive relation between quantities demanded and price though the relation was not statistically 
significant. The magnitudes of the parameters suggest that except for Greece prices in all other 
countries were highly elastic to quantity demanded. The increase in the ratio of apparent 
production to apparent consumption according to economic theory should increase opening 
stocks. All thirteen countries of the EU conform to this theory and are positively correlated to
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Table 3.3: Empirical Estimation of Elasticities for Rye in the European Union using Non-Linear Three Stage SLS 
RYE   lndmpr (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp   lndmpr 
  a1 A2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
AUSTRIA *1.19332 *-5.70332 *2.71508 0.11921 -0.1404 0.16084 -0.1568 *3.91042 0.05559 -13.47740 0.7409 
BELGIUM 0.07719 *-1.36530 *8.44446 -0.09790 0.1614 0.02829 *-0.3638 -0.06875 0.09064 26.47895 0.9415 
DENMARK *13.06195 -1.51951 1.68536 2.47733 -0.1928 -0.09661 *-0.4887 -0.05872 0.16806 19.14495 -1.8396 
FRANCE -2.54917 *-2.09617 0.40704 -4.15982 *-0.8772 *0.37206 *0.3419 0.05196 0.15408 0.16791 *-3.4648 
GERMANY *19.06222 *-1.55969 *0.49586 -2.94265 *-0.2142 -0.18390 *-0.3848 -0.14515 *0.25337 *17.92232 -0.5684 
GREECE -0.18389 *-0.48137 *1.64825 *11.52886 *-0.5809 0.23824 *-0.2126 -0.02608 *0.90702 0.10876 *-7.4438 
ITALY -0.45502 *-1.40069 *1.10072 0.29889 *-0.2898 *-0.21775 *-0.5241 -0.03694 *0.44832 *35.70048 -1.3536 
N.LANDS 0.20653 -0.48316 *0.89399 1.74532 *-0.1514 -0.03625 -0.4624 0.07017 0.12855 -1.28129 -0.3744 
UK -0.45741 -0.43642 *4.83589 *7.33691 *-0.2354 -0.01569 -0.1412 -0.02281 *0.17240 -2.39083 0.5709 
SPAIN *2.39660 0.42265 0.35087 *2.53454 -0.0228 -0.09892 *-0.3928 0.03185 -0.17924 6.76210 -2.9883 
PORTUGAL *1.23411 *-5.02050 *1.58552 -4.11184 -0.2697 0.33525 0.4262 *0.22809 *1.42425 *38.55650 *-4.2751 
FINLAND *2.88591 -0.25297 *1.49810 1.75872 0.0353 *-0.22996 *-0.5745 -0.10817 *0.40412 0.45958 0.25423 
SWEDEN 1.38275 *-1.10770 *1.48462 *7.11401 *-0.3048 *-0.19670 *-0.508 0.02925 *0.37995 0.99860 -4.9318 
 
RYE lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt mref aref   lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
  c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 D1 d2 d3 d4 d5  D6 
AUSTRIA *1.37796  0.03029 *-2.7321 *-1.07788 *-1.6267 *15.44665 0.28045 -0.78835 *-1.3266 -0.00201 1.71560 
BELGIUM 0.10189 0.23164 5.0284 -3.93243 -0.3761 7.71027 *2.24663 -0.81984 0.4717 -0.37275 0.16076 
DENMARK 0.31789 0.25425 1.0627 -1.17803 -0.5823 2.14175 1.13811 -0.59326 -4.8332 0.10878 0.01527 
FRANCE *1.54425 *33.89145 2.1327 *-1.06940 -0.6530 -19.99380 0.70002 -0.84988 *-1.9229 -0.75940 0.05174 
GERMANY *1.33001 *17.92232 *-2.5531 -0.54181 -0.7067 *45.17485 *2.06507 -2.38284 *-6.9786 -0.41092 *1.08113 
GREECE *7.37959 *37.61494 *9.7823 *-4.26537 -1.7763 -31.45570 *1.86697 -1.19842 -1.8665 *-0.89620 0.16830 
ITALY 0.63193 0.34620 -0.7084 0.84335 -3.2296 -6.00730 0.33921 -1.74846 -0.3707 -0.10260 *3.03501 
N.LANDS *1.79958 0.68877 0.7636 0.22619 -0.0115 -7.82688 0.43829 -0.70467 -0.2591 *-0.91190 0.21509 
UK *3.10836 *1.00474 -4.2458 *1.25275 -1.1044 *13.51014 -0.53413 -0.31611 -0.4901 -0.15460 0.98729 
SPAIN -0.00400 2.43174 -0.8226 -0.24025 0.7929 18.78572 1.74080 -3.97186 -0.0608 -1.64970 4.87248 
PORTUGAL 1.67410 0.19288 1.6864 -0.58357 1.6911 -29.54230 0.43397 2.29046 -2.3263 -0.43790 *3.62532 
FINLAND 0.27299 0.01690 -0.2970 0.24479 -0.3034 *25.19864 1.02789 -0.67235 -0.1288 *-0.56400 *0.91644 
SWEDEN 0.50577 0.03668 -0.0694 -0.55190 -0.2862 0.40255 0.32826 -0.63520 -0.9745 *-0.84400 1.87336 
(Table Continued)
(Table Continued) 
RYE aref lngdp  lndmpr lnprodr mref aref Lngdp 
  d7 d8 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
AUSTRIA -0.50489 -0.3720 -0.0779 6.56390 0.0716 *-0.24867 *-0.5276 -0.0927
*-0.9925 BELGIUM 0.59509 0.6845 0.3029 *17.67505 *0.6006 -0.07161 *-0.4221
DENMARK 0.84627 0.4889 *-1.3435 *7.07593 -0.0245 -0.14063 *-1.0906 0.2800
FRANCE *-2.26136 *1.8125 *-1.0344 0.25256 *-0.1148 *-0.37761 *-0.6829 *-0.2053
GERMANY 0.66587 *-2.6388 -0.1195 *7.78826 *0.4711 *-0.31209 -0.0663 0.0573
GREECE *2.15306 *2.3710 4.0080 *8.86270 *0.0697 *-0.35782 *-1.1795 -0.1171
ITALY -0.43459 *0.6306 *8.0395 *0.29091 0.0096 -0.05773 *-0.5154 *-0.3237
N.LANDS -0.66138 *1.5325 5.7797 *1.05393 0.1481 -0.11640 -0.0110 *-0.4564
UK 30.06800 *-0.4270 *-0.4213 *4.38502 0.0342 -0.02636 *-0.5203 0.2853
SPAIN 0.55886 1.7575 -0.3063 *4.42346 *0.1608 *-0.24489 *-0.7297 0.1468
PORTUGAL *4.45105 1.5714 0.0727 *7.32650 -0.0017 -0.37427 *-0.7528 *-0.2601
FINLAND 0.13659 -1.0687 -0.1597 5.99839 -0.1002 *-0.73088 -0.2612 0.0008
SWEDEN -0.73580 0.1272 -0.3112 *11.73394 0.0017 -0.11600 -0.1979 *-0.456
 
opening stocks. Ten of the countries which include Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, Portugal, Finland and Sweden show that this relation is 
significant at 90 percent significance level. The magnitudes of the log form variable show that 
the relation is elastic except for Germany and the Netherlands.   
3.3.2.2 Domestic Demand 
The demand function which for the simultaneous equation model was modeled as an 
inverse demand function depended on consumption, opening stocks, GDP which represented the 
expendable income, opening stocks and the two policy variables vis-à-vis the Mac Sharry 
Reforms and the Agenda 2000 Reforms of the CAP. Results from the log form model show that 
as prices increased consumption decreased in all countries in the European Union except for 
Finland and Belgium-Luxemburg though the relation was not significant for these two countries 
at 90 percent significance levels. Al other countries which included Austria, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, Spain, Portugal and Sweden showed that the 
relation was significant at the 90 percent significance level. The magnitudes of the parameters 
suggest that the relation is inelastic for all the European countries. An increase in GDP which 
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represented the expendable income of the consumers in each of the countries should in ideal 
conditions increase simultaneously with an increase in prices as people tend to buy more with 
higher expendable incomes. All countries except Spain show this relation to be true while the 
negative relation for Spain is not significant at the 90 percent significance level. Seven of the 
countries – Germany, Greece, Italy, the UK, Portugal, Finland and Sweden show that this 
relation is significant at 90 percent significance level. An increase in opening stocks should in 
ideal conditions decrease prices. Empirical results for this relation show mixed results. Seven of 
the countries comply with economic theory which suggest that as opening stocks increase 
domestic prices should show a decrease as quantity in the market for supply increases, these 
include – Belgium-Luxemburg, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the UK and Finland. None of 
these countries showed a significant relation at the 90 percent significance levels. Austria and 
Portugal show that an increase in opening stocks actually increase domestic prices in each of 
these countries and is significant at the 90 percent significance level. Except for Austria, all other 
countries show that this relation is inelastic. The Agenda 2000 Reforms show that it has an 
overall negative impact on domestic price which suggests that the implementation of the policy 
depressed domestic prices. This was significant in nine of the thirteen countries which included 
Belgium-Luxemburg, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Finland and Sweden at 
the 90 percent significance level. The effect on domestic prices due to the Mac Sharry Reforms 
show mixed results with Portugal, Greece, Austria and Benelux countries showing a positive 
impact due to the implementation of the policy while the rest show a negative impact on prices 
due to the same policy. None of the four countries show significance at 90 percent significance 
level. France, Italy, Finland and Sweden show a significant negative impact due to the policy 
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implementation. It should be noted that Finland being one of the major exporters of rye to the 
world has a significant impact on world prices.  
3.3.2.3 Export Demand 
Export demand accounts for the demand of exports and the various variables that 
influence quantities exported. Quantities exported is modeled as a function of Domestic Price, 
World Price, Export Refunds, Exchange Rates, and the two policy dummies which account for 
significance of the policies on exports (c1 – c7 in table 3.3). Higher world prices would make 
exports more attractive and thus have a positive effect on quantities exported. Coefficients for 
the world price variable showed acceptable statistical results with all of the European countries 
showing a positive correlation to the dependent variable (in this case quantity exported). Spain 
shows that world price is inversely related to that of quantity exported but this relation is not 
significant at 90 percent significance level. Austria, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands 
and the UK showed that this relation is significant at the 90 percent significance level. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients for all the above countries also suggest that this relation is elastic. 
An increase in domestic prices would under ideal conditions decrease the quantity exported to 
the world. Our empirical results suggest that this relation holds true for all the EU countries 
except Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg and Finland though they were not significant at the 90 
percent significance level for these countries. Increase in export refunds would stimulate higher 
extra-EU exports. Results suggest that this positive relation is significant for only four of the 
thirteen countries which included France, Germany, Greece and UK at 90 percent significance 
level. These countries also show that exports are highly elastic to export refunds. A higher 
exchange rate strengthens export quantities and assists export growth. As seen in wheat, 
empirical results suggest the contrary with seven of the thirteen countries namely, Austria, 
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Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, Finland and Sweden. It is vital to observe that the 
Benelux countries and Denmark which represented the ‘fixed floats’ in the historical exchange 
rate regimes show that exchange rates are directly related to that of quantity exported. This 
provides an ample insight on the variation caused by an internal exchange rate system that used 
to be followed in the European Union before the Euro became the common currency. Austria, 
Germany and Greece showed significant effect of exchange rate on the exports of rye. The 
dummy variable for the Agenda 2000 Reforms of the CAP, which represents any significant 
impact of the policy on the exports of rye showed mostly negative impact on quantity exported 
except for Spain and Portugal. This relation was only significant in case of Austria at the 90 
percent significance level. Mac Sharry Reforms showed a more significant impact on member 
countries though the results were not consistent across countries. Except for Italy, the 
Netherlands, the UK and Finland all other countries showed a negative impact on exports due to 
this policy reform. The relation was significant and elastic for Austria, France, Greece and the 
UK. 
3.3.2.4 Import Demand 
The import demand equation in our model tries to captures the import quantity 
demanded. Higher domestic prices relative to the world prices in the European Union would 
make exports by other countries to the EU attractive. Restrictions to this natural flow of 
commodities until they adjust to the world price equilibrium which include import levies try to 
drag a wedge between actual domestic demands for imports to the artificial maintained prices. 
Thus import demand for rye is dependent on domestic prices, the world prices, exchange rate 
changes, import levies, GDP and the two policy dummies. Statistical results from the regression 
suggest that import demand decreased with an increase in import levies. The relation was 
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inelastic for all the countries except for Spain. Greece, Italy, Finland and Spain showed that this 
relation was significant at the 90 percent significance level. An increase in world price for rye 
decreases rye imports to the EU. Results from our empirical formulation suggests that this 
relation holds good for all the countries in the EU though none of them showed any significance 
at 90 percent significance level. This could be due to fact that imports form a very small part of 
total consumption of these countries as shown in Figure 3.3. The Mac Sharry Reforms and the 
Agenda 2000 Reforms have had a largely positive impact on import quantity demanded for rye. 
The Germany, Italy, Portugal and Finland have significant effect for the Mac Sharry Reforms at 
the 90 percent significance level. Except for Finland the other three countries shows that this 
relation is elastic. France shows a negative impact on import quantity demanded due to the 
Agenda 2000 Reforms and that the relation is significant at 90 percent significance. Greece and 
Protugal are the only other countries that show significant effect due to the Agenda 2000 
Reforms on import quantity demanded. This also shows that imports do not have a major impact 
on internal prices and thus policies to reform these largely have minimal impact on prices. 
Exchange rate shows a negative effect to import quantity for all the countries in the EU. This 
follows theoretical assumptions that exchange rate adversely affect import quantity by the 
importing country. Austria, France and Germany show that this relation is significant at the 90 
percent significance level. Higher domestic prices increase the demand for imports. This relation 
also holds true in our analysis for rye import demand. Belgium, Germany and Greece show that 
this relation is significant and elastic at 90 percent significance level.  
3.3.2.5 Supply Equation 
The supply of rye was illustrated as a function of domestic prices, the production refund, GAP 
which represented the expendable income by the population and the two policy dummies which 
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Figure 3.4: Imports as a percentage of total Consumption in the EU 
captured if the change is supply was significant after the policies were implemented. All the EU 
countries show that supply was positively affected by the domestic price in each of the EU 
countries. This conforms to our economic reasoning that supply of rye should be positively 
related to the domestic price. Ten of the thirteen countries in our empirical model show that this 
relation is significant at the 90 percent significance level. These include Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, Spain, Portugal and Sweden. The magnitude of 
the elasticity results show that the relation is highly elastic, that is a slight change in price could 
have a large effect on the supply of rye. The Mac Sharry Reforms had significantly decreased the 
production refunds to nearly fifty percent in the post 1992 years. This made production of rye 
less attractive to farmers. Empirical results show that this relation holds for all the countries in 
the EU. The Mac Sharry Reforms had significant effect on the supply of rye in Austria, France, 
Germany, Greece, Spain and Finland at the 90 percent significance level. The Agenda 2000 
Reforms further decreased the production refunds that farmers were eligible for. Thus supply 
was adversely affected by the introduction of the Agenda 2000 Reforms. This relation was 
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significant for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the UK, Spain and Portugal 
among the thirteen EU nations. An increase in production refunds should increase the supply of 
rye. Empirical results show that except for France all other countries conformed to this economic 
theory interpretation. Belgium, Germany, Greece and Spain show that this relation is significant 
at the 90 percent significance level. The magnitude of the elasticities show that the relation is 
inelastic suggesting that a large increase in production refund show a small increase in the supply 
of rye. 
3.3.1.5 Elasticity Results for Corn 
Results from the Non-linear Three Stage Least Squares (N3SLS) model for our 
simultaneous equation model are presented in table 3.4. Due to unavailability of trade data which 
included export quantity of corn, opening stocks and import quantity prior to 1995, analysis for 
Finland and Sweden were omitted. We thus presume that these countries would follow the 
general trend in trade along with the rest of the European nations considered in our analysis. 
3.3.3.1 Inventory Demand 
Inventory demand which signifies the relation of the opening stocks, domestic price and the ratio 
of apparent production to apparent consumption showed statistically acceptable results. An 
increase in domestic prices influenced by the increased quantity demanded decreases opening 
stocks. This relation holds true in the case of corn in all European Union with all except the 
Netherlands showing that the domestic prices are directly related to the opening stocks. Eight of 
the twelve countries which included France, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the UK 
and Greece showed that this relation was significant at the 90 percent significance level. The 
Netherland shows that the domestic prices are positively related to the opening stocks and that 
the relation is significant at the ninety percent significance level. 
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Table 3.4: Empirical Estimation of Elasticities for Corn in the European Union using Non-Linear Three Stage SLS: 
CORN   lndmpr (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp   lndmpr 
 a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
FRANCE 2.4291 *-1.1308 *6.8775 1.5864 -0.9571 *-0.2615 *-0.5059 *-0.3987 *0.2841 0.0452 -0.4647
AUSTRIA 0.4548 *-1.4601 *1.6391 0.1518 *-0.2278 *-0.3019 *-0.4499 *-0.1930 *0.4211 0.8300 *-24.0806
BELGIUM -0.1143 *-1.3639 *8.0129 0.0022 -0.0280 *-0.5493 *-0.8450 *-2.9499 *0.4117 8.0153 -2.6844
GERMANY -0.3687 *-1.3698 *10.2927 0.1125 -0.1109 *-0.3814 *-0.5319 *-0.1698 *0.3985 0.0545 -0.2497
DENMARK 1.1797 -1.9071 *7.9908 0.0782 *0.1012 *-0.3553 *-0.7118 *-1.3429 *0.3548 3.7721 -1.1454
IRELAND 2.4331 *-15.4992 *2.3128 5.1448 -0.1078 *-0.3198 *-0.5977 -5.5549 0.0961 0.9714 -7.1385
ITALY 10.6049 *-2.0666 *0.3465 0.0823 -0.0261 *-0.5861 *-0.8022 0.2306 0.2961 -3.3167 *-17.4387
N.LANDS 1.5919 *0.7084 0.1787 0.0710 -0.1623 *-0.3966 *-0.6705 0.2485 *0.3608 0.0222 *-1.2656
SPAIN -4.3926 -0.7786 *14.6784 1.5152 -0.0354 *-0.4130 *-0.6469 -0.0710 0.0448 50.9711 -4.3452
UK -3.7344 *-2.1782 *2.0325 0.1052 -0.2633 *-0.3094 *-0.4530 -0.0095 *7.3998 8.6676 -0.6436
GREECE 0.1915 *-5.2283 *15.3625 12.4165 -0.1141 *-0.5759 *-0.9699 *-0.2662 *-0.8370 2.4081 -24.4435
P.GAL 1.5815 -9.0079 *7.4503 0.0387 *-5.6676 *-0.4179 *-0.6859 *-10.5490 *0.3414 14.1762 *-6.4258
 
CORN lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt mref aref   lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
  c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
FRANCE *1.1147 *7.6408 *1.2940 -0.2933 *0.9896 15.0454 *0.7830 -0.4174 *-0.7218 *-0.4535 *-0.8040
AUSTRIA *3.7138 *2.1208 1.8722 -0.3158 *-1.3599 13.8964 *1.1894 -0.0574 -1.9580 -0.3493 -1.6638
BELGIUM 0.0760 0.0765 1.7163 -0.5593 *-3.1796 11.2358 0.6609 0.1947 -0.0504 *-0.6429 0.4353
GERMANY 0.2113 *7.9629 *2.0066 *-4.4726 *-0.3959 17.3134 *1.3946 0.0535 *-0.7015 -0.0186 0.1646
DENMARK 0.1557 0.0938 *5.1419 0.3526 -0.6012 0.5115 *27.1891 -0.1565 -0.3519 -0.1378 *-1.7848
IRELAND 0.2133 *1.9822 *3.2134 0.1019 *3.2134 0.3791 *5.2281 -0.4390 -0.4410 0.0425 0.1620
ITALY *0.9316 0.0147 *3.8825 -0.3245 -0.1237 0.1686 *19.2091 0.2489 -1.1304 0.0173 0.0417
N.LAND *1.0173 *17.2986 *2.0703 -0.2814 -0.2945 0.1024 *19.4245 -0.1532 *-0.8736 *-0.4263 -0.0831
SPAIN *1.8219 0.0107 0.9419 -1.3810 -0.2315 0.8354 1.1364 -0.0855 *-9.7622 -0.0308 0.0971
UK 0.2514 0.0822 *1.9472 *-1.5781 -0.5876 0.3043 *9.2080 *-0.4408 *-0.7743 -0.0252 0.1374
GREECE 0.2882 *0.8527 *5.7596 *-2.2067 *-3.4022 24.0424 1.3439 -0.9687 -0.1289 *-0.5208 *1.1264
P.GAL 1.4014 *0.6455 0.0882 -0.9874 -1.5492 5.1399 *1.5322 -0.1289 *-0.4067 -0.0390 *0.8615
              (Table Continued)  
 
 
(Table Continued) 
CORN aref Lngdp   lndmpr lnprodr mref aref lngdp 
  d7 d8 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
FRANCE *-0.5426 *0.5033 0.2410 *6.4567 0.1071 0.1349 -0.1632 0.1700
AUSTRIA -1.7132 1.7894 0.0800 *3.9043 0.0641 -0.1777 -0.0311 0.2075
BELGIUM -0.0691 0.3382 0.0780 *0.6805 *1.2909 *-0.8815 *-5.2495 *0.8355
GERMANY *-0.5660 *0.3877 -5.3971 *0.5739 *0.1148 0.1771 -0.1192 *0.8396
DENMARK -0.1218 *0.8723 1.7870 *12.5899 0.5839 1.2494 *-1.8924 1.3409
IRELAND *-0.2423 *0.7158 -3.6055 *30.1242 *7.9685 -1.2913 -0.2696 0.1422
ITALY *-0.4851 0.4620 -0.3413 *29.4847 *0.2101 -0.0410 *-0.5989 0.0729
N.LANDS -0.0551 0.0696 -0.1300 *6.2647 *7.4018 -0.4306 -0.1530 *5.5761
SPAIN 0.6342 *1.8301 -0.2747 *0.4349 0.0446 *-0.5627 *-0.6438 *0.4651
UK 0.2290 0.0789 -38.4882 4.4465 1.0243 -0.4703 -1.4000 2.9793
GREECE -0.6342 *1.9946 3.0158 *0.2799 0.0136 *-0.8465 *-0.9805 *0.4247
P.GAL *1.2825 *1.1144 -2.1576 *3.8979 0.3632 -0.0288 -0.1186 *0.1412
 
The magnitude of the parameters suggests that the relation is elastic except for the 
Netherlands. An increase in the ratio of apparent production to apparent consumption would 
increase the opening stocks according to economic theory. This relation holds true in all the 
twelve EU countries in out analysis. Empirical results also suggest that the relation is significant 
for nine of the twelve countries which included France, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain, the UK and Greece. The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that the 
relation is highly elastic. 
3.3.3.2 Domestic Demand 
The domestic demand equation was modeled as a price dependent equation with the 
domestic price being a function of consumption, quantities of opening stocks, the GDP of the 
country as a proxy for expendable income of the population and the two dummy variables each 
for the specific policy regime change to the CAP. Empirical results showed that consumption 
decreased as domestic prices increased and thus was inversely related. This conforms to 
economic theory of an inverse relation to consumer demand of goods as prices of the good 
increased. Results show that this relation was significant at ninety percent significance for only 
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three of the twelve countries which included Austria, Denmark and Portugal. An increased 
quantity of opening stocks should decrease the domestic prices since the supply of the 
commodity increases. This relation holds true for ten of the twelve countries though Italy and the 
Netherlands suggest that the positive relation is not significant. Seven of the twelve countries 
show that the relation is significant at the 90 percent significance level, these included France, 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Greece and Portugal. Elasticity results also suggest that 
the relation is highly elastic for Portugal, Denmark, Germany and Ireland while it is inelastic for 
the rest of the EU nations. GDP shows a positive correlation to domestic prices suggesting that 
as expendable income increases the demand for good increases and hence prices tend to increase. 
This conforms to our knowledge of economic theory which suggests that increased income has a 
positive effect on prices. Eight of the twelve countries show that the relation is significant and 
negative for this relation and include France, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, the UK and Portugal while Greece shows unexpected results for the same. 
Statistical results also show that the relation is inelastic for all the countries except the UK which 
shows a highly elastic relation suggesting that a small change in income could bring about a huge 
change in the domestic price of corn. The two dummy variable each for the policy regime change 
shows that they had a negative impact on domestic price. All the countries in the EU showed that 
the relation was significant for both the policy re-instrumentation of CAP. The relation also 
showed that it was significant for all the countries in the EU and were inelastic in nature.  
3.3.3.3 Export Demand 
For the most part, the estimated parameters for export demand displayed signs 
consistent with economic expectations, and were significant. The quantity exported depended on 
domestic price, world price, export refund, the exchange rates and the dummy variables for each 
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of the reforms of the CAP. An increase in domestic price should decrease quantity exported as 
the domestic market seems more attractive for the sale of the commodities. This holds true for 
our empirical results for all the EU countries. Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and Greece showed 
that this relation was significant and elastic at the 90 percent significance level. An increase in 
world price should in ideal conditions increase quantity exported. All the EU countries conform 
to this economic theory with France, Austria, Italy, The Netherlands and Spain showing 
statistical significance at the 90 percent level. The magnitudes of the coefficients of the 
parameters suggest that except for Italy all the other countries which showed significance were 
elastic to export quantity suggesting that a slight change in world price would have a significant 
impact on quantity of corn exported by the EU. Export Refunds tend to increase the amount of 
quantity exported. All countries in the EU showed that export refunds were positively correlated 
to that of export quantities of corn. France, Austria, Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands, Greece 
and Portugal showed that the relation was significant at the 90 percent significance level. France, 
Austria, Germany and The Netherlands showed that the export quantities were elastic to changes 
in the export refunds. An increase in the exchange rate of an exporting country tends to increase 
the amount of exports to other countries. The relation holds true for all the EU nations with eight 
of the twelve countries showing significance. France, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, The 
Netherlands, the UK and Greece show that the relation is also export quantity is elastic to 
changes in the exchange rates. The policy re-instrumentation of the CAP showed mixed effects 
on the quantity exported with Denmark and Ireland showing an increase in the quantity exported 
due to the implementation of the Mac Sharry Reforms though these were not significant at the 90 
percent significance level. Germany, the UK and Greece showed that the policy had a 
significantly negative effect on the quantity of exports. France showed a positive effect due to 
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the implementation of the Agenda 2000 Reforms of the CAP and was significant at the 90 
percent significance level. The rest of the EU showed that the relation was negative suggesting 
that exports of corn to other countries declined considerably due to the implementation of the 
Agenda 2000 Reforms. Austria, Belgium, Germany and Greece showed that the relation was 
significant at the 90 percent significance level.  
3.3.3.4 Import Demand 
Quantity of imports demanded of corn depended on the domestic prices of corn, the 
world prices, the exchange rate, the applied import levies which were a combination of fixed and 
variable levies, expendable income of the population measured by the change in GDP and the 
policy dummies to capture any significant change in the amount of imports due to their 
implementation. Statistically significant relations were observed for most of the variables in the 
sub model. An increase in domestic price should attract more imports, this relation held true for 
all the EU countries. Austria, France, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, the 
UK and Portugal showed that the coefficients were significant at the 90 percent significance 
levels. The magnitudes of the coefficients suggest that the relation was elastic since all the 
coefficients were higher than 1 except for France which showed less elastic relation to import 
quantity. An increase in world price should in ideal conditions decrease the amount of imports 
since imports would become relatively costly. The relation holds true for all the EU countries in 
our analysis though only the UK showed statistical significance at the 90 percent significance 
level. The magnitude of the coefficient for the UK suggests that the relation is relatively 
inelastic. The less significance of the relation could be due to the fact that the domestic markets 
were kept insulated from the world market through a extensive system of price regimes 
controlled by the CAP policies. This is illustrated in figure 3.4 which shows that the domestic 
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prices in the UK, as an example, were kept relatively higher than the world price while imports 
were kept low through the presence of import levies and the internal exchange rate system. This 
is true for all the countries in the EU though the magnitude of the difference between the 
domestic and world prices differed. 
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Figure 3.5: Domestic and World Prices of Corn for the United Kingdom 
An increased exchange rate would decrease the amount of imports since commodities became 
relatively costly. This economic aspect held true for all the EU nations in our analysis. France, 
Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, the UK and Portugal showed that the relation was significant 
at the 90 percent significance level and was relatively inelastic to import quantity. Import levies 
acted as a deterrent to imports from other countries and hence an increase in the import levies 
decreased the quantity of corn imported to the EU. France, Belgium, The Netherlands and 
Greece showed that the relation is significant at the 90 percent significance level and negative as 
suggested by economic theory. An increase in the spending power of the population would 
effectively lead them to demand more of imports. This holds true for the demand of imports of 
corn by the EU. All the EU countries conform to this economic theory and show a positive sign 
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of the coefficient of the parameter in our sub model for import demand. France, Germany, 
Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal show that this relation is significant at the 90 
percent significance level. The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that except for Spain, 
Greece and Portugal the relation is inelastic. Changes in the CAP have had mixed impact on the 
imports of corn in the EU nations. Greece and Portugal had a positive and significant effect due 
to the implementation of the Mac Sharry reforms, France and Denmark showed a totally opposite 
effect suggesting a decrease in imports due to the implementation of the 1992 reforms. The 
Agenda 2000 Reforms have largely had a negative impact on imports with France, Germany, 
Ireland and Italy showing significance at the 90 percent level. Portugal showed that the 
implementation of the Agenda 2000 Reforms has increased the amount of imports to the country 
and the coefficient was significant at the 90 percent significance level.     
3.3.3.5 Supply Equation 
Supply of corn depended on the domestic prices, the production refunds that farmers 
were paid, the expendable income and the two dummies to capture any significant effect of the 
policy changes in the CAP. An increase in domestic price should increase the amount of corn 
supplied since it is profitable for farmers to produce more. This is reflected in our empirical 
analysis since all the coefficients show a positive relation to quantities supplied. Except the UK 
the rest of the eleven countries show that this relation is significant at the 90 percent significance 
levels. Production refunds also create incentives for increased production and hence increase the 
amount of supply. Results from our analysis show that the production refunds have positive 
effects on production on corn in all the EU nations. Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy and The 
Netherlands show that this relation is significant at the 90 percent significance level. Increased 
household incomes would increase consumption of goods and this holds true for all the EU 
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countries corn supply. Belgium, Germany, Spain, The Netherlands, Greece and Portugal show 
that this relation is significant at the 90 percent significance level. Except for The Netherlands all 
other countries show that the relation is inelastic while the relation is elastic in case of The 
Netherlands suggesting a slight change in the income could increase the amount of supply by a 
significant amount. The two dummy variables which captured significant changes in supply due 
to the implementation of the policies showed mixed results. France, Germany and Denmark 
showed that the Mac Sharry Reforms actually help increase production in these countries though 
they were not statistically significant while the rest of the countries showed a negative effect on 
the production of corn due to its implementation. Belgium, Spain and Greece showed that the 
effect of the reforms was significant at the 90 percent significance level. All the EU countries 
showed a decrease in production of corn due to the reforms of the Agenda 2000 of the CAP. 
Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Spain and Greece showed that the result was significant at the 90 
percent significance level.  
3.3.1.5 Elasticity Results for Barley 
Table 3.4 shows the elasticity coefficients for Barley. The definition of the variables 
remains the same as that defined in table 3.2. The amount of trade in barley which includes both 
imports and exports formed a significantly small amount of total trade in cereals. Thus we expect 
that trade related variables have little or no significant effect on the prices, consumption and 
production of the commodity. The following sections discuss the results from each of the sub 
models in our N3SLS simultaneous equation model. 
3.3.4.1 Inventory Demand 
Inventory demand which estimates the effect of variables on the opening stocks of a 
commodity are modeled as a function of domestic prices and the ratio of the apparent production 
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to apparent consumption. An increase in prices would in ideal conditions decrease the amount of 
opening stocks due to higher demand of barley by consumers. All the EU countries showed that 
this relation holds true. France, Germany, Ireland, Greece and Portugal showed that the relation 
is significant at the 90 percent significance level while the magnitudes of the coefficients showed 
that the relation is highly elastic. An increase in the ratio of apparent production and apparent 
consumption should increase the inventory added. This holds true for all the EU nations with all 
the fourteen countries except Spain showing that the relation is significant at the 90 percent 
significance level. The magnitudes of the coefficients which represent the elasticities suggest that 
except for The Netherlands all the other countries show that the relation is highly elastic.  
3.3.4.2 Domestic Demand 
Domestic demand measures the effects on domestic consumption of barley and the variables that 
affect it. A price dependent domestic demand equation is generated for the model to normalize 
the simultaneous equation system. Thus domestic prices are a function of domestic consumption, 
the opening stocks or the inventory, the expendable income and the two dummies to account for 
any significant changes in domestic prices due to the implementation of policy reforms in the 
CAP. Economic theory suggests that consumption decrease with increase in the prices. This 
holds true in our analysis for all the fourteen EU nations. The relation is significant for France, 
Belgium, Ireland, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Sweden. The magnitudes of the elasticities 
suggest that except for Sweden the relation is highly elastic. Increased opening stocks suggest 
decreased prices in the domestic country. Mixed statistical results were observed for the relation 
with France, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain showing a positive effect on domestic 
prices though none of the above countries showed that the relation is significant. Germany, the 
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Table 3.5: Empirical Estimation of Elasticities for Barley in the European Union using Non-Linear Three Stage SLS 
BARLEY   lndmpr (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp   lndmpr 
  a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
FRANCE  2.4244 *-21.5909 *12.1271 1.4090 *-15.0248 -0.0450 *-0.3155 0.0212 *0.4496 0.4440 *-2.9029
AUSTRIA  1.2856 *-9.5415 *4.2187 0.0408 -0.9160 *-0.3668 *-0.5306 0.0042 *0.4387 10.6965 -0.4939
BELGIUM  1.8098 *-4.2306 *11.1232 1.8884 *-0.3935 *-0.2853 *-0.7304 0.0401 0.1743 8.6573 -1.2476
GERMANY  0.9280 *-20.7089 *42.5574 *0.1506 -0.3370 *-0.3569 *-0.5641 *-0.1275 *0.5489 4.9556 -0.0823
DENMARK  -0.3137 -0.5809 *8.4644 1.1331 -4.7174 *-0.2654 *-0.4183 -0.0716 0.1884 2.3880 -1.4188
IRELAND  1.2786 *-0.3549 *4.0302 -0.0235 *-12.2620 -0.2382 -0.4603 -0.2265 *1.3934 6.1446 -0.1047
ITALY  7.4009 -0.9110 *0.8126 0.0716 -0.9624 *-0.3625 *-0.4723 -0.1500 *0.1171 -14.8390 -3.3099
N.LANDS -0.0422 -0.6958 *0.4052 0.1405 -0.7005 *-0.2700 *-0.4375 0.1071 *0.2931 2.8321 -0.2963
SPAIN  -0.0176 -0.2693 0.6394 0.1239 *-0.7849 *-0.4563 *-0.5591 0.0488 *5.5266 0.2609 -0.8082
UK  1.1754 -0.6264 *8.4406 -0.0401 -0.2809 *-0.4270 *-0.5821 *-0.2341 0.1333 *1.2846 -4.0365
GREECE  0.0309 *-0.6133 *8.5081 0.0399 *-0.5452 -0.0311 -0.0483 *-0.2433 *1.8221 *58.4581 -6.0589
P.GAL -1.2653 *-0.6994 *3.6833 0.3017 *-1.1910 *-0.3181 *-0.3856 -0.0826 *3.8334 34.9633 -2.9941
SWEDEN  0.3516 -0.1144 *4.5200 -0.0059 *-0.6514 *-0.7453 *-1.5157 *-0.2344 *0.2358 0.9223 *-0.8170
FINLAND  -0.0173 -0.0162 *1.1155 1.2804 -0.2243 *-0.5091 *-0.6448 -1.0617 *0.2671 0.0044 *-0.6786
 
BARLEY lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt mref aref   lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
  c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
FRANCE  0.0602 *6.9985 0.0526 -0.7788 -0.1494 12.4393 0.7453 -0.4815 -1.8652 -0.4573 -0.3419
AUSTRIA  0.1962 0.0570 0.0865 -0.3900 -0.6060 0.8134 *11.7989 -0.5748 -0.4466 *-0.5945 0.0160
BELGIUM  0.2649 0.0301 0.1225 -0.0439 -1.0570 5.2054 0.2670 -0.0156 0.4751 0.1188 0.2636
GERMANY  0.2675 *0.1503 *1.5059 -0.0732 -1.0617 *17.1080 0.3703 0.1950 -0.6576 -0.0336 0.1925
DENMARK  0.3166 0.0241 0.1351 -0.3070 -0.0281 1.7595 *1.5787 -2.5135 0.2254 0.1390 *1.8182
IRELAND  0.0619 *1.8059 *2.8493 *-0.7544 *-0.9292 0.6633 0.3695 0.9011 -6.3973 -0.0500 0.6498
ITALY  0.6326 *6.8514 *4.9656 -0.0645 -0.0609 *1.8938 *1.5231 -0.0907 -0.9107 -0.4983 0.0376
N.LAND 0.2177 0.1913 *0.8652 -1.9492 -0.8644 *0.2140 0.6279 *0.5520 0.8994 *-13.0704 0.0805
SPAIN  1.1193 0.1446 0.0626 -0.4526 -1.6981 *53.0176 0.4843 -0.6099 -0.7676 -1.3825 -2.1126
UK  0.2360 0.2046 0.5694 -0.0813 -0.6749 8.3142 *1.6590 0.4530 *-9.3113 *-6.2380 *-1.2561
GREECE  0.1132 0.4054 1.9054 -0.3891 *-6.9692 -3.3598 *8.7245 -0.7688 -0.8010 -0.1191 *-0.8820
P.GAL 0.0918 1.1260 1.3449 -0.4023 *-4.1561 *0.8276 0.4757 -0.0886 -3.2126 -0.2591 0.2000
SWEDEN  0.5412 0.2055 0.7724 -0.1581 -0.5149 5.1793 1.5585 -0.1556 -1.4444 -0.5308 -0.8974
FINLAND  0.1572 *9.8080 *7.6993 *-0.8037 *-1.1552 1.2586 *18.4782 -0.1476 -0.0567 -0.6128 *-2.0024
 
(Table Continued) 
BARLEY aref lngdp   lndmpr lnprodr mref aref lngdp 
  d7 d8 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
FRANCE  *-1.4062 0.6024 -0.0262 0.1232 -0.0216 -0.0731 *-0.0676 *9.4044
AUSTRIA  -0.3714 0.6100 -0.0641 *7.0111 0.0038 *-0.1872 *-0.4363 0.0395
BELGIUM  -0.2077 -0.1086 -0.0708 *8.8511 *3.2071 *-0.4068 *-0.5931 -0.1609
GERMANY  0.3438 *-0.7858 *-0.4412 *4.8217 *8.9584 -0.1291 -0.2288 *0.4233
DENMARK  *3.0714 *-1.6708 -0.0402 *10.5102 0.0398 *-0.3151 *-0.2901 -0.0992
IRELAND  0.3384 -0.1264 *-0.0495 *0.1419 *5.6559 *-0.1623 *-0.4518 *0.1383
ITALY  -0.2891 *-0.4163 *-0.5555 0.2164 *7.2481 *-0.4986 *-0.8805 *0.4582
N.LANDS 0.0362 *0.6232 0.0631 *5.2960 -0.0127 -0.1458 -0.3446 0.1513
SPAIN  0.1793 *-1.6604 *-0.7028 *5.5264 *4.2626 *-0.5163 *-0.7022 *0.3329
UK  0.0180 0.5680 -0.0407 *8.6708 *0.2451 -0.1402 *-0.2276 -0.0872
GREECE  *-1.0649 *2.0205 -0.2011 *0.3676 0.0483 -0.0142 *-0.3250 *8.5611
P.GAL 0.0694 *0.7094 -0.2747 3.2908 0.0008 -0.5746 *-1.6406 0.1041
SWEDEN  -1.9479 0.7093 *-0.4128 *8.5327 *-0.0787 *-0.4095 *-0.6997 0.1136
FINLAND  -1.9023 -0.5558 -0.3780 *7.3706 *3.0473 -0.1760 -0.2025 0.1398
 
UK, Greece and Sweden showed that the relation is significant at negative, thus conforming to 
economic theory of inverse relation. The magnitudes of the coefficients suggest that the relation 
is inelastic thus a very large change in opening stocks would signify a small change in domestic 
prices. Increased expendable incomes would increase domestic demand and hence increase the 
domestic prices of the commodity in our case Barley. All fourteen countries show that the 
relation holds true, further the relation seemed significant for France, Austria, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Sweden and Finland. Except for Portugal, 
Greece, Spain and Ireland the relation shows that it is inelastic. The two policy dummies which 
accounted for any significant changes in the domestic prices due to change in policy show 
negative effect on the prices for all the countries in the EU. The relation was significant for 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, the UK, Portugal Sweden 
and Finland for the Mac Sharry reforms of 1992. The Agenda 2000 Reforms of the CAP showed 
significant effect on all the EU countries except Ireland.  
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3.3.4.3 Export demand 
Export demand modeled the relation between the quantities exported of barley to the 
various other variables that influenced these exports. The quantity exported of barley depended 
on the domestic price of barley, the world price, the exchange rates, the export refunds that 
distorted trade and made exports viable for many of the EU countries and the dummy variables 
which accounted for the significance of policy re-instrumentation of the CAP. Increase in the 
domestic prices should in ideal conditions make exports less attractive and more quantities sold 
in the domestic market. This is signified by all the countries in the EU in our empirical results. 
The relation was significant for France, Sweden and Finland. An increase in world price should 
in ideal conditions increase the quantities of barley exported to the rest of the world. This holds 
true for all the EU nations in out analysis, though none of them showed significance at the 90 
percent significance levels. Increased export refunds will increase exports of barley which can be 
seen to be true from the table France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Finland showed that the 
relation was significant. Except for Germany the other three EU countries showed that the 
relation was highly elastic suggesting that a small increase in export refunds could give rise to a 
relatively higher increase in exports of barley. Increased exchange rates of exporting countries 
would increase the amount of exports by the country since it brings relatively more units of 
foreign currency per unit of commodity sold. All the EU nations show that this positive relation 
of exchange rates to that of quantity of exports holds true. Germany, Ireland, Italy, The 
Netherlands and Finland show that this relation is significant and the magnitudes of the 
coefficients suggests that the relation is elastic. The CAP reforms had a negative impact on the 
quantities of barley exported to the world since they were aimed at decreasing the trade 
distortions caused by the controlled price regimes followed in the EU. The negative impact of the 
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Mac Sharry reforms of the CAP was observed to be significant for Ireland and Finland while it 
was significant for Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Finland due to the implementation of the 
Agenda 2000 Reforms.  
3.3.4.4 Import demand 
The import demand sub-model in our simultaneous equation model specifies the effect 
on import quantity of barley due to factors like domestic prices, world prices, exchange rates, 
import levies, income and the two dummies which observe significant impact of the reforms of 
the CAP. An increase in domestic prices increases the amount of imports since it becomes more 
attractive for the rest of the world to export excess barley to higher priced markets. Our statistical 
results conform to this theory showing a significant relationship in four of the fourteen countries 
which included Austria, Denmark, the UK and Finland. The magnitudes of the coefficients 
suggest that the relation is highly elastic. Increased world prices should decrease the amount of 
imports by any importing country. This holds true for all the EU nations except The Netherlands 
none of them showed any significant at the 90 percent significance level. This may be due to the 
fact that the EU markets were highly insulated from the market fluctuations in the world markets. 
Importing countries import more of goods when the exchange rates decreases. This theory was 
statistically proven in our analysis with all fourteen countries showing the negative effect of 
exchange rates on the quantities of barley imported. The relation was significant for the UK and 
was also highly elastic. Import levies tend to decrease the amount of imports to the country thus 
differentiating the markets and keeping domestic prices higher than it would have normally been 
in their absence. The relation was significant for Austria, The Netherlands and the UK while the 
rest of the EU countries though showing a negative impact on the quantities of barley imported 
did not show any significance at the 90 percent significance level. This may also be due to the 
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fact that the quantities of barley imports were relatively insignificant compared to the rest of the 
cereals. Increased expendable income usually increases the demand for imports. We observe 
mixed results for this relation with France, Austria, the UK and Sweden showing that the imports 
was positively related to amount of imports while the rest of the countries showing the contrary. 
The two policy dummies which captured any significant effects of CAP reforms showed mixed 
impact on imports of barley. While the UK, Greece and Finland showed a significantly negative 
impact of the Mac Sharry Reforms on the imports of barley, Denmark showed a significant 
positive impact of imports due to the implementation of the 1992 reforms. France and Greece 
also showed a negative impact on imports of barley due to the implementation of the Agenda 
2000 reforms while Denmark showed significantly positive effect on the quantity of barley 
imported into the country. These mixed results could be due to the fact that the implementation 
of the reforms also corrected for the increased domestic prices which over the years was 
realigned to the world prices thus export of barley became unattractive when the transportation 
and other costs were accounted for. 
3.3.4.5 Supply Equation 
The supply of barley depended not only on the domestic prices but also on the 
production refunds, the consumer incomes and the effect of the policy reforms of the CAP. 
Theoretically, increased prices should increase the quantity of barley supplied to the market. The 
relation is statistically significant and positive for Austria, Denmark, The Netherlands, Spain, the 
UK, Greece and Finland. The magnitudes of the coefficients suggest that the relation is highly 
elastic to the domestic prices in the EU countries. Increased production refunds to farmers should 
in ideal conditions increase the amount of supply. This holds true for all the EU countries. The 
relation was observed to be significant for Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, the UK, 
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Finland and Sweden. Increased incomes of the domestic population would ideally increase the 
demand for barley and hence increase the supply of the commodity. Six of the fourteen countries 
showed that the relation was significant and positive which included France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Spain and Greece. The two policy variables had a negative effect on the supply of barley in 
all the countries of the EU. Seven of the EU countries which included Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Sweden showed that the relation was significant at the 90 
percent significance level for the reforms implemented in 1992. The Agenda 2000 reforms show 
that the relation was significant and negative for all countries except for Germany, the 
Netherlands and Finland. 
3.3.1.5 Elasticity Results for Oats 
Results from the three-stage non linear least square simultaneous equation system has 
been documented in table 3.6. Due to non availability of import quantities, production quantities 
and the amount of consumption of oats in Finland and Sweden these countries were excluded 
from our analysis. We assume that these countries would follow the general trend of the 
regression results. 
3.3.5.1 Inventory Demand 
The inventory demand which estimates the relation of the quantities of opening stocks 
and the variables that affect it was modeled as a function of the domestic prices and the ratio of 
apparent production to apparent consumption. An increase in the domestic prices would in ideal 
conditions decrease the quantities in opening stocks as the demand in the market increases. This 
holds true for all the EU nations in our model. Five countries which included Austria, Denmark, 
The Netherlands, Spain and Greece show that this relation is significant at the 90 percent 
significance level. The relation was elastic in case of Austria, Spain and The Netherlands while it 
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was inelastic for the rest of the countries. An increase in the ratio of apparent production to 
apparent consumption in ideal conditions should increase the amount of opening stocks. Thus the 
parameter has a positive effect on the quantities of opening stocks. This holds true for all the EU 
countries in our analysis. All the twelve countries show that the relation is significant at the 90 
percent significance level. Except for Germany, the coefficients of the parameters suggest that 
the relation is elastic and that a slight change in the ratio could have a relatively higher change in 
the amount of opening stocks held by those countries.  
3.3.5.2 Domestic Demand 
The total consumption by the population was modeled as a price dependent equation in the 
econometric model. Thus, prices depended on the amount of consumption, the opening stocks, 
GDP which accounted for the expendable income of the population and the two dummy 
variables which try to observe any significant changes in the domestic consumption and prices 
due to policy regime changes. An increase in the prices would in ideal conditions decrease the 
amount of consumption. Statistical results suggest that this theory of demand holds true for all 
the EU nations. The relation was significant at the 90 percent significance level for France, 
Germany, Denmark, Spain, UK, Greece and Portugal. The magnitudes of the coefficients suggest 
that except for Spain and Portugal the relation was elastic and hence a slight change in 
consumption behavior had a profound effect on the prices of oats in the country. Increased 
opening stocks tend to decrease domestic prices since the supply of oats for the market is higher. 
This relation is justified in our empirical model. Germany, Denmark, The Netherlands and The 
UK show that the relation was negative and significant at the 90 percent significance level. GDP 
which acts as a proxy for income changes in the country shows that an increase in the income of 
the population in the country tends to increase domestic prices of the commodity in our case oats
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Table 3.6: Empirical Estimation of Elasticities for Oats in the European Union using Non-Linear Three Stage SLS 
OATS   lndmpr (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp   lndmpr 
  a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
FRANCE 1.9877 -1.1906 *9.6719 -0.8782 *-5.8762 -0.0783 *-0.3791 -0.0445 *0.4449 0.3181 -0.3188
AUSTRIA -1.6999 *-3.1821 *2.6355 -0.4302 -0.0488 -1.7113 -0.2369 -0.9654 *0.4179 3.9365 -1.0517
BELGIUM -2.0743 -0.2865 *7.8874 0.2300 -4.0786 -0.1767 *-0.4207 -0.0199 *0.3728 46.9580 *-4.1141
GERMANY -0.0173 -0.7948 *0.7157 -0.3660 *-8.0337 *-0.2148 *-0.3390 *-1.3727 *0.4969 14.7492 *-2.2456
DENMARK -0.2808 *-0.9084 *8.0109 0.6979 *-1.2299 *-0.2216 *-0.5909 *-0.2778 0.1822 -4.0734 -0.5311
IRELAND 0.0365 -1.1145 *9.9807 5.4140 -0.1486 -0.1671 *-0.4782 -0.0882 0.0828 -15.2515 -0.0983
ITALY 0.2589 -1.7054 *6.2175 -4.0502 -0.1668 *-0.3837 *-0.6660 -0.1330 *0.7724 3.0687 -0.3805
N.LANDS 0.2145 *-15.9312 *3.1657 0.9315 -0.0560 -0.0785 -0.1428 *-0.5318 *0.2592 11.1351 *-1.0206
SPAIN 0.0159 *-1.1169 *4.1696 3.2194 *-0.6709 *-0.4333 *-0.3938 -0.0096 0.1033 19.6960 -1.4948
UK 0.0593 -0.0386 *3.4407 15.6731 *-1.3804 *-0.3813 *-0.3901 *-0.3468 *0.2106 -10.8812 -1.3505
GREECE -0.1966 *-0.9614 *2.9207 -0.5168 *-1.0310 *-0.6862 *-0.8454 -0.0736 *0.9483 16.5341 *-3.1597
P.GAL 0.0620 -0.4927 *2.1237 9.8313 *-0.8252 *-0.3983 *-0.5553 -0.0163 *2.8188 28.2251 *-2.0844
 
OATS lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt mref aref   lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
  c3 c4 C5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
FRANCE 0.2964 0.1304 0.0109 *-0.6450 -0.7591 0.3351 0.8860 -3.2030 *-1.5583 -0.4868 0.0571
AUSTRIA 0.5451 3.3320 0.2410 *-4.0499 *-4.0137 1.8582 *1.7173 -0.4551 -0.0382 -0.2694 *-2.3382
BELGIUM *0.1589 0.0316 1.1029 -0.7582 -0.6917 7.2877 0.1701 -0.9493 -0.3360 *-1.9529 *-0.2636
GERMANY 0.0150 *5.3220 0.2497 -0.0734 -0.3261 33.3707 0.0306 0.3492 *-1.9697 -0.0471 0.2218
DENMARK 0.4837 0.0191 0.7403 -0.1181 *-5.3771 6.6419 0.3090 -0.2493 -1.1596 -0.2115 0.5115
IRELAND 0.4656 0.0877 *4.2849 -0.0045 -1.4414 8.3077 0.6176 -0.1841 *-2.2781 -0.1895 -0.2392
ITALY 2.6987 0.2186 0.4574 -1.4046 2.4779 10.4374 0.6024 0.0856 *-0.6526 -0.1235 *-1.3740
N.LAND 1.0130 2.1813 1.3178 *-0.6888 *-1.0824 -5.8437 0.9127 -0.6361 *-0.2091 *-1.9669 -0.4051
SPAIN 0.0475 0.0782 *3.0215 -0.2567 -0.4275 -54.4403 *4.6718 1.7018 *-0.4772 -0.2624 *-0.8083
UK *1.5507 0.1091 *2.3622 *-2.7603 *-1.9669 19.8118 *3.7146 -0.4584 -1.0453 -0.2697 *-1.4533
GREECE 0.1075 0.1651 0.4024 *-1.8264 *-2.9867 -10.2463 0.3559 0.6922 -1.6819 -2.2121 0.1207
P.GAL 1.3191 *1.9432 0.6056 *-3.9480 -1.6224 -9.3685 1.6181 1.1160 -0.9168 -0.0269 *-0.1628
                (Table Continued) 
 
 
 
 
(Table Continued) 
BARLEY aref lngdp   lndmpr lnprodr mref aref lngdp 
  d7 d8 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
FRANCE -0.8843 0.0176 14.1717 *0.3374 0.1057 *-0.2353 *-0.2473 *7.8370
AUSTRIA *-2.1014 0.1209 -0.0052 *0.2344 *8.1418 *-0.3105 *-0.5475 0.0266
BELGIUM *-0.3128 *0.6728 15.2875 0.4035 *3.7148 -0.0102 -0.1185 *0.4465
GERMANY *-1.9278 *0.8921 14.1457 0.2951 0.0012 *-0.1123 *-0.3342 0.1221
DENMARK -0.1255 *1.1803 10.0113 0.2837 *0.8241 -9.3000 -0.0860 *0.4537
IRELAND *-0.7030 0.4600 -0.0015 0.2480 *5.0039 -0.0243 -0.0608 0.0480
ITALY *-0.4321 0.4663 6.4393 *0.2474 0.0753 *-0.0582 -0.0749 0.0382
N.LANDS -0.1637 0.9647 20.1987 0.4730 1.1062 -0.1030 -0.0732 0.2367
SPAIN -0.1171 *2.0950 -0.9338 *6.2110 0.0939 *-0.4608 -0.1776 0.0851
UK -1.0504 0.5826 10.5173 2.1946 0.1038 -0.0044 -0.0245 1.3293
GREECE 1.5069 0.6113 -0.0790 0.1425 *0.2878 -0.0150 *-0.0893 0.0617
P.GAL -0.0203 0.2079 10.8356 *1.7876 0.0330 -0.4100 -0.4505 0.1693
 
The relation was significant in nine of the twelve countries which included France, 
Austria, Belgium, Germany Italy, The Netherlands UK, Greece and Portugal. Portugal shows 
that the relation was elastic while the rest of the countries suggest that it was highly inelastic to 
the income changes of the population. The changes in the policies had a largely negative impact 
on the prices suggesting that their implementation forced the domestic prices to decrease in 
member countries. While Germany, Denmark, Italy, UK Spain, Greece and Portugal showed that 
Mac Sharry Reforms of 1992 had significant negative impact on the domestic prices of oats, all 
the member countries except Austria and The Netherlands showed that the Agenda 2000 
Reforms had significant effect on the domestic prices of oats in the respective countries.  
3.3.5.3 Export Demand 
Quantities of oats exported were modeled as a function of the domestic prices, world 
prices, export refunds, exchange rates and the two policy variables which captured any 
significant impact on the quantities exported due to the implementation of the new policies in the 
CAP. Increased domestic prices would make exports unattractive. This relation holds true for all 
the countries in the EU. Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands, Greece and Portugal show that the 
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relation is significant and the magnitudes of the coefficients show that they are highly elastic in 
the log-log sub model. Increased world prices would in ideal conditions make quantities exported 
increase. All the EU member countries show that the relation holds true though only Belgium 
and UK show that the relation is significant at the 90 percent significance level. Increased export 
refunds would make exports to other countries more attractive and would give a premium for 
traders to export more oats over the world price. Only Germany and Portugal show that the 
relation was significant though all the countries show a positive sign of the coefficient for the 
parameter suggesting that though the relation holds true only two countries show any significant 
statistical results. This could be due to the fact that a relatively small amount of oats is traded 
when compared to other cereals between the EU and the rest of the world. Increased exchange 
rates would in ideal conditions make the exports attractive since relatively more national 
currency are bought in per unit of oats sold in the world market. The relation is significant for 
Ireland, Spain and UK at the 90 percent significance level. The Mac Sharry Reforms and the 
Agenda 2000 Reforms were implemented to decrease trade distortions caused by keeping 
domestic prices artificially higher than the world prices while adding trade instruments to 
prevent imports. Thus they have had a negative influence on the quantities exported since their 
implementation decreased the amount of export refunds to oat farmers and hence made exports 
less attractive. France, Austria, The Netherlands, UK, Greece and Portugal showed that the 
relation was negative and significant due to the implementation of the Mac Sharry Reforms. 
Austria, Denmark, The Netherlands, UK and Greece showed that the exports were significantly 
lowered due to the implementation of the Agenda 2000 Reforms.  
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3.3.5.4 Import Demand 
The quantities of oats imported was influenced by domestic prices, world prices, the 
exchange rates, the import levies implemented by the EU the income of the population and the 
implementation of new policies aimed at decreasing distortions to trade. Increased domestic 
prices made imports of oats more attractive as it would be cheaper to buy oats from the world 
market with higher demand in the domestic markets. This relation holds true for all the EU 
nations though only Austria, Spain and UK showed that the relation was significant at the 90 
percent significance level. A decrease in world price would make imports cheaper and hence 
increase the quantities of oats imported. Though the sign of the coefficients suggests that the 
relation holds true none of the EU member countries showed that the relation was statistically 
significant at the 90 percent significance level. This could be due to the fact that very 
insignificant quantities of oats are being imported by the EU and that world prices have been 
relatively stable for the last three decades. A decreased exchange rate would make imports 
attractive since they can be bought at a relatively cheaper national currency. France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands and Spain show that the relation is statistically significant at the 
90 percent significance level. Import levies are aimed at decreasing the amount of quantities 
imported into any country since it creates a wedge between world prices and domestic prices. 
Though the relation was negative for all the countries in the EU it was significant for Belgium 
and The Netherlands. Increased income of the population would generate higher demand for the 
commodity in our case oats. The relation was true for all the member countries in the EU though 
it showed significance at the 90 percent significance level for Belgium, Germany, Denmark and 
Spain. The reforms of the CAP which were in their earlier form more protective of domestic 
markets and tended to the world market influence on the EU markets showed that it had a mixed 
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effect on the imports. While quantities of imports increased due to the implementation of the 
Mac Sharry Reforms in France, Germany, Denmark, Ireland and Greece it had a negative impact 
for the rest of the EU countries. The Agenda 2000 Reforms had a largely negative impact on the 
quantities imported except for Greece which showed significantly increased imports of oats due 
to the implementation of the 2000 reforms.  
3.3.5.5 Supply Equation 
Supply of oats in the EU was influenced by the domestic prices, the production refunds, 
the changes in the expendable income of the population and the policy change regimes of the 
CAP. We observed that increased domestic prices increased the quantities of oats supplied to the 
market. France, Italy, Spain and Portugal showed that the relation was significant at the 90 
percent significance level. The relation was elastic for Spain and Portugal thus suggesting that a 
slight change in the prices had a significantly higher change in the quantities of oats supplied. 
The production refunds made production of oats more attractive since it gave an incentive to the 
farmer to produce oats though not economically viable. The relation showed significant effects 
on the quantities supplied for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Greece. The coefficients 
suggested that it was highly elastic for Austria, Belgium and Ireland. Increased income would in 
ideal conditions lead to higher demand and hence a higher supply of oats. This held true for all 
the EU nations. France, Belgium and Denmark showed that the relation was significant at the 90 
percent significance level. The Mac Sharry Reforms of 1992 and the Agenda 2000 Reforms had 
a largely negative impact on the quantities of oats supplied since they decreased and in some 
cases removed all production refunds for oats. Mac Sharry reforms had significant impact on the 
supply of oats in France, Austria, Germany, Italy and Spain while the Agenda 2000 reforms had 
a significant negative impact on supplies in France, Austria, Germany and Greece.  
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CHAPTER 4 
FORECASTING DOMESTIC PRICE EFFECTS EU 
4.1 Introduction 
Forecasting different scenarios based on the econometric framework developed in our 
model enables us to better understand the effects of different policy initiatives and their 
subsequent welfare effects on different agents in agricultural trade including the exporters, the 
importers, the governments and the farmers in each of the trading countries.  We incorporate the 
estimation results from our econometric model to develop a free trade scenario between the EU 
and the U.S. for wheat. Theory would suggest that restrictions to trade tend to decrease imports, 
control market prices and increase the opening stocks in the country.  
4.2 Modifications to the Data 
Certain assumptions are made in order to forecast a free trade scenario for wheat which 
is documented in this section. To develop a forecasting framework for our existing econometric 
model we assume that the exogenous variables in our model which include the GDP of the 
country representing the expendable income, the population of the country and the consumption 
behavior of the consumers follow a logarithmic trend. Since in a free trade scenario there is no 
distortions to trade we assume that the export refunds, import levies and the production refunds 
will have no effect on imports and domestic prices. The simultaneous five equation system is 
solved for three variables that include the opening stocks, domestic prices and domestic 
production separately forming three reduced form equations in Mathematica each for one of the 
dependent variables.  
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Changes in opening stocks would indicate the change in the amount of government 
procurement at higher prices than what the market dictates. Decreased opening stocks thus would 
signify lower procurement by government agencies. Equation 4.2 illustrates the reduced form 
equation for opening stocks derived from our econometric model and solved in Mathematica. 
The coefficients and the parameters are defined in Appendix 2 for the reference of the readers.   
4.2.3 Production 
The reduced form equation for domestic price generated from Mathematica is presented 
in equation 4.1. Since the domestic price is seen in all the five equation (as described in 
equations 3.7 – 3.11), the reduced form equation needs only three of the five equations to solve 
for domestic prices. We select equation 3.7, 3.8 and 3.11 to generate the equation presented in 
equation 4.1. The definitions of the coefficients are defined in Appendix A2. 
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4.2.1 Domestic Price 
Equation 4.1 
2
5 * e1 + a3 * aref * b5 * e5 
 lnconp + aref * b4 * lnconp 
 b5 * lnconp + b2 * lnconp1lndmpr = 
(a3 b5 * e2 - lnconp + a2  b5 * e6 * lngdp + b6 * lnco
−
np
ngdp + a3 * b5 * e4 * mref + b3 *
onp * mref + a3 * b5 * e3 * prodr
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a3 * b
+ b1 *
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4.2.2 Opening Stocks 
The effect of free trade on the amount of domestic production is illustrated by the 
equation 4.3. An increased access to domestic markets of the EU would increase imports while 
supplies tend to increase. Domestic production could decrease while the total supply to the 
market may increase suggesting that a higher share of wheat consumed would be from imports.  
e1 * lnconp - a2 * b5 * e1 * lnconp + b1 * e2 *
lnconp + aref * b4 * e2 * lnconp + a1 * b5 * e2
* lnconp + aref  * e5 * lnconp - a2 * are
1LnPROD = 
(a3 * b5 * e2 - lnconp + a2 * b5 * lnconp)
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞−⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
2
f * b5 *
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lnconp* lngdp + e6 * lnconp * lngdp - a2 * b5 *
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Equation 4.2 
Equation 4.3 
 
 
4.3 Results 
The results for the domestic prices are presented in table 4.1 which suggests that the 
domestic prices show a significant decrease in the domestic prices (figure 4.1). A free trade 
scenario which removes the distortions caused by the import levies and the production refunds 
tends to increase the amount of imports thus increasing supply and decreasing the domestic 
prices. This is further illustrated in figure 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Forecasted Average Domestic Prices in the EU in a Free Trade Scenario 
YEAR DOMESTIC PRICES ($/Ton) 
2005 224.3096 
2006 224.1747 
2007 224.0539 
2008 223.9471 
2009 223.8535 
2010 223.7722 
2011 223.704 
2012 223.6481 
2013 223.6037 
2014 223.5712 
2015 223.5496 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
19
76
19
79
19
82
19
85
19
88
19
91
19
94
19
97
20
00
20
03
20
06
20
09
20
12
20
15
Year
Domestic Prices
Log. (Domestic Prices)
 
Figure 4.1: Change in Domestic Prices in the EU in a free trade scenario. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1    Introduction 
The cereal industry forms one of the largest parts of the U.S. export industry accounting 
for over $13 billion dollars in annual sales to the world market38. The major factors affecting 
U.S. cereal exports to the EU remains the stringent protective policies followed by the EU under 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Trade negotiations under the GATT and later the WTO 
have forced the EU to bring about reforms to the CAP. This study was aimed at quantifying the 
effects of these policy reforms on bilateral cereal trade between the fifteen EU nations and the 
U.S. at a disaggregated level. The decreasing trade distortion effects caused by the earlier CAP 
which included the export refunds, the import levies and the production refunds quantified to 
estimate if there were significant effects on trade and domestic prices in the EU.  
Specifically, the objectives for this elaborate study were to (1) Understand the CAP and 
its effects on cereal production and trade, (2) Evaluate the effects of the change in policies of the 
CAP vis-à-vis the Mac Sharry Reforms and the Agenda 2000 Reforms on cereal trade with the 
U.S. and (3) Evaluate the effect of domestic prices in a free trade scenario for wheat. To 
accomplish these objectives data from various sources which included the European Statistical 
Division, International Grain Council, International Rice Research Institute, International 
Monetary Fund, Foreign Agricultural Service of the United States Department of Agriculture, 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development, Agriculture-Canada, the legislation 
division of the EU (EURO-LEX) was aggregated for each of the countries in the study. 
A Non Linear three stage least squares (N3SLS) econometric model was developed and 
analyzed for understanding the effects of policy reforms on the bilateral trade with the U.S. of 
                                                 
38 USDA – Foreign Agricultural Service 2004 report on Cereal exports to world.  
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the five cereals in each of the EU countries. The simultaneous equation model took into 
consideration any significant effects of the changes in the CAP with the introduction of two 
dummy variables in the model.    
5.2    Results 
Results from the model estimation showed a largely significant negative effect on the 
domestic prices and production in the EU countries while having a significant positive effect on 
the quantities of imports of cereals from other countries.  In the case of the wheat model 
constructed for each of the EU nations a ratio of the exports by the U.S. to the total exports to the 
EU was estimated to understand if the change in policies in the EU had significant effect on the 
amount of wheat exported by the US. Results from the estimation showed that this was 
significant, suggesting that the decreasing trade distortion effects of the EU have had a 
significant positive effect on the U.S. exports of wheat. Further, the study was also able to 
estimate that changes in the government payments made production of cereals in some EU 
countries more costly than the world prices suggesting that opening up the EU markets would 
significantly decrease cereal production in these countries due to higher imports at cheaper 
prices. Elasticities obtained from this simultaneous equation model solving for the demand side 
equations and the supply side form a good approximation of the effect of policies and their 
implications on trade. The approximation that trade effects due to change in the domestic 
policies of the EU would affect the U.S. in the same manner as that of other exporting countries 
in case of cereals apart from wheat can be substantiated by the trend in the total exports and U.S. 
exports which follow similar patterns. Results from our estimation also showed that the domestic 
prices for cereals in most of the EU nations for all the five cereals have significantly decreased 
due to implementation of the policy reforms of the CAP. Opening stocks of these cereals have 
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decreased drastically in some cases due to lesser procurement of these cereals by the intervention 
agencies in member countries. Demand for imports which were restricted due to the 
implementation of a complex import levy system showed a drastic surge due to their partial 
removal in the case of wheat, maize, barley and rye and a total cessation of levies in case of oats. 
Production refunds which distorted the supplies of cereals in the EU showed a significant impact 
when restricted due to the implementation of the reforms. Export refunds largely decreased the 
amount of exports of wheat in case of France which forms one of the major exporters in the 
world for wheat. The exchange rate system which is abstracted in most studies since EU is 
considered as a single entity was better documented in our disaggregated study of the EU nations 
which showed varied intensity of the effects of trade in these countries. Monte Carlo simulation 
and forecasting of a free trade scenario model for wheat was developed to observe the effect on 
domestic prices in the EU nations. A significant decrease in the domestic prices followed by a 
decrease in production was observed when forecasted up to the year 2015. Further, this lead to a 
decrease in the welfare of domestic producers in the EU while consumers in each of these 
countries showed substantial positive effect. Producers in the U.S. would show gains in trade due 
to higher demand for exports of cereals.  
5.3    Implications of Results   
This study is the first of its kind to evaluate the country wise effects on bilateral trade 
with the U.S. due to the CAP re-instrumentation. We hope that this research forms a foundation 
to further investigate effect of policies not considered in our study on trade and welfare effects.  
Results show that the losses incurred by the producers and exporters in the EU are 
relatively much lower than the gains to consumers and the Government of the EU, the producers 
in the U.S. and other exporting countries. If a total free trade area was created between one of the 
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world’s largest importer and the one of the world’s largest exporter of cereals the welfare effects 
could be huge and significant not only in these two trading partner entities but also on world 
prices and trade. Results from this model could be utilized to understand and include new 
policies that have lesser or no trade distorting effects and increase welfare among the partner 
countries. Hopefully this research would fuel research interest into the developing policies that 
aim for the highest welfare effects for every sector of the economy. The policy changes by the 
EU could augment further and more liberalizing changes in partner countries including the U.S. 
which while being WTO compliant could also bring about market orientation of the agriculture 
sector.  
5.4    Limitations 
While every effort was made to aggregate all the data and variables in our study, due to 
the complexity of the problem we did not consider the restrictions of trade put in place by the 
U.S. and assume that these restrictions were not binding. Assuming the U.S. as just a trading 
entity helped us focus on the effects on trade due to the policy changes in the CAP which would 
have been abstracted if effects of the FAIR Act of 1996 and the Farm Bill of 2002 were included 
in our study. The study was unable to estimate the elasticities of demand and supply for some 
countries due to the lack of availability of data for these countries. Further data for many 
countries in the EU was not available for trade in sorghum which forced us to remove sorghum 
from our study.  
5.5    Future Research 
This research was the first step in developing a disaggregated model to assess the 
impact of the two policies – the Mac Sharry Reforms of 1992 and the Agenda 2000 reforms in 
the EU 15 nations. Though this research was able to show that there were significant effects of 
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the policies on the EU – 15 nations, further study could be taken up to include the accession of 
the 10 new central European countries. Further a simultaneous dynamic model to include the 
effects of the trade distorting policies of the U.S. could show a comprehensive picture of the 
bilateral cereal trade between these two trading entities.  Simulations and forecasts could be 
made that included different scenarios and policy regimes followed in these two countries and 
effects on the world markets. Better research could be possible through availability of data from 
government agencies in these trading partners. Policy makers could take wiser decisions while 
implementing trade policies based on the results of such elaborate research model.    
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APPENDIX 1: RESULTS FROM NON-LINEAR THREE STAGE LEAST SQUARE REGRESSION FOR CEREALS  
 
Table A1.1: Results from the Regression for Wheat: 
WHEAT  lndmpr (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp  lndmpr 
 a1 
E
a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
FRA  NC            
 1.12326 -0.7451 5.426605 3.31563 -0.9090 -0.1194 -0.3590 -0.1705 0.45361 2.98747 0.05424
STD Err 2.8873 0.394 1.4251 0.3778 0.1784 0.0797 0.1062 0.0455 0.0945 2.8473 0.51
t value  0.39 -1.89 3.81 0.84 -5.1 -1.5 -3.38 -3.74 4.8 1.05 0.11
P Value 0.7004 0.0698 0.0008 0.4134 <.0001 0.1472 0.0026 0.0011 <.0001 0.3055 0.9163
AUSTRIA            
 1.69949 -0.93219 10.24812 1.652265 -0.3684 -0.2722 -0.5507 -0.05736 0.479362 4.616547 0.477384
STD Err 0.4828 0.341 1.8724 1.0881 0.1705 0.0876 0.108 0.0681 0.0807 2.3185 0.3186
t value  -1.45 -2.73 5.47 1.52 -2.16 -3.11 -5.1 -0.84 5.94 1.99 1.5
P Value 0.1593 0.0111 <.0001 0.1425 0.0414 0.005 <.0001 0.408 <.0001 0.059 0.1482
BELGIUM            
 2.608067 1.11385 0.030716 1.247883 -0.789 -0.0962 -0.1001 0.107835 0.43134 11.29073 -2.30252
STD Err 1.947 0.3935 1.2028 0.9089 0.1169 0.0696 0.0975 0.0475 0.0681 11.9519 2.1485
t value  1.34 2.83 0.03 0.27 -6.75 -1.38 -1.03 2.27 6.33 0.94 -1.07
P Value 0.192 0.0088 0.9798 0.7879 <.0001 0.1796 0.3148 0.0329 <.0001 0.3551 0.2955
GERMANY           
 1.301017 0.851131 3.796 -0.49773 -0.5209 -0.3214 -0.4755 0.06917 0.52732 18.01321 -0.81615
STD Err 3.5136 0.3521 2.05 1.0009 0.1595 0.0754 0.0923 0.0586 0.0916 0.0259 0.8681
t value  0.37 2.42 1.95 -0.5 -3.27 -4.26 -5.15 1.18 5.75 0.51 -0.94
P Value 0.7142 0.0229 0.075 0.6237 0.0034 0.0003 <.0001 0.25 <.0001 0.6155 0.3573
DENMARK           
 3.779979 -1.65968 4.272407 -0.812 -0.3162 -0.1659 -0.3679 -0.02086 0.563506 7.887355 -0.29476
STD Err 4.3833 0.7962 1.5935 0.6572 0.0499 0.0563 0.0668 0.0304 0.0716 6.833 1.5429
t value  0.86 -2.08 2.68 -1.24 -6.33 -2.95 -5.51 -0.69 7.87 1.15 -0.19
P Value 0.3964 0.0471 0.0126 0.2291 <.0001 0.0072 <.0001 0.4991 <.0001 0.2608 0.8502
IRELAND            
 -0.77523 1.022619 -0.40622 4.102613 -0.6043 -0.2923 -0.7744 0.145539 0.406637 -0.07253 3.353254
STD Err 4.3963 0.3724 1.9598 0.1361 0.1637 0.085 0.1078 0.0551 0.0824 0.1093 0.6754
t value  -0.18 2.75 -0.21 0.75 -3.69 -3.44 -7.18 2.64 4.94 -0.66 4.96
P Value 0.8614 0.0108 0.8374 0.4597 0.0012 0.0022 <.0001 0.0145 <.0001 0.5139 <.0001 
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(Table Continued) 
WHEAT lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt mref aref  lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
FRA  NCE            
 0.418281 0.009464 0.738048 0.239418 0.226732 -0.1539 -0.23414 0.515967 1.702043 -12.3909 -0.25752
STD Err 0.2474 0.0504 0.3944 0.1501 0.2913 0.1164 0.9234 0.479 0.9055 6.5828 0.3358
t value  1.69 0.19 1.87 1.6 0.78 -1.32 -0.25 1.08 1.88 -1.88 -0.77
P Value 0.105 0.0529 0.0746 0.1249 0.4446 0.2011 0.8024 0.2942 0.0748 0.0744 0.4521
AUSTRIA            
 0.032159 -0.11617 0.599626 -0.30793 -0.17176 16.40767 -3.25959 0.123778 -1.98264 -0.13585 -1.44103
STD Err 0.2099 0.0396 0.3049 0.1242 0.21 13.2568 1.642 1.0594 2.2171 0.2191 0.7887
t value  0.15 -2.93 1.97 -2.48 -0.82 1.24 -1.99 0.12 -0.89 -0.62 -1.83
P Value 0.8796 0.0077 0.062 0.0213 0.4222 0.2302 0.061 0.9082 0.3818 0.5422 0.0826
BELGIUM            
 -0.00871 0.190096 -0.66647 0.233633 -0.5928 -9.30979 0.255669 0.982207 0.673451 -0.08974 0.223388
STD Err 0.8808 0.1911 1.9066 0.6133 0.981 6.8041 0.9768 0.4252 1.0656 0.1082 0.3384
t value  -0.01 0.99 -0.35 0.38 -0.6 -1.37 0.26 2.31 0.63 -0.83 0.66
P Value 0.9922 0.3306 0.73 0.7069 0.5518 0.1864 0.7962 0.0317 0.5346 0.4167 0.5167
GERMANY           
 -0.26493 1.83117 -1.99968 0.262911 0.724791 -1.30603 0.341101 -0.03407 1.104717 0.000986 -0.20254
STD Err 0.3837 4.5161 0.7382 0.2552 0.4087 5.7774 0.5743 0.2729 0.8263 0.0621 0.2194
t value  -0.69 4.05 -2.71 1.03 1.77 -0.23 0.59 -0.12 1.34 0.02 -0.92
P Value 0.4972 0.0005 0.0128 0.314 0.09 0.8235 0.5592 0.9019 0.1962 0.9875 0.3669
DENMARK           
 -0.14698 -0.01057 0.54142 0.637554 0.573726 -8.69949 1.438219 -0.74985 3.763721 -0.10315 1.280129
STD Err 0.5797 0.1168 1.0866 0.3873 0.637 8.0268 1.5228 0.6596 1.3503 0.1613 0.5188
t value  -0.25 -0.09 0.5 1.65 0.9 -1.08 0.94 -1.14 2.79 -0.64 2.47
P Value 0.8022 0.9287 0.6232 0.1139 0.3775 0.2913 0.3562 0.2691 0.0114 0.5298 0.0228
IRELAND            
 0.309252 1.60619 2.717158 1.201726 1.770503 1.563265 0.096516 -0.07751 0.262729 0.072969 -0.12439
STD Err 0.4678 6.4397 0.6099 0.245 0.4999 3.6319 0.4051 0.2397 0.4638 0.0663 0.1982
t value  0.66 2.49 4.46 4.9 3.54 0.43 0.24 -0.32 0.57 1.1 -0.63
P Value 0.5155 0.0206 0.0002 <.0001 0.0018 0.6715 0.8141 0.7498 0.5774 0.2841 0.5373
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WHEAT aref Lngdp lnimpqu/lnimpq lndmpr lnprodr mref aref lngdp 
 d7 
E
d8 d9 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
FRA  NC          
 -0.552 0.89094 3.081319 3.15469 -0.6943 6.625723 -0.15469 -0.4236 0.450149
STD Err 0.524 0.2981 1.5659 0.0783 0.1404 0.8887 0.0783 0.1507 0.0724
t value  -1.05 2.99 4.52 1.98 -4.95 7.46 -1.98 -2.81 6.22
P Value 0.3044 0.0073 0.0002 0.0604 <.0001 <.0001 0.0604 0.0099 <.0001 
AUSTRIA          
 -1.65514 0.411929 -0.29443 0.07481 -0.2292 5.241738 -0.17163 -0.0581 0.187085
STD Err 1.1815 0.9246 0.4769 0.0536 0.2174 0.8769 0.1257 0.2121 0.1266
t value  -1.4 0.45 -0.62 1.4 -1.05 5.98 -1.37 -0.27 1.48
P Value 0.1766 0.6607 0.5439 0.1761 0.3026 <.0001 0.1852 0.7864 0.1531
BELGIUM          
 -0.00299 0.259485 1.614537 0.03715 -0.6928 1.598091 -0.17945 -0.3562 0.589442
STD Err 0.4885 0.2952 0.9304 0.0441 0.1503 0.8503 0.0954 0.1605 0.093
t value  -0.01 0.88 1.74 0.84 -4.61 1.88 -1.88 -2.22 6.34
P Value 0.9952 0.3898 0.0961 0.4083 0.0001 0.0729 0.0728 0.0366 <.0001 
GERMANY         
 -0.09448 0.404549 0.37384 1.013766 -0.5546 2.100771 0.017256 0.09901 0.609937
STD Err 0.3179 0.2914 0.1828 0.0419 0.1711 0.8328 0.1027 0.1627 0.0917
t value  -0.3 1.39 2.05 0.33 -3.24 2.52 0.17 0.61 6.65
P Value 0.7694 0.1803 0.0542 0.7458 0.0036 0.019 0.868 0.5489 <.0001 
DENMARK         
 1.451459 0.975423 -0.16501 -3.16298 -2.3463 0.048707 -0.39907 -0.9569 1.553344
STD Err 0.7489 0.3932 0.2855 1.8482 0.332 0.0838 0.1906 0.3067 0.1801
t value  1.94 2.48 -0.58 -1.71 -7.07 0.58 -2.09 -3.12 8.62
P Value 0.0669 0.0221 0.5697 0.1005 <.0001 0.5667 0.0475 0.0048 <.0001 
IRELAND          
 -0.04627 0.390937 4.797031 1.03262 -0.5828 2.973492 -0.27028 -0.4704 0.58861
STD Err 0.3498 0.1134 0.7058 0.0761 0.2536 1.4543 0.1565 0.2928 0.1017
t value  -0.13 3.45 6.8 0.43 -2.3 2.04 -1.73 -1.61 5.79
P Value 0.8961 0.0025 <.0001 0.6722 0.031 0.0525 0.0975 0.1218 <.0001 
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WHEAT  lndmpr (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp  Lndmpr 
 a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
ITALY            
 9.92008 0.929969 9.690053 2.161606 -0.7394 -0.51692 -0.67461 0.293433 0.061685 5.203512 -1.78495
STD Err 2.7804 0.2504 4.9932 4.4624 0.4734 0.0943 0.1045 0.0635 0.0858 4.2645 0.7223
t value  -0.33 3.71 1.94 0.48 -1.56 -5.48 -6.46 4.62 0.72 1.22 -2.47
P Value 0.7434 0.001 0.0632 0.6327 0.132 <.0001 <.0001 0.0001 0.4792 0.2353 0.0217
NETHERLANDS           
 0.027018 0.171444 0.434926 -0.73357 -0.3920 -0.16786 -0.39911 0.203106 0.567788 0.00537 0.41981
STD Err 0.0566 0.2526 0.9208 1.1325 0.1453 0.0906 0.1214 0.1061 0.0986 0.0374 0.3685
t value  0.48 0.68 0.47 -0.65 -2.7 -1.85 -3.29 1.91 5.76 0.14 1.14
P Value 0.6386 0.5033 0.6406 0.5236 0.0128 0.0768 0.0032 0.0682 <.0001 0.8872 0.2668
SPAIN            
 0.196992 -0.06223 5.920328 9.010716 -1.1971 -0.27598 -0.121 0.040558 0.115814 1.16292 -1.00973
STD Err 0.9769 0.4355 1.7599 2.1939 0.2581 0.1089 0.1737 0.0509 0.0892 0.1744 1.1995
t value  0.2 -0.14 3.36 4.11 -4.64 -2.53 -0.7 0.8 1.3 0.93 -0.84
P Value 0.8418 0.8875 0.0024 0.0004 0.0001 0.0186 0.4931 0.4337 0.207 0.3604 0.4089
UK            
 10.07868 0.125769 -5.67089 10.07368 -1.0637 -0.45026 -0.60238 0.043951 0.46745 3.020291 4.194562
STD Err 0.0789 0.3879 1.8356 0.5014 0.5958 0.0994 0.1267 0.0919 0.1475 0.138 0.7764
t value  1 0.32 -3.09 0.15 -1.79 -4.53 -4.75 0.48 3.17 0.15 5.4
P Value 0.3308 0.7484 0.0047 0.8846 0.0874 0.0001 <.0001 0.6368 0.0043 0.8845 <.0001 
GREECE            
 10.51301 -0.25844 -3.90531 11.39609 0.0421 -0.34546 -0.51395 0.047951 -1.03331 10.09985 1.829329
STD Err 0.6531 0.3266 2.038 4.4044 0.4603 0.2479 0.3321 0.087 0.2475 0.2003 1.8512
t value  0.79 -0.79 -1.92 2.59 0.09 -1.39 -1.55 0.55 -4.18 0.5 0.99
P Value 0.4413 0.4359 0.0664 0.0165 0.9279 0.1767 0.1354 0.5868 0.0004 0.6231 0.3338
PORTUGAL           
 3.598615 -0.19024 0.741402 10.428349 -1.6659 0.267896 0.412049 0.081256 -0.49542 11.51748 -4.48538
STD Err 2.0483 0.1852 1.192 0.6977 0.7189 0.2871 0.3468 0.1074 0.1739 10.8995 1.7151
t value  1.76 -1.03 0.62 0.61 -2.32 0.93 1.19 0.76 -2.85 1.06 -2.62
P Value 0.0907 0.3137 0.5394 0.5462 0.0297 0.3605 0.2469 0.4568 0.0091 0.3021 0.0158
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WHEAT lnworldp Lnexpr lnexrt mref aref  lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
ITALY            
 0.418281 0.093364 -1.15642 0.271463 -0.31699 5.493373 -0.03155 -0.45702 0.823783 -0.17934 -0.07624
STD Err 0.2474 0.0751 0.5754 0.2715 0.3634 2.4573 0.3997 0.2156 0.4183 0.0534 0.16
t value  1.69 1.24 -2.01 1 -0.87 2.24 -0.08 -2.12 1.97 -3.36 -0.48
P Value 0.105 0.227 0.0569 0.3282 0.3925 0.0369 0.9379 0.0468 0.0629 0.0031 0.6389
NETHERLANDS           
 0.032159 8.661298 -0.02184 0.298232 0.105821 3.95614 -1.11765 0.387901 -0.42838 -3.74208 0.100146
STD Err 0.2099 2.1822 0.3283 0.1048 0.1708 3.7765 0.4628 0.2122 0.6208 1.8744 0.1605
t value  0.15 3.97 -0.07 2.85 0.62 1.05 -2.42 1.83 -0.69 -2 0.62
P Value 0.8796 0.0007 0.9476 0.0094 0.542 0.3073 0.0254 0.0825 0.4981 0.0565 0.5396
SPAIN            
 -0.00871 2.730177 -2.44302 0.539013 0.566459 13.79969 0.546431 -1.85273 -0.38911 0.093347 1.831107
STD Err 0.8808 9.5147 0.9469 0.4151 0.7722 9.897 1.1353 0.7802 1.1164 0.1927 0.5235
t value  -0.01 2.87 -2.58 1.3 0.73 1.39 0.48 -2.37 -0.35 0.48 3.5
P Value 0.9922 0.0089 0.0171 0.2075 0.471 0.1785 0.6355 0.0277 0.7311 0.6333 0.0023
UK            
 -0.26493 7.6602 2.799324 1.561534 1.486212 13.74175 -1.14963 0.157155 -1.65422 -1.69901 0.078716
STD Err 0.3837 7.3391 0.9039 0.332 0.6047 3.7617 0.4647 0.3172 0.7295 3.6752 0.2244
t value  -0.69 2.41 3.1 4.7 2.46 3.65 -2.47 0.5 -2.27 -4.62 0.35
P Value 0.4972 0.025 0.0053 0.0001 0.0223 0.0016 0.0224 0.6257 0.0346 <.0001 0.7294
GREECE            
 -0.14698 2.945302 -0.28923 2.076387 2.215007 8.986458 -0.89616 -1.66493 0.568849 -0.1162 -0.33917
STD Err 0.5797 11.4374 1.5997 0.7934 1.2345 8.0307 1.2933 3.5568 1.1967 0.1496 0.4352
t value  -0.25 2.58 -0.18 2.62 1.79 1.12 -0.69 -3.28 0.48 -0.78 -0.78
P Value 0.8022 0.0173 0.8582 0.0157 0.0865 0.2764 0.4963 0.003 0.6397 0.4463 0.4449
PORTUGAL           
 0.309252 -0.15687 -3.82736 -0.78437 -0.02537 7.416288 0.908698 -0.45924 1.169546 -0.09712 0.978614
STD Err 0.4678 0.2123 1.3114 1.1409 1.3505 5.0444 0.7259 0.5006 0.593 0.0903 0.4242
t value  0.66 -0.74 -2.92 -0.69 -0.02 1.47 1.25 -0.92 1.97 -1.08 2.31
P Value 0.5155 0.4678 0.008 0.4989 0.9852 0.1571 0.2251 0.3699 0.0626 0.295 0.0319
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WHEAT aref lngdp lnimpqu/lnimpq lndmpr lnprodr mref aref lngdp 
 d7 d8 d9 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
ITALY          
 -0.3507 0.371419 1.1901 1.013459 0.211506 1.57305 0.004054 -0.1236 -0.2149
STD Err 0.2259 0.0915 0.6493 0.0446 0.1127 0.6478 0.0839 0.132 0.0564
t value  -1.55 4.06 1.83 0.3 1.88 17.86 0.05 -0.94 -3.81
P Value 0.1363 0.0006 0.0817 0.7657 0.0732 <.0001 0.9619 0.3584 0.0009
NETHERLANDS         
 0.214689 0.323673 -0.24269 4.604752 -0.06739 -0.04739 -0.01202 -0.0734 0.245791
STD Err 0.2718 0.2669 0.2906 1.1463 0.2309 0.0527 0.1224 0.2141 0.1402
t value  0.79 1.21 -0.84 4.02 -0.29 -0.9 -0.1 -0.34 1.75
P Value 0.4389 0.2394 0.4134 0.0005 0.773 0.378 0.9226 0.7348 0.0928
SPAIN          
 2.144867 1.109397 0.538593 8.018061 -0.41495 -0.02041 -0.41595 -0.4214 0.067798
STD Err 0.8453 0.4451 0.3024 1.1728 0.1886 0.0823 0.1452 0.2574 0.1005
t value  2.54 2.49 1.78 6.84 -2.2 -0.25 -2.86 -1.64 0.67
P Value 0.0196 0.0216 0.09 <.0001 0.0381 0.8064 0.0088 0.1152 0.5065
UK          
 0.288189 -0.56779 1.251766 2.004813 0.026057 5.140374 -0.24345 -0.4550 0.678672
STD Err 0.3297 0.172 4.404 0.0606 0.1705 1.0018 0.1136 0.1877 0.0878
t value  0.87 -3.3 2.84 0.08 0.15 5.13 -2.14 -2.42 7.73
P Value 0.3924 0.0036 0.0092 0.9374 0.8799 <.0001 0.043 0.0236 <.0001 
GREECE          
 -0.34528 0.125511 0.566985 4.075386 0.589024 3.880894 0.214422 -0.1537 -0.17327
STD Err 0.5963 0.5965 0.1787 0.0907 0.1398 2.3061 0.1563 0.2617 0.1659
t value  -0.58 0.21 3.17 0.83 4.21 3.42 1.37 -0.59 -1.04
P Value 0.569 0.8355 0.0048 0.4145 0.0003 0.0024 0.1834 0.5624 0.307
PORTUGAL         
 1.253302 -0.09707 1.94095 3.964956 -0.02684 0.190501 -0.27138 -1.5233 0.000881
STD Err 0.4336 0.2149 4.2633 3.9771 0.3886 0.2393 0.3981 0.6307 0.2604
t value  2.89 -0.45 3.97 1 -0.07 0.8 -0.68 -2.42 0
P Value 0.009 0.6563 0.0006 0.3292 0.9455 0.4342 0.5022 0.0241 0.9973
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WHEAT  lndmpr (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp  lndmpr 
 a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
SWEDEN            
 5.999294 0.174887 -0.64284 -0.10764 -0.4755 -0.6760 -0.9898 0.0908 0.54538 1.67627 -0.9332
STD Err 1.6105 0.3271 0.4753 1.8156 0.1478 0.09 0.1093 0.1076 0.1351 7.1126 0.6914
t value  3.73 0.53 -1.35 -0.06 -3.22 -7.51 -9.06 0.84 4.04 0.24 -1.35
P Value 0.001 0.5974 0.1879 0.9532 0.0038 <.0001 <.0001 0.4071 0.0005 0.8159 0.1908
FINLAND            
 7.869577 -1.03836 0.819484 2.083789 -0.1152 -0.3820 -0.6012 -0.0996 0.217641 1.909344 -1.4054
STD 
Error 0.9842 0.282 0.2149 1.3171 0.0598 0.0575 0.074 0.0409 0.0481 9.2006 1.6255
t value  8 -3.68 3.81 1.58 -1.93 -6.65 -8.12 -2.44 4.52 0.21 -0.86
P Value <.0001 0.0011 0.0008 0.1293 0.0663 <.0001 <.0001 0.023 0.0002 0.8375 0.3966
 
WHEAT lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt mref aref  lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
SWEDEN            
 0.747867 0.009852 -0.8375 -0.7504 0.196016 -14.941 -3.9644 -0.69011 -0.18167 -0.0390 -1.4301
STD Err 0.566 0.1387 0.5491 0.4317 0.7271 22.9249 1.8114 1.4954 2.1705 0.4023 1.3344
t value  1.32 0.07 -1.53 -1.74 0.27 -0.65 -2.19 -0.46 -0.08 -0.1 -1.07
P Value 0.2 0.944 0.1414 0.0961 0.79 0.522 0.0407 0.6494 0.9341 0.9236 0.2966
FINLAND            
 0.874964 -0.10526 -0.2882 -2.1031 -3.0414 30.38712 -2.4078 -3.57365 5.431779 -0.6460 -2.4125
STD Err 0.6932 0.1554 1.139 0.5532 0.9091 24.9252 4.6637 1.9944 4.0441 0.4538 1.8052
t value  1.26 -0.68 -0.25 -3.8 -3.35 1.22 -0.52 -1.79 1.34 -1.42 -1.34
P Value 0.2201 0.5053 0.8026 0.001 0.0029 0.237 0.6113 0.0883 0.1943 0.17 0.1964
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 115
Table A1.2: Results from the Regression for Rye: 
RYE  lndmpr (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp  lndmpr 
 a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
AUSTRIA            
 1.193324 -5.70332 2.715082 0.119209 -0.14045 0.160844 -0.15683 3.910419 0.055592 -13.4774 0.740903
STD Error 0.4857 2.2489 0.408 0.0913 0.1516 0.1487 0.1637 2.0708 0.1148 8.1659 0.8913
t value  2.46 -2.54 6.65 1.31 -0.93 1.08 -0.96 1.89 0.48 -1.65 0.83
P Value 0.021 0.0176 <.0001 0.2046 0.3638 0.2905 0.3479 0.0717 0.6327 0.1131 0.4147
BELGIUM            
 0.077192 -1.3653 8.444456 -0.0979 0.161446 0.02829 -0.36386 -0.06875 0.090636 26.47895 0.941499
STD Error 0.7661 0.7467 1.5649 1.4623 0.1008 0.127 0.1457 0.0709 0.1223 19.065 1.8008
t value  0.1 -1.83 5.4 -0.07 1.6 0.22 -2.5 -0.97 0.74 1.39 0.52
P Value 0.9205 0.079 <.0001 0.9472 0.123 0.8256 0.0201 0.3424 0.4661 0.1788 0.6063
DENMARK           
 13.06195 -1.51951 1.685359 2.477333 -0.19285 -0.09661 -0.48877 -0.05872 0.168062 19.14495 -1.83961
STD Error 5.1588 1.1617 2.6622 1.6286 0.1867 0.1378 0.1816 0.0463 0.1512 18.7907 1.4094
t value  2.53 -1.31 0.63 1.52 -1.03 -0.7 -2.69 -1.27 1.11 1.02 -1.31
P Value 0.0177 0.2023 0.5322 0.1419 0.3123 0.4901 0.013 0.2175 0.2778 0.3193 0.2053
FRANCE            
 -2.54917 -2.09617 0.407042 -4.15982 -0.87724 0.372064 0.341983 0.051956 0.154078 0.167914 -3.46486
STD Error 1.6388 0.5545 0.6398 2.6551 0.2562 0.1256 0.1886 0.041 0.1212 0.1156 1.3177
t value  -1.56 -3.78 0.64 -1.57 -3.42 2.96 1.81 1.27 1.27 1.45 -2.63
P Value 0.1319 0.0008 0.5302 0.1308 0.0023 0.007 0.0828 0.2179 0.2164 0.1606 0.0153
GERMANY           
 19.06222 -1.55969 0.495864 -2.94265 -0.2142 -0.1839 -0.38483 -0.14515 0.25337 17.92232 -0.56849
STD Error 3.2497 0.7458 0.1901 2.3639 0.1116 0.1491 0.1658 0.0916 0.1311 7.9884 0.9077
t value  5.87 -2.09 2.61 -1.24 -1.92 -1.23 -2.32 -1.58 1.93 2.24 -0.63
P Value <.0001 0.0464 0.0149 0.2257 0.0674 0.2298 0.0295 0.1267 0.0657 0.0353 0.5376
GREECE            
 -0.18389 -0.48137 1.648248 11.52886 -0.5809 0.238241 -0.21262 -0.02608 0.907023 0.108755 -7.44386
STD Error 0.2793 0.1957 0.173 2.6403 0.1196 0.2433 0.2988 0.105 0.2477 0.4506 2.8162
t value  -0.66 -2.46 9.53 4.37 -4.86 0.98 -0.71 -0.25 3.66 0.24 -2.64
P Value 0.516 0.0209 <.0001 0.0002 <.0001 0.3376 0.4838 0.806 0.0013 0.8115 0.0148
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(Table Continued) 
RYE lnworldp lnexpr Lnexrt mref aref  lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
AUSTRIA            
 1.377961 0.030292 -2.73212 -1.07788 -1.62676 15.44665 0.280449 -0.78835 -1.32668 -0.00201 1.715595
STD Error 0.8022 0.1613 1.1279 0.3484 0.6752 8.6203 0.9953 1.3074 0.6308 0.3729 2.3883
t value  1.72 0.19 -2.42 -3.09 -2.41 1.79 0.28 -0.6 -2.1 -0.01 0.72
P Value 0.0999 0.8528 0.0241 0.0053 0.0248 0.0876 0.7809 0.553 0.0477 0.9958 0.4805
BELGIUM            
 0.101892 0.231641 5.028422 -3.93243 -0.3761 7.71027 2.246634 -0.81984 0.471732 -0.37275 0.16076
STD Error 0.6072 0.3167 3.214 2.4734 1.2867 7.6791 0.7001 0.9668 1.4512 0.2537 0.4024
t value  0.17 0.73 1.56 -1.59 -0.29 1 3.21 -0.85 0.33 -1.47 0.4
P Value 0.8683 0.4722 0.132 0.1261 0.7728 0.3268 0.004 0.406 0.7484 0.1566 0.6935
DENMARK            
 0.31789 0.254247 1.062695 -1.17803 -0.58238 2.141754 1.138109 -0.59326 -4.8332 0.108781 0.015268
STD Error 0.467 0.2064 2.7225 2.099 0.8795 1.9874 1.0556 1.4126 12.2954 0.3162 0.5013
t value  0.68 1.23 0.39 -0.56 -0.66 1.08 1.08 -0.42 -0.39 0.34 0.03
P Value 0.5031 0.2311 0.7 0.5803 0.5147 0.2934 0.2932 0.6788 0.6982 0.7342 0.976
FRANCE            
 1.544251 33.89145 2.132789 -1.0694 -0.65307 -19.9938 0.700016 -0.84988 -1.92297 -0.7594 0.051742
STD Error 0.872 11.1996 1.646 0.3288 0.5 27.1599 2.8961 1.9501 0.8876 0.5943 3.685
t value  1.77 3.03 1.3 -3.25 -1.31 -0.74 0.24 -0.44 -2.17 -1.28 0.01
P Value 0.0904 0.0062 0.2085 0.0037 0.205 0.4698 0.8114 0.6674 0.0419 0.2153 0.9889
GERMANY            
 1.330007 17.92232 -2.55314 -0.54181 -0.70676 45.17485 2.065066 -2.38284 -6.97867 -0.41092 1.08113
STD Error 0.3506 7.9884 1.0279 0.7541 0.7698 11.9902 0.934 0.846 2.0914 0.3176 0.575
t value  3.79 2.24 -2.48 -0.72 -0.92 3.77 2.21 -2.82 -3.34 -1.29 1.88
P Value 0.001 0.0353 0.0211 0.48 0.369 0.0011 0.0383 0.0103 0.0031 0.2097 0.074
GREECE            
 7.379593 37.61494 9.782343 -4.26537 -1.77637 -31.4557 1.866968 -1.19842 -1.86655 -0.8962 0.168299
STD Error 3.1049 20.5018 3.7173 1.6254 2.1233 19.9683 1.6648 1.6097 2.0742 0.5191 0.7768
t value  2.38 1.83 2.63 -2.62 -0.84 -1.58 1.12 -0.74 -0.9 -1.73 0.22
P Value 0.0266 0.0801 0.0152 0.0155 0.4118 0.1301 0.2748 0.4648 0.3784 0.099 0.8306
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(Table Continued) 
 
RYE aref lngdp  lndmpr lnprodr Mref aref lngdp 
 d7 d8 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
AUSTRIA         
 -0.50489 -0.37202 -0.07792 6.563901 0.071683 -0.24867 -0.52764 -0.09275
STD Error 0.8546 0.8337 0.2563 1.4259 0.0574 0.1296 0.1967 0.129
t value  -0.59 -0.45 -0.3 4.6 1.25 -1.92 -2.68 -0.72
P Value 0.561 0.66 0.7638 0.0001 0.2244 0.0676 0.0133 0.4793
BELGIUM         
 0.595094 0.684574 0.302982 17.67505 0.600693 -0.07161 -0.42212 -0.9925
STD Error 0.526 0.4239 0.2767 1.7871 0.1821 0.1521 0.2239 0.1557
t value  1.13 1.61 1.1 9.89 3.3 -0.47 -1.89 -6.37
P Value 0.2707 0.1213 0.2848 <.0001 0.0031 0.6422 0.0721 <.0001 
DENMARK         
 0.84627 0.488906 -1.34356 7.075928 -0.02459 -0.14063 -1.09067 0.280077
STD Error 0.624 0.4345 0.382 2.4516 0.0786 0.1877 0.265 0.1781
t value  1.36 1.13 -3.52 2.89 -0.31 -0.75 -4.12 1.57
P Value 0.1894 0.2732 0.0019 0.0083 0.7571 0.4614 0.0004 0.1294
FRANCE         
 -2.26136 1.812511 -1.03448 0.252564 -0.11482 -0.37761 -0.68297 -0.20532
STD Error 1.042 0.6951 0.1373 0.1603 0.0345 0.0785 0.112 0.0756
t value  -2.17 2.61 -7.54 1.58 -3.33 -4.81 -6.1 -2.72
P Value 0.0416 0.0164 <.0001 0.1287 0.0029 <.0001 <.0001 0.0123
GERMANY         
 0.665874 -2.63884 -0.11957 7.788255 0.471137 -0.31209 -0.06633 0.057365
STD Error 0.7464 0.8122 0.349 2.0621 0.2674 0.066 0.0787 0.1665
t value  0.89 -3.25 -0.34 3.78 1.76 -4.73 -0.84 0.34
P Value 0.3825 0.0038 0.735 0.001 0.0914 <.0001 0.4081 0.7335
GREECE         
 2.153063 2.371072 4.008039 8.862704 0.069749 -0.35782 -1.17957 -0.11714
STD Error 0.8713 0.9785 2.7387 1.1338 0.074 0.1597 0.2289 0.2158
t value  2.47 2.42 1.46 7.82 0.94 -2.24 -5.15 -0.54
P Value 0.0221 0.0245 0.1569 <.0001 0.3557 0.035 <.0001 0.5925
                      (Table Continued) 
 118
(Table Continued) 
 
RYE  lndmpr (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp lnconp mref aref lnopstk Lngdp  lndmpr 
 a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
ITALY            
 -0.45502 -1.40069 1.100723 0.298893 -0.28988 -0.21775 -0.52419 -0.03694 0.44832 35.70048 -1.35365
STD Error 0.2796 0.5588 0.4924 1.8158 0.1142 0.1242 0.1456 0.0905 0.2009 11.5002 1.2678
t value  -1.63 -2.51 2.24 0.16 -2.54 -1.75 -3.6 -0.41 2.23 3.1 -1.07
P Value 0.1157 0.0188 0.0342 0.8707 0.0183 0.093 0.0015 0.6868 0.0357 0.0052 0.2972
NETHERLANDS           
 0.206533 -0.48316 0.893988 1.745316 -0.15142 -0.03625 -0.46247 0.070172 0.128553 -1.28129 -0.37449
STD Error 0.357 1.5794 0.4788 1.4025 0.0861 0.1303 0.1659 0.1142 0.1259 7.6267 0.6785
t value  0.58 -0.31 1.87 1.24 -1.76 -0.28 -2.79 0.61 1.02 -0.17 -0.55
P Value 0.5679 0.7621 0.0732 0.2259 0.0919 0.7833 0.0105 0.545 0.3178 0.8681 0.5866
UK            
 -0.45741 -0.43642 4.835893 7.336909 -0.23547 -0.01569 -0.14129 -0.02281 0.172395 -2.39083 0.570971
STD Error 0.5099 0.3825 1.9754 0.5344 0.1236 0.1025 0.1378 0.0848 0.085 17.4434 1.518
t value  -0.9 -1.14 2.45 13.73 -1.9 -0.15 -1.03 -0.27 2.03 -0.14 0.38
P Value 0.3779 0.2642 0.0214 <.0001 0.0694 0.8796 0.3157 0.7903 0.0543 0.8922 0.7104
SPAIN            
 2.396596 0.422648 0.350866 2.534538 -0.02285 -0.09892 -0.39285 0.031853 -0.17924 6.762101 -2.9883
STD Error 0.6397 0.7314 0.5283 1.6071 0.1644 0.15 0.2004 0.0514 0.1357 29.2045 3.552
t value  3.75 0.58 0.66 1.58 -0.14 -0.66 -1.96 0.62 -1.32 0.23 -0.84
P Value 0.0009 0.5683 0.5124 0.1284 0.8906 0.5161 0.0622 0.5414 0.1997 0.819 0.4092
PORTUGAL           
 1.234108 -5.0205 1.585523 -4.11184 -0.26978 0.335249 0.426215 0.228085 1.424249 38.5565 -4.27512
STD Error 0.2908 1.6532 0.2383 4.3698 0.2507 0.326 0.4216 0.1086 0.436 14.3835 1.9329
t value  4.24 -3.04 6.65 -0.94 -1.08 1.03 1.01 2.1 3.27 2.68 -2.21
P Value 0.0002 0.0054 <.0001 0.3565 0.293 0.3144 0.3225 0.0468 0.0034 0.0137 0.0377
FINLAND            
 2.88591 -0.25297 1.498096 1.758717 0.035305 -0.22996 -0.57457 -0.10817 0.404124 0.45958 0.254231
STD Error 1.2739 0.3923 0.453 1.8592 0.1045 0.0938 0.1178 0.081 0.2101 14.4288 1.2654
t value  2.27 -0.64 3.31 0.95 0.34 -2.45 -4.88 -1.33 1.92 0.03 0.2
P Value 0.032 0.5247 0.0028 0.354 0.7384 0.0223 <.0001 0.195 0.0669 0.9749 0.8426
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(Table Continued) 
RYE lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt mref Aref  lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
ITALY            
 0.631926 0.346198 -0.70842 0.843354 -3.22965 -6.0073 0.339213 -1.74846 -0.37075 -0.1026 3.035014
STD Error 1.207 0.2462 2.697 0.9708 2.2158 8.2838 0.8062 1.1891 0.5813 0.3111 1.502
t value  0.52 1.41 -0.26 0.87 -1.46 -0.73 0.42 -1.47 -0.64 -0.33 2.02
P Value 0.6058 0.1737 0.7952 0.3944 0.1591 0.4763 0.6782 0.1563 0.5305 0.7447 0.0563
NETHERLANDS           
 1.799579 0.688771 0.763661 0.226193 -0.01157 -7.82688 0.438288 -0.70467 -0.25912 -0.9119 0.215093
STD Error 0.8225 0.5597 0.9913 0.2782 0.1354 6.3226 0.7159 0.6628 0.3985 0.2181 0.352
t value  2.19 1.23 0.77 0.81 -0.09 -1.24 0.61 -1.06 -0.65 -4.18 0.61
P Value 0.0396 0.2315 0.4493 0.4249 0.9327 0.2294 0.547 0.2998 0.5226 0.0004 0.5477
UK            
 3.108363 1.004744 -4.24581 1.252753 -1.10444 13.51014 -0.53413 -0.31611 -0.49013 -0.1546 0.98729
STD Error 1.0077 0.2445 3.114 0.6467 1.7396 7.0649 0.7608 0.809 1.3999 0.2373 1.3574
t value  3.08 4.11 -1.36 1.94 -0.63 1.91 -0.7 -0.39 -0.35 -0.65 0.73
P Value 0.0054 0.0005 0.1865 0.0657 0.5321 0.0696 0.4904 0.6999 0.7297 0.5217 0.475
SPAIN            
 -0.004 2.431744 -0.82263 -0.24025 0.792942 18.78572 1.740799 -3.97186 -0.06088 -1.6497 4.872475
STD Error 4.3281 1.7382 5.1491 0.4909 2.2203 39.8098 3.9091 4.8273 1.8989 1.145 5.7043
t value  0 1.4 -0.16 -0.49 0.36 0.47 0.45 -0.82 -0.03 -1.44 0.85
P Value 0.9993 0.1758 0.8745 0.6294 0.7244 0.6419 0.6606 0.4199 0.9747 0.1644 0.4026
PORTUGAL            
 1.674099 0.192875 1.686404 -0.58357 1.69115 -29.5423 0.433967 2.290456 -2.32632 -0.4379 3.625323
STD Error 1.4327 0.2879 1.8871 0.748 1.1039 32.2531 1.6185 2.7496 2.3786 0.7166 1.0083
t value  1.17 0.67 0.89 -0.78 1.53 -0.92 0.27 0.83 -0.98 -0.61 3.6
P Value 0.2551 0.5099 0.3812 0.4436 0.1398 0.3701 0.7912 0.4142 0.3392 0.5477 0.0017
FINLAND            
 0.272989 0.016895 -0.29702 0.244791 -0.30342 25.19864 1.027888 -0.67235 -0.12889 -0.5640 0.916444
STD Error 1.5645 1.1191 2.3338 0.6904 0.2215 9.0453 0.9812 1.1596 0.6326 0.3368 1.8748
t value  0.17 0.02 -0.13 0.35 -1.37 2.79 1.05 -0.58 -0.2 -1.67 0.49
P Value 0.8631 0.9881 0.8999 0.7263 0.1845 0.0111 0.3067 0.5682 0.8405 0.1088 0.63
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(Table Continued) 
RYE aref lngdp  lndmpr lnprodr mref aref lngdp 
 d7 d8 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
ITALY         
 -0.43459 0.63066 8.039542 0.29091 0.009627 -0.05773 -0.5154 -0.32377
STD Error 0.6971 0.3272 0.7685 0.1129 0.0362 0.0709 0.1102 0.0639
t value  -0.62 1.93 10.46 2.58 0.27 -0.81 -4.68 -5.06
P Value 0.5397 0.0676 <.0001 0.0169 0.7926 0.4238 0.0001 <.0001 
NETHERLANDS        
 -0.66138 1.532525 5.779721 1.053928 0.148128 -0.1164 -0.0110 -0.45645
STD Error 0.5142 0.5163 3.3902 0.5403 0.2493 0.1076 0.4006 0.2824
t value  -1.29 2.97 1.7 1.95 0.59 -1.08 -0.03 -1.62
P Value 0.2124 0.0073 0.1017 0.0634 0.5582 0.2908 0.9782 0.1197
UK         
 0.068004 -0.42704 -0.42135 4.385015 0.034221 -0.02636 -0.5203 0.285387
STD Error 0.4303 0.2508 0.2331 1.6899 0.1166 0.0573 0.1848 0.1081
t value  0.16 -1.7 -1.81 2.59 0.29 -0.46 -2.82 2.64
P Value 0.8759 0.1034 0.0838 0.0162 0.7717 0.6496 0.0098 0.0146
SPAIN         
 0.558857 1.757576 -0.30631 4.423459 0.1608 -0.24489 -0.7297 0.146865
STD Error 2.1558 1.1222 0.2248 1.4792 0.0675 0.1477 0.2421 0.119
t value  0.26 1.57 -1.36 2.99 2.38 -1.66 -3.01 1.23
P Value 0.798 0.1322 0.1862 0.0065 0.0259 0.1109 0.0062 0.2296
PORTUGAL         
 4.451046 1.571455 0.07278 7.326503 -0.00175 -0.37427 -0.7528 -0.26018
STD Error 1.2166 1.1666 0.1308 1.6388 0.0628 0.1536 0.1983 0.137
t value  3.66 1.35 0.56 4.47 -0.03 -2.44 -3.8 -1.9
P Value 0.0015 0.1923 0.5834 0.0002 0.978 0.023 0.0009 0.0702
FINLAND         
 0.136587 -1.06872 -0.1597 5.998392 -0.10023 -0.73088 -0.2612 0.000799
STD Error 0.8311 0.3611 0.7627 4.5665 0.1734 0.3129 0.5929 0.305
t value  0.16 -2.96 -0.21 1.31 -0.58 -2.34 -0.44 0
P Value 0.871 0.0075 0.836 0.2019 0.5689 0.0286 0.6636 0.9979
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RYE  lndmpr (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp  lndmpr 
 a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 C1 c2 
SWEDEN            
 1.382752 -1.1077 1.484615 7.114013 -0.3048 -0.1967 -0.5089 0.029254 0.379954 0.998596 -4.9318
STD Error 1.0529 0.4904 0.3402 1.5228 0.0988 0.1022 0.1645 0.0774 0.2112 1.1428 11.4786
t value  1.31 -2.26 4.36 4.67 -3.09 -1.93 -3.09 0.38 1.8 0.87 -0.43
P Value 0.2005 0.0325 0.0002 0.0001 0.0052 0.0666 0.0051 0.7088 0.0852 0.3917 0.6716
 
RYE lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt Mref aref  lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
 C3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
SWEDEN            
 0.505766 0.036682 -0.0694 -0.5519 -0.2862 0.402548 0.328256 -0.6352 -0.9745 -0.8440 1.87336
STD Error 1.4617 0.1584 1.9246 0.59 0.7184 2.052 1.7846 19.7823 0.9115 0.5237 2.8508
t value  0.35 0.23 -0.04 -0.94 -0.4 0.2 0.18 -0.03 -1.07 -1.61 0.66
P Value 0.7326 0.819 0.9715 0.3597 0.6942 0.8464 0.8558 0.9747 0.2971 0.1219 0.5182
 
RYE aref Lngdp  lndmpr lnprodr mref aref lngdp 
 d7 d8 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
SWEDEN         
 -0.7358 0.127261 -0.3112 11.73394 0.001776 -0.1160 -0.1979 -0.4565
STD Error 1.1513 0.6276 0.3208 2.7249 0.0799 0.1856 0.2913 0.1938
t value  -0.64 0.2 -0.97 4.31 0.02 -0.63 -0.68 -2.36
P Value 0.5297 0.8413 0.342 0.0003 0.9825 0.538 0.5035 0.0274
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Table A1.3: Results from the Regression for Barley: 
BARLEY  lndmpr (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp  lndmpr 
 a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
AUSTRIA            
 1.285619 -9.54153 4.218654 0.040819 -0.91599 -0.3668 -0.5306 0.004246 0.438673 10.69653 -0.4939
Std.Error 0.9352 5.2827 2.1131 0.2055 2.0484 0.0951 0.1014 0.0307 0.093 8.8497 0.6313
t value 1.37 -1.81 2 0.2 -0.45 -3.86 -5.23 0.14 4.72 1.21 -0.78
P value 0.1809 0.0825 0.0565 0.8443 0.6589 0.0008 <.0001 0.8911 <.0001 0.2396 0.4423
BELGIUM            
 1.80977 -4.23059 11.12321 1.888412 -0.39352 -0.2853 -0.7304 0.040067 0.174261 8.657272 -1.24763
Std.Error 1.3023 2.2493 5.0627 2.3109 0.1795 0.1027 0.1776 0.0272 0.1213 13.2682 2.1192
t value 1.39 -1.88 2.2 0.82 -2.19 -2.78 -4.11 1.47 1.44 0.65 -0.59
P value 0.1764 0.0712 0.0371 0.4222 0.0388 0.0107 0.0004 0.1548 0.1641 0.5209 0.562
DENMARK           
 -0.31365 -0.58089 8.464395 1.133063 -4.71736 -0.2654 -0.4183 -0.07164 0.188392 2.387982 -1.41877
Std.Error 0.3925 0.4332 1.5814 1.0659 3.6544 0.103 0.1162 0.0891 0.1117 4.9777 1.3823
t value -0.8 -1.34 5.35 1.06 -1.29 -2.58 -3.6 -0.8 1.69 0.48 -1.03
P value 0.4315 0.1916 <.0001 0.2988 0.2096 0.0168 0.0015 0.4295 0.1052 0.6362 0.3159
FINLAND            
 -0.0173 -0.01617 1.115542 1.280414 -0.22434 -0.5091 -0.6448 -1.06172 0.267071 0.004357 -0.6786
Std.Error 0.0454 0.6111 0.3599 1.2017 0.2241 0.077 0.0937 4.7117 0.0874 0.054 0.405
t value -0.38 -0.03 3.1 1.07 -1 -6.61 -6.88 -0.23 3.06 0.08 -1.68
P value 0.7061 0.9791 0.0046 0.2977 0.3272 <.0001 <.0001 0.8237 0.0056 0.9364 0.1079
FRANCE            
 2.424437 -21.5909 12.12706 1.408981 -15.0248 -0.0450 -0.3155 0.021167 0.449566 0.444008 -2.9029
Std.Error 1.7995 11.0406 4.1142 0.3074 3.6205 0.1037 0.1074 0.0239 0.124 0.2848 1.4327
t value 1.35 -1.96 2.95 4.58 -4.15 -0.43 -2.94 0.89 3.63 1.56 -2.03
P value 0.1895 0.0613 0.0067 0.0001 0.0004 0.6678 0.0074 0.3847 0.0014 0.1332 0.0531
GERMANY           
 0.927956 -20.7089 42.55744 0.150583 -0.33696 -0.3569 -0.5641 -0.12745 0.548922 4.955551 -0.08232
Std.Error 0.7515 5.0049 9.0345 0.0604 0.5604 0.0899 0.1026 0.0569 0.1124 6.4081 0.2506
t value 1.23 -4.14 4.71 2.49 -0.6 -3.97 -5.5 -2.24 4.88 0.77 -0.33
P value 0.2279 0.0003 <.0001 0.0203 0.5535 0.0006 <.0001 0.0351 <.0001 0.4476 0.7456
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BARLEY lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt mref aref  lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
AUSTRIA            
 0.196192 0.056955 0.08647 -0.38999 -0.60601 0.813441 11.79889 -0.5748 -0.44658 -0.59453 0.015993
Std.Error 1.2481 0.1288 0.843 0.4651 0.8026 1.3153 5.8152 0.4443 0.7817 0.2934 0.3719
t value 0.16 0.44 0.1 -0.84 -0.76 0.62 2.03 -1.29 -0.57 -2.03 0.04
P value 0.8765 0.6627 0.9192 0.4108 0.4582 0.5429 0.0553 0.2098 0.5739 0.0556 0.9661
BELGIUM            
 0.264924 0.030132 0.122481 -0.0439 -1.05699 5.205436 0.266981 -0.01559 0.475066 0.118819 0.26357
Std.Error 0.6338 0.0858 1.9262 0.7731 0.8409 6.9672 1.095 0.4155 1.0492 0.1691 0.3389
t value 0.42 0.35 0.06 -0.06 -1.26 0.75 0.24 -0.04 0.45 0.7 0.78
P value 0.68 0.7288 0.9499 0.9552 0.2219 0.4633 0.8097 0.9704 0.6554 0.49 0.4454
DENMARK            
 0.316597 0.024098 0.135118 -0.30703 -0.02813 1.759472 1.578654 -2.51348 0.225419 0.138968 1.818183
Std.Error 0.3243 0.0734 0.6565 0.2777 0.5128 1.9812 0.9155 14.8702 1.9988 0.7165 0.7637
t value 0.98 0.33 0.21 -1.11 -0.05 0.89 1.72 -0.17 0.11 0.19 2.38
P value 0.3396 0.7457 0.8388 0.2808 0.9567 0.3846 0.0993 0.8674 0.9113 0.8481 0.0268
FINLAND            
 0.157192 9.808029 7.699251 -0.80367 -1.15516 1.258591 18.47824 -0.14763 -0.05673 -0.61276 -2.00243
Std.Error 0.8557 3.2903 2.1562 0.2351 0.4542 1.8696 9.7962 0.8104 1.1596 0.5397 0.7411
t value 0.18 2.98 3.57 -3.42 -2.54 0.67 1.89 -0.18 -0.05 -1.14 -2.7
P value 0.8559 0.0069 0.0017 0.0025 0.0185 0.5082 0.0732 0.8572 0.9614 0.269 0.0134
FRANCE            
 0.060204 6.998538 0.052618 -0.77881 -0.14939 12.43933 0.745349 -0.48146 -1.86516 -0.45733 -0.34193
Std.Error 0.1444 3.4979 0.2872 1.0653 0.6951 8.2846 1.1825 0.5065 1.1956 0.3918 0.45
t value 0.42 2 0.18 -0.73 -0.21 1.5 0.63 -0.95 -1.56 -1.17 -0.76
P value 0.6807 0.0574 0.8563 0.4724 0.8318 0.1481 0.5353 0.3527 0.1337 0.2562 0.4558
GERMANY            
 0.267498 0.150347 1.50594 -0.07321 -1.06165 17.10799 0.370322 0.194958 -0.65761 -0.03358 0.192499
Std.Error 0.388 0.08 0.5059 0.4434 0.8748 3.2509 0.2717 0.1443 0.5009 0.0917 0.1276
t value 0.69 1.88 2.98 -0.17 -1.21 5.26 1.36 1.35 -1.31 -0.37 1.51
P value 0.4978 0.0734 0.007 0.8704 0.2378 <.0001 0.1873 0.1911 0.2034 0.718 0.1464
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BARLEY aref lngdp  lndmpr lnprodr mref aref lngdp 
 d7 d8 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
AUSTRIA         
 -0.37142 0.610011 -0.0641 7.01113 0.00379 -0.1872 -0.43632 0.039529
Std.Error 0.732 0.5132 0.1576 0.6098 0.0272 0.0866 0.1242 0.093
t value -0.51 1.19 -0.41 11.5 0.14 -2.16 -3.51 0.42
P value 0.6172 0.2479 0.6879 <.0001 0.8904 0.0413 0.0019 0.6748
BELGIUM         
 -0.20765 -0.10857 -0.0708 8.851073 3.20714 -0.4068 -0.59306 -0.16092
Std.Error 0.4756 0.1509 0.1647 0.9919 0.7652 0.1 0.1424 0.1058
t value -0.44 -0.72 -0.43 8.92 4.19 -4.07 -4.16 -1.52
P value 0.6668 0.4797 0.671 <.0001 0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 0.1419
DENMARK         
 3.071425 -1.67083 -0.0402 10.51023 0.039803 -0.3151 -0.29006 -0.09922
Std.Error 1.4345 0.6573 0.1585 0.7802 0.1018 0.0864 0.1226 0.085
t value 2.14 -2.54 -0.25 13.47 0.39 -3.65 -2.37 -1.17
P value 0.0442 0.019 0.8019 <.0001 0.6995 0.0013 0.0267 0.2552
FINLAND         
 -1.90225 -0.55582 -0.3780 7.370558 3.047345 -0.1760 -0.20247 0.139837
Std.Error 1.5067 0.5009 0.2292 0.9178 1.1605 0.1447 0.2097 0.1011
t value -1.26 -1.11 -1.65 8.03 2.63 -1.22 -0.97 1.38
P value 0.2206 0.2797 0.1127 <.0001 0.0143 0.236 0.3444 0.1799
FRANCE         
 -1.4062 0.602387 -0.02618 0.12323 -0.0216 -0.0731 -0.0676 9.404404
Std.Error 0.7665 0.3921 0.0668 0.1386 0.0247 0.0704 0.032 0.7796
t value -1.83 1.54 -0.39 0.89 -0.88 -1.04 -2.11 12.06
P value 0.0808 0.1394 0.6989 0.3832 0.3901 0.3095 0.0459 <.0001 
GERMANY         
 0.343831 -0.78582 -0.4412 4.821702 8.958379 -0.1291 -0.22878 0.423285
Std.Error 0.2493 0.1958 0.1791 0.9855 4.6175 0.1055 0.1422 0.1036
t value 1.38 -4.01 -2.46 4.89 1.94 -1.22 -1.61 4.09
P value 0.1824 0.0006 0.0217 <.0001 0.0647 0.2335 0.1213 0.0005
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BARLEY  lndmpr 
(lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp 
 lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp  lndmpr 
 a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
GREECE            
 0.030881 -0.6133 8.5081 0.039946 -0.5452 -0.0311 -0.0483 -0.24325 1.82211 58.4581 -6.0589
Std.Error 0.4012 0.2101 2.4184 0.024 0.1814 0.1805 0.2313 0.0598 0.3635 23.8104 3.8889
t value 0.08 -2.92 3.52 1.67 -3.01 -0.17 -0.21 -4.07 5.01 2.46 -1.56
P value 0.9393 0.0072 0.0016 0.1091 0.0063 0.8647 0.8364 0.0005 <.0001 0.0225 0.1335
IRELAND            
 1.27861 -0.3549 4.03023 -0.0235 -12.262 -0.2382 -0.4603 -0.22652 1.3934 6.14455 -0.1047
Std.Error 1.0946 0.1155 1.6991 0.0342 6.5391 0.4225 0.2897 0.1714 0.5752 4.3653 0.1187
t value 1.17 -3.07 2.37 -0.69 -1.88 -0.56 -1.59 -1.32 2.42 1.41 -0.88
P value 0.2534 0.0049 0.0254 0.4983 0.0735 0.5783 0.1258 0.1994 0.0237 0.1732 0.3871
ITALY            
 7.40085 -0.911 0.81264 0.07160 -0.9624 -0.3625 -0.4723 -0.14999 0.11714 -14.839 -3.3099
Std.Error 6.8493 3.7033 0.3182 0.4859 3.2442 0.1361 0.1536 0.0983 0.0583 10.4328 25.5605
t value 1.08 -0.25 2.55 0.15 -0.3 -2.66 -3.07 -1.53 2.01 -1.42 -0.13
P value 0.2898 0.8076 0.0169 0.8841 0.7694 0.0139 0.0054 0.1406 0.0566 0.1689 0.8981
NETHERLAND           
 -0.04216 -0.6958 0.40520 0.14047 -0.7005 -0.2700 -0.4375 0.10707 0.29308 2.83211 -0.2963
Std.Error 0.0689 0.5819 0.227 0.1291 0.887 0.0723 0.0935 0.1833 0.1111 6.4757 1.1115
t value -0.61 -1.2 1.79 1.09 -0.79 -3.74 -4.68 0.58 2.64 0.44 -0.27
P value 0.5468 0.2426 0.0859 0.2879 0.4378 0.0011 0.0001 0.5647 0.0147 0.6661 0.7922
PORTUGAL           
 -1.26529 -0.6994 3.68331 0.30173 -1.1910 -0.3181 -0.3856 -0.08261 3.83337 34.9633 -2.9941
Std.Error 1.4994 0.1829 0.9204 0.1895 0.2287 0.1479 0.1945 0.0752 1.0823 15.3472 2.1932
t value -0.84 -3.82 4 1.59 -5.21 -2.15 -1.98 -1.1 3.54 2.28 -1.37
P value 0.4064 0.0007 0.0005 0.125 <.0001 0.0422 0.0595 0.2832 0.0017 0.0328 0.186
SPAIN            
 -0.01762 -0.2693 0.63943 0.123854 -0.7849 -0.4563 -0.5591 0.048767 5.526637 0.260911 -0.8082
Std.Error 0.0464 1.1008 0.6114 0.0932 0.2599 0.1117 0.136 0.0335 2.2299 0.2712 3.2138
t value -0.38 -0.24 1.05 1.33 -3.02 -4.09 -4.11 1.46 2.48 0.96 -0.25
P value 0.7075 0.8086 0.3052 0.1969 0.0061 0.0005 0.0004 0.1591 0.021 0.3465 0.8038
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BARLEY lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt mref aref  lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
GREECE            
 0.113201 0.405421 1.905376 -0.38909 -6.96919 -3.35983 8.724489 -0.76882 -0.80102 -0.11909 -0.882
Std.Error 0.2948 0.2563 2.2709 1.3478 3.4005 10.8728 3.0559 0.5198 1.2054 0.3931 0.4073
t value 0.38 1.58 0.84 -0.29 -2.05 -0.31 2.86 -1.48 -0.66 -0.3 -2.17
P value 0.7046 0.128 0.4105 0.7755 0.0525 0.7604 0.0095 0.1539 0.5136 0.7649 0.042
IRELAND            
 0.061872 1.805927 2.849256 -0.75441 -0.92916 0.66334 0.369497 0.901059 -6.39726 -0.05002 0.649848
Std.Error 0.3311 0.7411 1.2054 0.2435 0.4823 1.717 0.2176 0.8022 14.5114 0.6233 0.5167
t value 0.19 2.44 2.36 -3.1 -1.93 0.39 1.7 1.12 -0.44 -0.08 1.26
P value 0.8535 0.0234 0.0273 0.0052 0.0671 0.7031 0.1043 0.274 0.6638 0.9368 0.2223
ITALY            
 0.632627 6.8514 4.965642 -0.06446 -0.06093 1.893847 1.523125 -0.09071 -0.91068 -0.4983 0.037587
Std.Error 0.4462 1.9841 1.6967 0.1049 0.4599 0.566 0.5036 0.2289 1.1966 0.1937 0.2026
t value 1.42 3.45 2.93 -0.61 -0.13 3.35 3.02 -0.4 -0.76 -2.57 0.19
P value 0.1703 0.0023 0.0078 0.5452 0.8958 0.0031 0.0064 0.6959 0.4551 0.0178 0.8546
N.LAND            
 0.217688 0.191344 0.865173 -1.94923 -0.86443 0.213972 0.627926 0.552032 0.89936 -13.0704 0.080479
Std.Error 0.4016 0.1367 0.4979 1.5265 1.0815 0.1137 0.4463 0.1776 0.5576 2.9761 0.1597
t value 0.54 1.4 1.74 -1.28 -0.8 1.88 1.41 3.11 1.61 -4.39 0.5
P value 0.5932 0.1755 0.0963 0.2149 0.4327 0.0739 0.1741 0.0053 0.1217 0.0003 0.6195
PORTUGAL            
 0.091803 1.126006 1.344853 -0.40229 -4.15606 0.827595 0.475715 -0.08864 -3.21257 -0.25911 0.199995
Std.Error 0.1246 0.9919 1.5699 0.3335 1.6671 0.4232 0.568 0.2946 5.6615 0.209 0.2541
t value 0.74 1.14 0.86 -1.21 -2.49 1.96 0.84 -0.3 -0.57 -1.24 0.79
P value 0.4689 0.2685 0.4009 0.2406 0.0207 0.064 0.4117 0.7665 0.5764 0.2288 0.44
SPAIN            
 1.119345 0.144566 0.06257 -0.45256 -1.69814 53.0176 0.484259 -0.60993 -0.76764 -1.38253 -2.11257
Std.Error 2.0595 0.231 1.6031 2.5 3.2895 19.4943 1.02 1.4191 2.2213 1.083 1.8803
t value 0.54 0.63 0.04 -0.18 -0.52 2.72 0.47 -0.43 -0.35 -1.28 -1.12
P value 0.5923 0.5379 0.9692 0.858 0.6108 0.0128 0.6399 0.6717 0.7331 0.2157 0.2739
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BARLEY aref lngdp  lndmpr lnprodr mref aref lngdp 
 d7 d8 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
GREECE         
 -1.06488 2.02049 -0.20107 0.367623 0.048331 -0.0142 -0.32497 8.561123
Std.Error 0.6002 0.6762 0.148 0.1069 0.1233 0.047 0.1764 1.7594
t value -1.77 2.99 -1.36 3.44 0.39 -0.3 -1.84 4.87
P value 0.0905 0.007 0.1874 0.0022 0.6986 0.7651 0.0783 <.0001 
IRELAND         
 0.338414 -0.12636 -0.04945 0.141918 5.655948 -0.16231 -0.45181 0.138311
Std.Error 1.1857 0.3976 0.0281 0.0342 0.6382 0.0915 0.1326 0.06
t value 0.29 -0.32 -1.76 4.15 8.86 -1.77 -3.41 2.3
P value 0.7781 0.7538 0.092 0.0004 <.0001 0.0893 0.0024 0.0305
ITALY         
 -0.28911 -0.41626 -0.55548 0.216356 7.248124 -0.49856 -0.88047 0.458208
Std.Error 0.4083 0.1418 0.1956 0.9454 1.7836 0.1229 0.1775 0.0828
t value -0.71 -2.94 -2.84 0.23 4.06 -4.06 -4.96 5.54
P value 0.4867 0.0079 0.0093 0.821 0.0004 0.0005 <.0001 <.0001 
NETHERLAND         
 0.036207 0.623232 0.063143 5.295975 -0.01268 -0.14577 -0.34461 0.151267
Std.Error 0.3036 0.2282 0.2914 1.6615 0.0577 0.1846 0.4015 0.2311
t value 0.12 2.73 0.22 3.19 -0.22 -0.79 -0.86 0.65
P value 0.9062 0.0125 0.8304 0.0041 0.828 0.4377 0.3996 0.5192
PORTUGAL         
 0.06935 0.709413 -0.27466 3.290815 0.000838 -0.57458 -1.64057 0.104054
Std.Error 0.3756 0.2818 0.3636 3.294 0.1418 0.3536 0.4992 0.2966
t value 0.18 2.52 -0.76 1 0.01 -1.62 -3.29 0.35
P value 0.8553 0.02 0.4577 0.3282 0.9953 0.1178 0.0032 0.7289
SPAIN         
 0.179343 -1.6604 -0.7028 5.526383 4.26258 -0.5163 -0.70221 0.332862
Std.Error 2.1637 0.8935 0.2617 1.4864 1.6728 0.1887 0.2865 0.1349
t value 0.08 -1.86 -2.69 3.72 2.55 -2.74 -2.45 2.47
P value 0.9347 0.0772 0.0132 0.0011 0.0171 0.0118 0.0223 0.0215
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BARLEY  lndmpr 
(lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp
 lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp  lndmpr 
 a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
SWEDEN            
 0.351644 -0.11438 4.520039 -0.00592 -0.6514 -0.7453 -1.5157 -0.2344 0.23578 0.922291 -0.817
Std.Error 0.3613 0.9141 2.2954 0.0313 0.3376 0.1555 0.2503 0.1155 0.1157 5.1517 0.4514
t value 0.97 -0.13 1.97 -0.19 -1.93 -4.79 -6.06 -2.03 2.04 0.18 -1.81
P value 0.3394 0.9014 0.0597 0.8518 0.0661 <.0001 <.0001 0.0541 0.0531 0.8596 0.084
UK            
 1.175374 -0.62639 8.44064 -0.0401 -0.2809 -0.427 -0.5821 -0.2341 0.133258 1.284587 -4.03651
Std.Error 0.8737 0.3832 2.9754 0.0337 0.4307 0.0975 0.1418 0.0933 0.1425 0.6106 4.5594
t value 1.35 -1.63 2.84 -1.19 -0.65 -4.38 -4.11 -2.51 0.93 2.1 -0.89
P value 0.1902 0.1142 0.0087 0.2452 0.5208 0.0002 0.0004 0.0196 0.3595 0.047 0.3856
 
BARLEY lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt mref aref  lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
SWEDEN            
 0.541173 0.205537 0.77236 -0.15813 -0.51487 5.179318 1.558499 -0.15559 -1.4444 -0.53081 -0.8974
Std.Error 0.3911 0.1311 0.6835 0.3241 0.4952 12.3008 1.4645 0.8238 0.923 0.5915 0.6748
t value 1.38 1.57 1.13 -0.49 -1.04 0.42 1.06 -0.19 -1.56 -0.9 -1.33
P value 0.1803 0.1312 0.2707 0.6304 0.3097 0.678 0.2993 0.852 0.1325 0.3797 0.1978
UK            
 0.235995 0.204641 0.569414 -0.08133 -0.67493 8.314154 1.659006 0.452986 -9.31126 -6.238 -1.2561
Std.Error 0.3338 0.1203 0.7718 0.3355 0.7122 10.7089 0.4889 0.6969 2.0332 1.1035 0.5517
t value 0.71 1.7 0.74 -0.24 -0.95 0.78 3.39 0.65 -4.58 -5.65 -2.28
P value 0.487 0.103 0.4685 0.8107 0.3536 0.4462 0.0027 0.5228 0.0002 <.0001 0.0334
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Table A1.4: Results from the Regression for Oats: 
OATS  lndmpr (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp  lndmpr 
 a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
AUSTRIA            
 -1.69989 -3.18212 2.635512 -0.43024 -0.04876 -1.71133 -0.2369 -0.9654 0.417915 3.936483 -1.05165
Std.Error 1.3357 1.8677 0.1896 0.0996 0.1035 1.27 0.1842 1.3308 0.0949 10.3218 1.3844
t value -1.27 -1.7 13.9 -4.32 -0.47 -1.35 -1.29 -0.73 4.41 0.38 -0.76
P value 0.2164 0.1004 <.0001 0.0003 0.642 0.1894 0.211 0.4755 0.0002 0.7066 0.4555
BELGIUM            
 -2.07426 -0.28649 7.887401 0.230006 -4.07858 -0.17671 -0.4207 -0.01992 0.372807 46.95799 -4.1141
Std.Error 1.4442 0.7049 2.9017 0.1758 2.8709 0.1208 0.1376 0.0512 0.1776 10.446 1.69
t value -1.44 -0.41 2.72 1.31 -1.42 -1.46 -3.06 -0.39 2.1 4.5 -2.43
P value 0.1629 0.6877 0.0115 0.2036 0.1688 0.1571 0.0056 0.7008 0.0469 0.0002 0.0235
DENMARK           
 -0.28084 -0.90837 8.010851 0.69787 -1.22985 -0.22159 -0.5909 -0.27775 0.182224 -4.07335 -0.53111
Std.Error 0.061 0.3198 1.485 1.8516 0.6616 0.12 0.1741 0.116 0.127 11.8647 1.5508
t value -4.6 -2.84 5.39 0.38 -1.86 -1.85 -3.4 -2.39 1.43 -0.34 -0.34
P value 0.0001 0.0086 <.0001 0.7097 0.0744 0.0778 0.0025 0.0252 0.1648 0.7346 0.7352
FRANCE            
 1.987687 -1.19064 9.671903 -0.87816 -5.87622 -0.07825 -0.3791 -0.04452 0.444918 0.318085 -0.31876
Std.Error 1.3461 0.8048 2.9751 0.1473 2.7746 0.0976 0.1085 0.0306 0.13 0.7386 4.7751
t value 1.48 -1.48 3.25 -5.96 -2.12 -0.8 -3.49 -1.45 3.42 0.43 -0.07
P value 0.1546 0.151 0.0032 <.0001 0.0452 0.4307 0.002 0.1592 0.0023 0.6709 0.9474
GERMANY           
 -0.01725 -0.79481 0.715687 -0.36601 -8.0337 -0.21482 -0.3390 -1.37268 0.496873 14.74924 -2.24562
Std.Error 0.076 0.819 0.2849 0.2004 3.0542 0.1103 0.1538 0.6519 0.1301 3.4736 0.5528
t value -0.23 -0.97 2.51 -1.83 -2.63 -1.95 -2.2 -2.11 3.82 4.25 -4.06
P value 0.8225 0.3408 0.0186 0.0808 0.015 0.0638 0.0378 0.045 0.0009 0.0003 0.0005
GREECE            
 -0.19664 -0.96138 2.920659 -0.51682 -1.03104 -0.68624 -0.8454 -0.07364 0.948322 16.53406 -3.15974
Std.Error 0.5673 0.3007 0.7336 0.0815 0.2051 0.231 0.2783 0.0534 0.2998 10.0413 1.4088
t value -0.35 -3.2 3.98 -6.34 -5.03 -2.97 -3.04 -1.38 3.16 1.65 -2.24
P value 0.7322 0.0036 0.0005 <.0001 <.0001 0.0068 0.0058 0.1812 0.0043 0.1139 0.0353
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OATS lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt mref aref  lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
AUSTRIA            
 0.545059 3.331959 0.24101 -4.04989 -4.01374 1.858215 1.717312 -0.45505 -0.03822 -0.26941 -2.33818
Std.Error 0.7734 7.5566 1.728 0.5747 0.9531 1.5491 0.9747 0.6041 0.2114 0.2827 0.4793
t value 0.7 0.44 0.14 -7.05 -4.21 1.2 1.76 -0.75 -0.18 -0.95 -4.88
P value 0.4884 0.6638 0.8903 <.0001 0.0004 0.2437 0.0926 0.4596 0.8582 0.3514 <.0001 
BELGIUM            
 0.158905 0.031606 1.102912 -0.75817 -0.69173 7.287716 0.170065 -0.94932 -0.33597 -1.95294 -0.2636
Std.Error 0.058 0.521 1.0107 0.5527 0.9669 2.5528 0.3081 0.7817 0.381 0.5901 0.1355
t value 2.74 0.06 1.09 -1.37 -0.72 2.85 0.55 -1.21 -0.88 -3.31 -1.95
P value 0.0116 0.9522 0.287 0.184 0.4819 0.0095 0.5867 0.2374 0.3879 0.0032 0.0653
DENMARK            
 0.483697 0.019141 0.740263 -0.11809 -5.37706 6.641861 0.309019 -0.24932 -1.15958 -0.21148 0.511467
Std.Error 0.824 0.2291 1.5444 0.2447 1.748 6.5776 0.2544 0.513 0.9908 0.9087 0.3742
t value 0.59 0.08 0.48 -0.48 -3.08 1.01 1.21 -0.49 -1.17 -0.23 1.37
P value 0.5632 0.9342 0.6364 0.6342 0.0055 0.3241 0.238 0.632 0.255 0.8182 0.1861
FRANCE            
 0.296429 0.130415 0.01093 -0.64495 -0.75907 0.335074 0.886038 -3.20295 -1.55826 -0.48675 0.057101
Std.Error 0.3657 0.0991 0.1136 0.2514 0.486 0.8244 1.4851 9.3577 0.7943 0.4371 0.6174
t value 0.81 1.32 0.1 -2.57 -1.56 0.41 0.6 -0.34 -1.96 -1.11 0.09
P value 0.4263 0.2016 0.9242 0.0177 0.1326 0.6885 0.5571 0.7355 0.0626 0.278 0.9272
GERMANY            
 0.015036 5.321969 0.249684 -0.07343 -0.32606 33.37069 0.030616 0.349185 -1.96968 -0.04706 0.221755
0.2365 1.6635 0.1671 0.1792 0.2892 6.5826 0.5783 0.2903 0.9253 0.1423Std.Error 0.2693
t value 0.06 3.2 1.49 -0.41 -1.13 5.07 0.05 1.2 -2.13 -0.33 0.82
P value 0.9499 0.0036 0.1487 0.6859 0.2717 <.0001 0.9583 0.2425 0.0453 0.744 0.4195
GREECE            
 0.107544 0.165082 0.402443 -1.82636 -2.98668 -10.2463 0.355851 0.692221 -1.68185 -2.21206 0.120659
Std.Error 0.1756 0.1971 0.4382 0.6577 0.9919 21.5259 0.6659 1.2985 2.4679 2.7191 1.0922
t value 0.61 0.84 0.92 -2.78 -3.01 -0.48 0.53 0.53 -0.68 -0.81 0.11
P value 0.5468 0.4112 0.3668 0.011 0.0064 0.639 0.5987 0.5996 0.503 0.425 0.9131
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OATS aref lngdp  lndmpr Lnprodr mref aref lngdp 
 d7 d8 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
AUSTRIA         
 -2.10143 0.12086 -0.0052 0.234415 8.14184 -0.31045 -0.54747 0.026587
Std.Error 0.7792 0.6527 0.018 0.0921 0.4797 0.0545 0.0876 0.0887
t value -2.7 0.19 -0.29 2.55 16.97 -5.69 -6.25 0.3
P value 0.0135 0.8549 0.7724 0.018 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.7674
BELGIUM         
 -0.31277 0.672849 15.28749 0.403549 3.714839 -0.01024 -0.11853 0.446546
Std.Error 0.1786 0.2235 1.4654 0.2358 1.6048 0.1351 0.1949 0.1649
t value -1.75 3.01 10.43 1.71 2.31 -0.08 -0.61 2.71
P value 0.0945 0.0067 <.0001 0.1004 0.0299 0.9402 0.5491 0.0126
DENMARK         
 -0.1255 1.180291 10.01129 0.283671 0.824126 -9.30E06 -0.086 0.45372
Std.Error 0.4085 0.6145 2.0807 0.1892 0.2934 0.3548 0.0632 0.2027
t value -0.31 1.92 4.81 1.5 2.81 0 -1.36 2.24
P value 0.7617 0.0684 <.0001 0.1474 0.01 1 0.186 0.0352
FRANCE         
 -0.88427 0.017631 14.17165 0.337402 0.10569 -0.23531 -0.24725 7.837047
Std.Error 1.0169 0.6782 0.9794 0.1857 0.156 0.0816 0.1293 2.5584
t value -0.87 0.03 14.47 1.82 0.68 -2.88 -1.91 3.06
P value 0.3943 0.9795 <.0001 0.0823 0.5047 0.0084 0.0685 0.0055
GERMANY         
 -1.92778 0.892139 14.14569 0.295054 0.001198 -0.1123 -0.33421 0.122121
Std.Error 0.4148 0.4172 1.0532 0.1769 0.099 0.0288 0.138 0.1756
t value -4.65 2.14 13.43 1.67 0.01 -3.9 -2.42 0.7
P value 0.0001 0.0444 <.0001 0.1088 0.9905 0.0007 0.0237 0.4938
GREECE         
 1.506867 0.611305 -0.079 0.142544 0.287824 -0.015 -0.0893 0.061719
Std.Error 1.5792 1.4108 0.0425 0.0999 0.1082 0.0379 0.0251 0.1348
t value 0.95 0.43 -1.86 1.43 2.66 -0.4 -3.56 0.46
P value 0.3508 0.6692 0.0754 0.167 0.014 0.6948 0.0017 0.6514
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OATS  lndmpr (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp  lndmpr 
 a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
IRELAND            
 0.036487 -1.11447 9.980733 5.413997 -0.14862 -0.1671 -0.4782 -0.08823 0.08281 -15.2515 -0.09833
Std.Error 0.2194 0.7743 3.6089 1.7069 0.2082 0.1257 0.181 0.0585 0.106 14.5343 0.1438
t value 0.17 -1.44 2.77 3.17 -0.71 -1.33 -2.64 -1.51 0.78 -1.05 -0.68
P value 0.8695 0.162 0.0103 0.0043 0.4825 0.1967 0.0146 0.1449 0.4425 0.3054 0.5011
ITALY            
 0.258897 -1.70538 6.217453 -4.05023 -0.16679 -0.3837 -0.6660 -0.13297 0.772416 3.068685 -0.38052
Std.Error 0.1915 1.353 2.4284 3.0243 0.1057 0.1014 0.1182 0.0842 0.3365 12.1542 1.1703
t value 1.35 -1.26 2.56 -1.34 -1.58 -3.79 -5.63 -1.58 2.3 0.25 -0.33
P value 0.188 0.2187 0.0166 0.1936 0.1282 0.001 <.0001 0.1278 0.0311 0.803 0.7481
NETHERLANDS           
 0.214548 -15.9312 3.165688 0.931465 -0.05602 -0.0785 -0.1428 -0.53181 0.259202 11.13514 -1.02063
Std.Error 0.0399 2.2364 0.7148 1.70E+00 0.1482 0.125 0.1652 0.1106 0.1159 6.1282 0.4546
t value 5.37 -7.12 4.43 0.55 -0.38 -0.63 -0.86 -4.81 2.24 1.82 -2.25
P value <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 0.5893 0.7088 0.5359 0.3962 <.0001 0.0353 0.0829 0.0351
PORTUGAL           
 0.061974 -0.49267 2.123735 9.831342 -0.82518 -0.3983 -0.5553 -0.0163 2.818814 28.22511 -2.08436
Std.Error 0.3752 0.6929 0.9216 1.1539 0.1411 0.1859 0.22 0.0439 0.5341 13.1882 0.9531
t value 0.17 -0.71 2.3 8.52 -5.85 -2.14 -2.52 -0.37 5.28 2.14 -2.19
P value 0.8701 0.4834 0.0294 <.0001 <.0001 0.043 0.0189 0.7139 <.0001 0.0437 0.0397
SPAIN            
 0.01593 -1.11688 4.16961 3.219435 -0.67085 -0.4333 -0.3938 -0.00958 0.103305 19.696 -1.49476
Std.Error 0.6847 0.6556 0.7718 1.205 0.132 0.0976 0.1426 0.0231 0.0795 16.9074 2.3797
t value 0.02 -1.7 5.4 2.67 -5.08 -4.44 -2.76 -0.41 1.3 1.16 -0.63
P value 0.9816 0.1004 <.0001 0.0136 <.0001 0.0002 0.0111 0.6825 0.2066 0.2565 0.5364
UK            
 0.059278 -0.03864 3.440705 15.67308 -1.38035 -0.3813 -0.3901 -0.34676 0.210594 -10.8812 -1.3505
Std.Error 0.1553 0.3072 0.9749 2.4679 0.2941 0.0878 0.1327 0.1251 0.1091 8.1664 1.0152
t value 0.38 -0.13 3.53 6.35 -4.69 -4.34 -2.94 -2.77 1.93 -1.33 -1.33
P value 0.7058 0.9009 0.0016 <.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0074 0.0109 0.066 0.1964 0.1971
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OATS lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt mref aref  lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
IRELAND  
 0.465648 0.087711 4.284882 -0.00452 -1.44135 8.307715 0.617634 -0.18412 -2.2781 -0.18949 -0.23916
Std.Error 0.9181 0.2612 1.7198 0.2301 1.9892 6.8628 0.8096 0.5127 0.9011 0.2515 0.3931
t value 0.51 0.34 2.49 -0.02 -0.72 1.21 0.76 -0.36 -2.53 -0.75 -0.61
P value 0.6171 0.7402 0.0208 0.9845 0.4767 0.2395 0.454 0.7231 0.0196 0.4595 0.5494
ITALY            
 2.69872 0.218631 0.457386 -1.40456 2.4779 10.43738 0.602435 0.085568 -0.65259 -0.12354 -1.37396
Std.Error 1.6377 0.2919 1.7444 1.4043 1.5069 3.8819 0.5617 0.3539 0.2187 0.1762 0.3287
t value 1.65 0.75 0.26 -1 1.64 2.69 1.07 0.24 -2.98 -0.7 -4.18
P value 0.1136 0.4618 0.7956 0.3281 0.1143 0.0137 0.2957 0.8113 0.0066 0.491 0.0004
NETHERLANDS           
 1.012971 2.181332 1.317752 -0.68877 -1.08235 -5.84373 0.912665 -0.63613 -0.20905 -1.96687 -0.40511
Std.Error 0.6479 1.6037 0.9798 0.3388 0.5605 6.6088 0.5642 0.4302 0.0546 0.8217 0.36
t value 1.56 1.36 1.34 -2.03 -1.93 -0.88 1.62 -1.48 -3.83 -2.39 -1.13
P value 0.1322 0.1876 0.1923 0.0543 0.0665 0.3866 0.1207 0.1541 0.0009 0.0242 0.2732
PORTUGAL           
 1.319086 1.9432 0.605606 -3.94796 -1.62236 -9.3685 1.618094 1.116026 -0.91681 -0.02687 -0.1628
Std.Error 1.6704 0.565 0.9128 2.0741 0.9603 16.2817 1.1702 0.9099 1.6005 0.4969 0.0874
t value 0.79 3.44 0.66 -1.9 -1.69 -0.58 1.38 1.23 -0.57 -0.05 -1.86
P value 0.4381 0.0023 0.5139 0.0701 0.1059 0.5711 0.1806 0.2336 0.5728 0.9574 0.0755
SPAIN            
 0.047527 0.078249 3.021536 -0.2567 -0.42748 -54.4403 4.671755 1.70179 -0.47718 -0.26237 -0.80833
Std.Error 1.5511 0.3888 0.7008 1.0161 1.9923 11.0617 1.7229 1.0327 0.0992 0.5176 0.2214
t value 0.03 0.2 4.31 -0.25 -0.21 -4.92 2.71 1.65 -4.81 -0.51 -3.65
P value 0.9758 0.8424 0.0003 0.8029 0.8321 <.0001 0.0131 0.1142 <.0001 0.6175 0.0013
UK            
 1.550737 0.109121 2.362155 -2.76026 -1.96687 19.81181 3.714641 -0.45836 -1.04525 -0.26967 -1.45326
Std.Error 0.6521 0.1734 0.4783 1.344 0.8217 8.6312 1.122 0.7142 1.5059 0.3615 0.5881
t value 2.38 0.63 4.94 -2.05 -2.39 2.3 3.31 -0.64 -0.69 -0.75 -2.47
P value 0.0265 0.5356 <.0001 0.0521 0.0242 0.0321 0.0032 0.5279 0.4952 0.4639 0.0221
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OATS aref lngdp  lndmpr Lnprodr mref aref lngdp 
 d7 d8 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
IRELAND         
 -0.70297 0.45997 -0.00154 0.247983 5.003864 -0.0243 -0.06082 0.047954
Std.Error 0.2884 0.7044 0.0307 1.424 0.9547 0.0905 0.1615 0.0653
t value -2.44 0.65 -0.05 0.17 5.24 -0.27 -0.38 0.73
P value 0.0237 0.5209 0.9606 0.8634 <.0001 0.7908 0.71 0.4699
ITALY         
 -0.43212 0.466346 6.43926 0.247355 0.075311 -0.05823 -0.07492 0.038176
Std.Error 0.1967 0.4467 0.6092 0.1112 0.073 0.0255 0.0515 0.055
t value -2.2 1.04 10.57 2.22 1.03 -2.29 -1.46 0.69
P value 0.0394 0.3083 <.0001 0.0362 0.3127 0.0319 0.159 0.4948
NETHERLANDS         
 -0.16372 0.964693 20.19869 0.473042 1.106177 -0.10301 -0.0732 0.236665
Std.Error 0.6224 0.6313 3.2775 0.3737 0.7232 0.2859 0.4235 0.2855
t value -0.26 1.53 6.16 1.27 1.53 -0.36 -0.17 0.83
P value 0.7951 0.1414 <.0001 0.2183 0.141 0.7219 0.8643 0.4165
PORTUGAL         
 -0.0203 0.20785 10.83555 1.787617 0.032972 -0.41004 -0.45047 0.169258
Std.Error 0.4605 0.6834 2.2453 0.8652 0.1137 0.2515 0.3338 0.573
t value -0.04 0.3 4.83 2.07 0.29 -1.63 -1.35 0.3
P value 0.9653 0.764 <.0001 0.0514 0.7744 0.1166 0.1903 0.7706
SPAIN         
 -0.11712 2.094984 -0.93379 6.210954 0.093927 -0.46083 -0.17761 0.085065
Std.Error 0.1591 0.6206 0.2351 1.4234 0.0785 0.1739 0.2784 0.1299
t value -0.74 3.38 -3.97 4.36 1.2 -2.65 -0.64 0.66
P value 0.469 0.0029 0.0006 0.0002 0.2436 0.0143 0.5298 0.5189
UK         
 -1.0504 0.582596 10.51731 2.194572 0.103835 -0.00443 -0.02452 1.329345
Std.Error 0.9356 1.0333 0.5609 1.5442 0.104 0.0684 0.0221 1.1696
t value -1.12 0.56 18.75 1.42 1 -0.06 -1.11 1.14
P value 0.2742 0.5789 <.0001 0.1699 0.3285 0.9489 0.2779 0.2685
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Table A1.5: Results from the Regression for Maize: 
CORN  lndmpr (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp  lndmpr 
 a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
AUSTRIA            
 0.45482 -1.46007 1.639112 0.151771 -0.22783 -0.3019 -0.4499 -0.19304 0.421112 0.830021 -24.0806
Std.Error 0.2727 0.3706 0.5857 0.1288 0.0933 0.0831 0.1102 0.038 0.0622 0.9625 10.6263
t value 1.67 -3.94 2.8 1.18 -2.44 -3.63 -4.08 -5.08 6.77 0.86 -2.27
P value 0.1073 0.0005 0.0095 0.2511 0.0227 0.0014 0.0005 <.0001 <.0001 0.3978 0.0336
BELGIUM            
 -0.11433 -1.36387 8.012914 0.00221 -0.02803 -0.5493 -0.845 -2.94985 0.411703 8.015275 -2.68435
Std.Error 0.6736 0.461 1.6028 0.0655 0.0604 0.1084 0.1582 1.4227 0.1068 22.9148 2.1052
t value -0.17 -2.96 5 0.03 -0.46 -5.07 -5.34 -2.07 3.85 0.35 -1.28
P value 0.8665 0.0065 <.0001 0.9734 0.6469 <.0001 <.0001 0.0495 0.0008 0.7298 0.2156
DENMARK            
 1.179724 -1.90705 7.990778 0.078179 0.101166 -0.3553 -0.7118 -1.34285 0.354751 3.772068 -1.14537
Std.Error 0.4985 1.5344 2.2227 0.0504 0.0522 0.0976 0.1296 1.5958 0.1238 17.5295 1.5051
t value 2.37 -1.24 3.6 1.55 1.94 -3.64 -5.49 -0.84 2.86 0.22 -0.76
P value 0.0257 0.225 0.0013 0.1346 0.065 0.0014 <.0001 0.4087 0.0088 0.8316 0.4547
FRANCE            
 2.429117 -1.13075 6.877499 1.586381 -0.95706 -0.2615 -0.5059 -0.39867 0.284123 0.045189 -0.46473
Std.Error 1.5772 0.2628 3.0696 3.2669 1.7961 0.0993 0.1185 0.0908 0.1071 0.0564 0.38
t value 1.54 -4.3 2.24 0.49 -0.53 -2.63 -4.27 -4.39 2.65 0.8 -1.22
P value 0.1356 0.0002 0.0338 0.6319 0.5993 0.0148 0.0003 0.0002 0.0142 0.4319 0.2343
GERMANY            
 -0.36872 -1.36983 10.29274 0.112514 -0.11088 -0.3814 -0.5319 -0.16984 0.398472 0.054517 -0.24966
Std.Error 1.4792 0.3186 2.7461 0.3144 0.2259 0.1086 0.1395 0.0808 0.0916 0.0407 0.434
t value -0.25 -4.3 3.75 0.36 -0.49 -3.51 -3.81 -2.1 4.35 1.34 -0.58
P value 0.8051 0.0002 0.0009 0.7237 0.6281 0.0019 0.0009 0.0466 0.0002 0.194 0.571
GREECE            
 0.191539 -5.22831 15.36247 12.41648 -0.11411 -0.5759 -0.9699 -0.26624 -0.837 2.408056 -24.4435
Std.Error 0.1249 1.1744 2.0644 3.1912 0.4746 0.2565 0.3731 0.1331 0.2801 2.2205 18.1396
t value 1.53 -4.45 7.44 3.89 -0.24 -2.25 -2.6 -2 -2.99 1.08 -1.35
P value 0.1372 0.0001 <.0001 0.0007 0.8121 0.0347 0.016 0.0574 0.0066 0.2899 0.1915
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CORN lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt mref aref  lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
AUSTRIA            
 3.713757 2.120771 1.872163 -0.31575 -1.35986 13.89638 1.189414 -0.0574 -1.95797 -0.34926 -1.66383
Std.Error 1.2788 1.0719 1.7623 1.9303 0.5576 20.9259 0.2645 0.0438 4.0298 0.5135 1.1795
t value 2.9 1.98 1.06 -0.16 -2.44 0.66 4.5 -1.31 -0.49 -0.68 -1.41
P value 0.0082 0.06 0.2996 0.8716 0.0233 0.5139 0.0002 0.2039 0.6321 0.5039 0.173
BELGIUM            
 0.075993 0.076547 1.716316 -0.55934 -3.17964 11.23575 0.660918 0.194696 -0.0504 -0.64293 0.435283
Std.Error 0.6628 0.3016 2.8989 1.1086 1.1844 7.2161 0.5376 0.4446 0.0487 0.3732 0.3803
t value 0.11 0.25 0.59 -0.5 -2.68 1.56 1.23 0.44 -1.03 -1.72 1.14
P value 0.9098 0.802 0.5598 0.6189 0.0135 0.1344 0.2325 0.6659 0.3118 0.0996 0.2653
DENMARK            
 0.155678 0.093781 5.141906 0.352617 -0.60122 0.511526 27.1891 -0.15652 -0.35187 -0.1378 -1.78482
Std.Error 2.1048 0.2261 2.2716 0.7822 1.1358 0.6298 5.7184 0.4327 0.7842 0.1526 0.2886
t value 0.07 0.41 2.26 0.45 -0.53 0.81 4.75 -0.36 -0.45 -0.9 -6.18
P value 0.9417 0.6823 0.0338 0.6565 0.6019 0.4258 0.0001 0.7211 0.6583 0.3767 <.0001 
FRANCE            
 1.114727 7.640804 1.294038 -0.29331 0.989621 15.04535 0.782961 -0.41738 -0.72177 -0.4535 -0.80395
Std.Error 0.2911 4.2761 0.6238 0.2074 0.5938 3.5955 0.4307 0.2839 0.1778 0.0735 0.2265
t value 3.83 1.79 2.07 -1.41 1.67 4.18 1.82 -1.47 -4.06 -6.17 -3.55
P value 0.0009 0.0877 0.0499 0.1713 0.1098 0.0004 0.0834 0.1564 0.0006 <.0001 0.0017
GERMANY            
 0.21129 7.962898 2.006617 -4.4726 -0.39591 17.31335 1.394562 0.053498 -0.70145 -0.01861 0.164604
Std.Error 0.334 3.5135 0.6401 1.8309 0.1707 3.1958 0.4734 0.1593 0.4061 0.0448 0.1271
t value 0.63 2.27 3.13 -2.44 -2.32 5.42 2.95 0.34 -1.73 -0.42 1.29
P value 0.5335 0.0336 0.0048 0.0231 0.0301 <.0001 0.0077 0.7403 0.0988 0.6821 0.2095
GREECE            
 0.288242 0.852742 5.759646 -2.20667 -3.40223 24.04244 1.343863 -0.9687 -0.1289 -0.52076 1.126379
Std.Error 1.5545 0.1982 2.1238 1.0554 1.427 9.4427 1.0024 0.7217 0.0949 0.2408 0.5001
t value 0.19 4.3 2.71 -2.09 -2.38 2.55 1.34 -1.34 -1.36 -2.16 2.25
P value 0.8546 0.0003 0.0127 0.0483 0.0262 0.0188 0.1943 0.1939 0.1873 0.0423 0.0351
(Table Continued) 
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CORN aref lngdp  lndmpr lnprodr mref aref lngdp 
 d7 d8 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
AUSTRIA         
 -1.71324 1.789368 0.079989 3.904274 0.064059 -0.17772 -0.03105 0.207522
Std.Error 1.671 1.5883 0.1727 0.8351 0.05 0.1277 0.2014 0.1256
t value -1.03 1.13 0.46 4.68 1.28 -1.39 -0.15 1.65
P value 0.3169 0.2726 0.6476 0.0001 0.2125 0.1773 0.8788 0.112
BELGIUM         
 -0.06905 0.338171 0.078007 0.680482 1.29086 -0.88149 -5.24946 0.835511
Std.Error 0.1751 0.4859 0.0916 0.2574 0.3734 0.3284 2.2161 0.2353
t value -0.39 0.7 0.85 2.64 3.46 -2.68 -2.37 3.55
P value 0.6972 0.494 0.403 0.0145 0.0021 0.0132 0.0266 0.0017
DENMARK         
 -0.12178 0.872342 1.787003 12.58987 0.583886 1.249356 -1.8924 1.340928
Std.Error 0.2069 0.3246 1.3213 6.436 0.3626 0.7647 0.7318 1.3432
t value -0.59 2.69 1.35 1.96 1.61 1.63 -2.59 1
P value 0.5623 0.0138 0.1894 0.0627 0.121 0.1159 0.0165 0.3285
FRANCE         
 -0.54263 0.503286 0.241038 6.456707 0.107133 0.134887 -0.16324 0.170022
Std.Error 0.1432 0.2562 0.2017 1.2342 0.0665 0.1128 0.1936 0.1118
t value -3.79 1.96 1.2 5.23 1.61 1.2 -0.84 1.52
P value 0.0011 0.0628 0.2442 <.0001 0.1209 0.2438 0.4077 0.142
GERMANY         
 -0.56598 0.38768 -5.39714 0.573861 0.114752 0.17708 -0.11915 0.839598
Std.Error 0.1743 0.1726 1.7194 0.2597 0.0653 0.1826 0.2562 0.1732
t value -3.25 2.25 -3.14 2.21 1.76 0.97 -0.47 4.85
P value 0.0039 0.0356 0.0046 0.0373 0.0923 0.3422 0.6463 <.0001 
GREECE         
 -0.63416 1.99455 3.015843 0.279933 0.013574 -0.84646 -0.98047 0.424655
Std.Error 0.6204 0.6307 3.232 0.1412 0.1329 0.2234 0.3691 0.2349
t value -1.02 3.16 0.93 1.98 0.1 -3.79 -2.66 1.81
P value 0.3183 0.0047 0.3605 0.0595 0.9196 0.0009 0.0141 0.0838
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CORN  lndmpr (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp lnconp mref aref lnopstk lngdp  lndmpr 
 a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 c1 c2 
IRELAND            
 2.433091 -15.4992 2.312826 5.144763 -0.10783 -0.3198 -0.5977 -5.55487 0.096067 0.971375 -7.13851
Std.Error 0.5672 3.7963 0.8221 1.2314 0.113 0.1256 0.2318 4.1784 0.0904 1.3331 13.1199
t value 4.29 -4.08 2.81 4.18 -0.95 -2.55 -2.58 -1.33 1.06 0.73 -0.54
P value 0.0002 0.0004 0.0092 0.0004 0.3501 0.018 0.0168 0.1967 0.2988 0.4739 0.5918
ITALY            
 10.60493 -2.06657 0.346475 0.082304 -0.0261 -0.5861 -0.8022 0.230625 0.296123 -3.31669 -17.4387
Std.Error 2.1569 1.0701 0.1558 0.0615 0.1219 0.1444 0.212 0.19 0.3321 1.9324 5.476
t value 4.92 -1.93 2.22 1.34 -0.21 -4.06 -3.78 1.21 0.89 -1.72 -3.18
P value <.0001 0.0644 0.035 0.1941 0.8323 0.0005 0.001 0.2372 0.3818 0.1002 0.0043
N.LANDS            
 1.59193 0.708372 0.178698 0.071047 -0.16227 -0.3966 -0.6705 0.248513 0.360779 0.022232 -1.26558
Std.Error 0.8603 0.1772 0.1125 2.7305 0.1517 0.0994 0.1504 0.1899 0.126 0.0444 0.4037
t value 1.85 4 1.59 0.03 -1.07 -3.99 -4.46 1.31 2.86 0.5 -3.13
P value 0.0757 0.0005 0.1243 0.9795 0.2958 0.0006 0.0002 0.2037 0.0088 0.6213 0.0048
PORTUGAL            
 1.581518 -9.00786 7.450312 0.038688 -5.6676 -0.4179 -0.6859 -10.549 0.341407 14.17618 -6.42583
Std.Error 0.2341 6.3279 3.4927 0.1686 1.9494 0.2018 0.2569 3.6788 0.0789 14.753 2.0889
t value 6.76 -1.42 2.13 0.23 -2.91 -2.07 -2.67 -2.87 4.33 0.96 -3.08
P value <.0001 0.1665 0.0425 0.8205 0.0084 0.0497 0.0137 0.0087 0.0002 0.347 0.0055
SPAIN            
 -4.39258 -0.77857 14.67837 1.515186 -0.03541 -0.4130 -0.6469 -0.07104 0.044751 50.97114 -4.34519
Std.Error 3.77 0.5227 6.9973 2.7502 0.2362 0.1545 0.2245 0.1149 0.0526 20.8273 2.7085
t value -1.17 -1.49 2.1 0.55 -0.15 -2.67 -2.88 -0.62 0.85 2.45 -1.6
P value 0.2545 0.1484 0.0458 0.587 0.8821 0.0135 0.0084 0.5426 0.4035 0.0228 0.1229
UK            
 -3.73438 -2.17817 2.032482 0.10521 -0.26332 -0.3094 -0.4530 -0.00946 7.399764 8.667626 -0.64358
Std.Error 2.526 0.461 0.4409 0.0629 0.225 0.1176 0.1761 0.1722 2.5794 11.1045 0.9214
t value -1.48 -4.72 4.61 1.67 -1.17 -2.63 -2.57 -0.05 2.87 0.78 -0.7
P value 0.1513 <.0001 <.0001 0.1081 0.2539 0.0149 0.017 0.9567 0.0087 0.4434 0.4922
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CORN lnworldp lnexpr lnexrt mref aref  lndmpr lnworldp lnexrt lnimpl mref 
 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 
IRELAND            
 0.213339 1.982231 3.213364 0.101872 3.213364 0.379125 5.228131 -0.43902 -0.44097 0.042503 0.162026
Std.Error 1.0608 0.5651 0.9547 0.1828 0.9547 0.2271 3.0039 0.3121 0.4183 0.0818 0.1855
t value 0.2 3.51 3.37 0.56 3.37 1.67 1.74 -1.41 -1.05 0.52 0.87
P value 0.8425 0.002 0.0028 0.583 0.0028 0.1099 0.0964 0.1741 0.3038 0.6089 0.3924
ITALY            
 0.931623 0.014718 3.882495 -0.32454 -0.12366 0.16858 19.20911 0.248919 -1.13039 0.017269 0.041681
Std.Error 0.4554 0.0758 0.6641 0.3238 0.4488 0.6341 5.7957 0.4699 0.82 0.1703 0.3646
t value 2.05 0.19 5.85 -1 -0.28 0.27 3.31 0.53 -1.38 0.1 0.11
P value 0.0529 0.8478 <.0001 0.3271 0.7855 0.7929 0.0033 0.6019 0.1826 0.9202 0.9101
N.LANDS            
 1.017284 17.2986 2.070262 -0.28141 -0.29452 0.102364 19.42448 -0.15321 -0.87358 -0.4263 -0.0831
Std.Error 0.2916 3.9419 0.4851 0.1911 0.1979 0.517 2.3503 0.1371 0.3427 0.1631 0.1061
t value 3.49 4.39 4.27 -1.47 -1.49 0.2 8.26 -1.12 -2.55 -2.61 -0.78
P value 0.0021 0.0002 0.0003 0.1551 0.1509 0.845 <.0001 0.2764 0.0187 0.0162 0.4423
PORTUGAL            
 1.401376 0.645514 0.088209 -0.98736 -1.54918 5.139921 1.532221 -0.1289 -0.4067 -0.03896 0.86146
Std.Error 1.3472 0.1763 0.1974 0.9343 1.1286 3.6309 0.4638 0.0949 0.1414 0.0763 0.2175
t value 1.04 3.66 0.45 -1.06 -1.37 1.42 3.3 -1.36 -2.88 -0.51 3.96
P value 0.3095 0.0014 0.6593 0.3021 0.1837 0.1715 0.0034 0.1873 0.009 0.6148 0.0007
SPAIN            
 1.821929 0.010698 0.941858 -1.38095 -0.23152 0.835441 1.136444 -0.0855 -9.76222 -0.03082 0.097134
Std.Error 0.5983 0.2863 1.0168 2.6557 1.6408 0.4993 0.6944 0.1738 5.8321 0.1578 0.3086
t value 3.05 0.04 0.93 -0.52 -0.14 1.67 1.64 -0.49 -1.67 -0.2 0.31
P value 0.0059 0.9705 0.3643 0.6083 0.8891 0.1091 0.1166 0.6277 0.109 0.8471 0.7561
UK            
 0.25137 0.082211 1.947218 -1.57805 -0.58762 0.304337 9.208027 -0.4408 -0.77426 -0.0252 0.137433
Std.Error 1.1989 0.1523 0.676 0.5355 1.9303 0.1435 1.7974 0.1977 0.3593 0.0563 0.1077
t value 0.21 0.54 2.88 -2.95 -0.3 2.12 5.12 -2.23 -2.16 -0.45 1.28
P value 0.8359 0.5946 0.0087 0.0075 0.7637 0.046 <.0001 0.0368 0.0429 0.6587 0.2157
(Table Continued) 
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CORN aref lngdp  lndmpr lnprodr mref aref lngdp 
 d7 d8 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 
IRELAND         
 -0.2423 0.715801 -3.60547 30.12424 7.968518 -1.29127 -0.2696 0.142194
Std.Error 0.0984 0.295 1.2055 7.778 0.6088 0.777 0.3314 1.4287
t value -2.46 2.43 -2.99 3.87 13.09 -1.66 -0.81 0.1
P value 0.0225 0.0243 0.0065 0.0008 <.0001 0.1101 0.4241 0.9216
ITALY         
 -0.4851 0.461984 -0.3413 29.48467 0.210127 -0.041 -0.59887 0.072866
Std.Error 0.1914 0.4822 0.4611 5.7788 0.0885 0.0437 0.201 0.055
t value -2.53 0.96 -0.74 5.1 2.37 -0.94 -2.98 1.32
P value 0.0193 0.3489 0.4666 <.0001 0.0264 0.3567 0.0067 0.1983
N.LANDS         
 -0.05508 0.069647 -0.12996 6.264693 7.401843 -0.4306 -0.153 5.576106
Std.Error 0.1736 1.4573 0.111 0.615 1.0167 0.9183 0.2385 0.8166
t value -0.32 0.05 -1.17 10.19 7.28 -0.47 -0.64 6.83
P value 0.7542 0.9623 0.2538 <.0001 <.0001 0.6435 0.5275 <.0001 
PORTUGAL         
 1.282534 1.114379 -2.15756 3.897915 0.363224 -0.0288 -0.11861 0.141159
Std.Error 0.2434 0.4005 0.6929 1.2682 0.9634 0.075 0.1207 0.0583
t value 5.27 2.78 -3.11 3.07 0.38 -0.38 -0.98 2.42
P value <.0001 0.0112 0.0049 0.0054 0.7099 0.7044 0.3361 0.0238
SPAIN         
 0.634218 1.830064 -0.27465 0.434903 0.044615 -0.56272 -0.64378 0.465059
Std.Error 0.4359 0.7522 0.0818 0.1904 0.2809 0.1635 0.2972 0.111
t value 1.46 2.43 -3.36 2.28 0.16 -3.44 -2.17 4.19
P value 0.1604 0.024 0.0027 0.0329 0.8753 0.0022 0.0409 0.0004
UK         
 0.229 0.078859 -38.4882 4.446464 1.024293 -0.47034 -1.40002 2.979343
Std.Error 0.1523 0.0954 9.3696 1.49 1.0898 0.937 1.5633 0.7289
t value 1.5 0.83 -4.11 2.98 0.94 -0.5 -0.9 4.09
P value 0.1475 0.4176 0.0004 0.0066 0.358 0.6205 0.3798 0.0005
 
 
APPENDIX 2: DEFINITIONS OF COEFFICIENTS AND VARIABLES 
 
Coefficient Variable Definition 
a1 Intercept  
a2 Lndmpr Domestic Price 
a3 (lnprod+lnimpq)/lnconp Ratio of Apparent production to Apparent consumption  
b1 Intercept  
b2 Lnconp Consumption 
b3 Mref 
Dummy Variable capturing the effect of Mac Sharry 
Reforms 
b4 Aref 
Dummy Variable capturing the effect of Agenda 2000 
Reforms 
b5 Lnopstk Opening Stocks 
b6 Lngdp Gross Domestic Product 
c1 Intercept  
c2 Lndmpr Domestic Price 
c3 Lnworldp World Price 
c4 Lnexpr Export Refund 
c5 Lnexrt Exchange Rates 
c6 Mref 
Dummy Variable capturing the effect of Mac Sharry 
Reforms 
c7 Aref 
Dummy Variable capturing the effect of Agenda 2000 
Reforms 
d1 Intercept  
d2 Lndmpr Domestic Price 
d3 Lnworldp World Price 
d4 Lnexrt Exchange Rates 
d5 Lnimpl Import Levies 
d6 Mref 
Dummy Variable capturing the effect of Mac Sharry 
Reforms 
d7 Aref 
Dummy Variable capturing the effect of Agenda 2000 
Reforms 
d8 Lngdp Gross Domestic Product 
e1 Intercept  
e2 Lndmpr Domestic Price 
e3 Lnprodr Production Refunds 
e4 Mref 
Dummy Variable capturing the effect of Mac Sharry 
Reforms 
e5 Aref 
Dummy Variable capturing the effect of Agenda 2000 
Reforms 
e6 Lngdp Gross Domestic Product 
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